orientation. Khvylovy considered that Ukrainian literature should go 665
its own way and look towards Western Europe, no matter whether 186
bourgeois or proletarian. Shumsky advocated that the Ukrainian Communist Party should be independent of the Russian Communist Party.

This crisis within the Ukrainian Communist Party* prompted the 661
Moscow Bolshevik leadership in 1926 to make one of Stalin's principal 665
assistants, L. M. Kaganovich, Ukrainian party secretary for a short 186
period during which the first great purge against the nationalist deviation was carried out. Khvylovy was ejected from the party and Shumsky expelled from the territory of the Ukrainian S.S.R. When Khvylovy repented he was given another chance and re-admitted as a party member, but in 1933 he committed suicide after a new campaign against Ukrainian nationalism had been launched.

Admittedly the methods of repression in the Ukraine were comparatively liberal until 1929-30. From that time onwards the oppressive policy of the Soviet State overshadowed in the minds of the Ukrainian nationalists in the U.S.S.R. the contribution which Polish, Rumanian and Czech communists were ready to make for the establishment of a Greater Soviet Ukraine. Many Ukrainian nationalists became convinced
that national unity was less vital to the Ukrainians than cultural and [177]
political freedom, in particular that free intercourse with the West which
Moscow was unwilling to grant.

The Soviet State inflicted many heavy blows on the representatives 668
of the western orientation among the Ukrainians, but never vanquished 661
it entirely. In this struggle Ukrainian nationalism commanded an almost inexhaustible reservoir of resistance forces. Bloodshed and terror seemed incapable of stamping out the longing for spiritual freedom. Almost every year brought the discovery of a new conspiracy, a new series of trials, a new trend in national Ukrainian deviations. In 1929 the G.P.U. discovered the 'Spilka Vyzvolenia Ukrainy', the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine', in 1931 the 'Ukrainian National Centre', in 1933 the 'Ukrainian Military Organization' (UVO).

The offensive by the central Government against the Ukraine's trends [814]
towards a more independent existence was conducted not only in the political sphere but also in the field of culture, where the régime had originally granted some scope to Ukrainian nationalism. One of the main bulwarks of Ukrainian nationalism was the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The history section of the Academy had turned out to be so anti-Bolshevik that it had to be disbanded altogether while its head, Professor Hrushevsky, was exiled to Russia proper. This banishment of the 'great old man' of Ukrainian nationalism from his place of work showed better than anything else that the policy of reconciliation which Moscow had originally pursued in its relation towards Ukrainian nationalism had been but a short-term manœuvre.

*[Cf. category 665, p. 130 --Analyst]

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661 668 423 Political and cultural oppression of Ukrainian nationalism[1] was co-ordinated with a tough fight against the Ukrainian peasant masses opposing the policy of collectivization. Famine, total disorganization of the Ukrainian agriculture and the formation of armed peasant bands were characteristic features of this period. The central Government got the situation in hand by physically annihilating peasant resistance, by making partial concessions on the tempo of collectivization and by thoroughly purging, between 1930 and 1932, the staff of the Ukrainian Peoples' Commissariat for Agriculture of alleged Borotbist wreckers.

THE SKRYPNIK AFFAIR

661 186 665 The Ukrainian crisis in the early thirties culminated in the 'affair Skrypnik', which was the most important single event in Ukrainian history of that period.

After his unsuccessful fight in 1922 as an associate of Rakovsky[2] for a 'Confederation of Soviet Republics' and for the quasi-independence of the Ukraine, Skrypnik in his day-to-day work as Peoples Commissar for the Interior, Justice, and Education tried to save for the Ukraine what could be saved in the way of an autonomous status. One of his main preoccupations was to prevent as far as possible the foundation of all-Union institutions such as the All-Union Agricultural Academy; but he failed.

Skrypnik had been a Marxist since 1897, and a member of the Bolshevik Party since its foundation. After the Revolution he was not just a local Ukrainian figure but became a Vice-Premier in the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nobody could with any shadow of justification denounce Skrypnik as nationalist. Skrypnik, it is true, considered that the central Government should bring proletarian internationalism and justified national aspirations into harmony with each other. 'Our work', he used to say, 'should be organized in such a way as to give the working masses of each nation the possibility of developing its national consciousness as much as possible'.

This conception amounted from an orthodox Bolshevik standpoint to the 'triumph of nationalism over the proletarian revolution' and was bound to get Skrypnik into trouble sooner or later. The men whom Stalin commissioned to liquidate the 'Skrypnik affair' were a Pole, Stanislav Kosior, and a Russian, Pavel Postyshev, first and second secretary respectively of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

The final clash occurred on June 10th, 1933, in Kharkov, when Postyshev and Kosior, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, accused Skrypnik of being an enemy of the State and the actual head of the Ukrainian counter-revolution. At

[1] [Cf. cat. 186, p.p. 130-131 -- Analyst]

[2] [Cf. cat. 642, p.128 -- Analyst]

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that meeting the Ukrainian Communist Party decided that Great Rus- 661
sian chauvinism had ceased to be the main danger in the Ukraine and
that Ukraine nationalism had become enemy number one. The decision 186
constituted an important landmark in the history of the Soviet Ukraine 665
and the prelude to a purge on a tremendous scale.

Skrypnik drew his conclusions from the 'new situation' by committing
suicide less than four weeks after the decisive meeting of the Ukrainian
Communist Party Executive Committee. Skrypnik's disappearance,
whilst affecting the situation in the Ukraine in general, was particularly
important in the field of Ukrainian cultural policy. After Skrypnik's
death Postyshev and Kosior stopped the 'Ukrainization of the
Ukraine', a favourite slogan of Ukrainian communists up to 1933, and
started a determined campaign against 'over-Ukrainization'. 'Fight [563]
against over-Ukrainization' was in reality nothing else than the re-
capture by the Great Russians of some of the positions which had been
lost to the Ukrainians, particularly in the Donets Basin. There is no
doubt that the Ukrainization had been overdone and had actually led
to the imposition of the Ukrainian language on non-Ukrainians,
particularly in the schools.

THE 'GREAT PURGE'

In 1934 and 1935 the party leadership discovered a big terrorist organiza- 661
tion of Borotbists in Kiev and Kharkov, as well as an alleged 'Nation- 665
alist-Trotskyite Bloc'.[6] In 1936 the situation seemed to be more stable 668
in the Ukraine, but 1937 was again a disastrous year for that country. Official Soviet statements claimed that in 1937 Ukrainian nationalism had made particularly extensive efforts to detach the Ukrainian S.S.R. from Russia by plotting with German and Polish fascists. Some of the plots and conspiracies uncovered had nothing to do with Ukrainian nationalism and were simply Ukrainian off-shoots of anti-Stalin currents within the All-Union Communist Party. It is true, however, that the Ukraine suffered much more during the big purge of 1937–38 than any other Soviet Republic. Moreover, the purge went on in the Ukraine after it had been ended on the whole in other parts of the Soviet Union.

The new chain of dramatic incidents started in the Ukraine in the summer of 1937, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Panas Petrovich Lyubchenko, committed suicide in anticipation of his arrest, trial and execution. Lyubchenko had been Prime Minister for three years during which he had made himself conspicuous by his passionate speeches denouncing Hitler's plans of aggression. Lyubchenko was a former Borotbist and thus suspect to the Kremlin. He was charged with having formed a secret Ukrainian fascist party and allying it to the 'right-wing Trotskyite centre'.[7] Lyubchenko's successor, Bondarenko, was arrested

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after two months of office for alleged treasonable contacts with Ukrain-
661 ian separatists. After Bondarenko, Vlas Y. Chubar, a Vice-Premier in
665 the Central Government, became Ukrainian Premier. He was purged
668 in the spring of 1938. Together with the three Prime Ministers, Lyubchenko, Bondarenko and Chubar, a large number of Ukrainian ministers, high officials and party dignitaries were removed from their posts including the party secretaries, Kosior and Postyshev, once so powerful. The purge of the Ukrainian Communist Party was so thorough that of the thirteen members forming the Ukrainian Politbureau in April 1937 not one was left by June 1938. One of the last prominent Ukrainian communists to disappear was Grigory Ivanovich Petrovsky, the President of the Ukrainian S.S.R. There is no evidence of Petrovsky, Kosior or Chubar ever having been sentenced by a court. No public trial of a Ukrainian communist leader seems to have taken place after March 1938 when Grigory Fyodorovich Grinko, Finance Minister of the U.S.S.R. was sentenced to death as a 'Ukrainian nationalist' and 'Polish spy'.

To clear up the situation in the Ukraine, Stalin, early in 1938, appointed two new men to the key positions of that republic. The party secretary of Moscow, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov became first party secretary of the Ukraine and M. A. Burmistenko second secretary. From the point of view of the Kremlin, Burmistenko's appointment was a mistake. He mysteriously vanished during the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine and may even have deserted to the enemy. Khrushchov, on the other hand, was the right man for the job. When taking it over he made a statement extremely characteristic of the entire communist Ukraine policy. He declared that the traitors to party and country would be annihilated to the last man just as Taras Bulba had killed the betrayer of his own people.

[539] The Cossack Ataman, Taras Bulba, the hero of Gogol's famous novel, slew his son, Andriy, who fell in love with a beautiful Polish girl, betrayed his homeland, his Orthodox faith and fought against his own people. Seen through modern eyes, Andriy is but a symbol of Polish, Western and Catholic orientation among the Ukrainians.

Yet Taras Bulba had still another son, Ostap, who represents the daring loyal Cossack fighter bravely enduring all tortures by the Poles who put him to death. The death of Ostap is the prelude to the triumph of Ostap's cause: 120,000 Cossacks appear on the horizon of the Ukraine, a victorious army sweeping away the enemies, the Poles. Taras died in this great struggle but before his death he pronounced a last curse upon the Poles and forecast the final triumph of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar'. 'The time will come', said Taras, 'when there will be no power in the world which will not be conquered by him'.

THE UKRAINE

S.U. 635 186 UK 661 668 665

Stalin and his collaborators see the essence of the Ukrainian problem in the same way as Gogol[1] did by considering it basically as a struggle of Taras against Andriy, the Russian conception of the Ukraine against the Western conception. Krushchov was right in evoking the parallel of Taras Bulba because under the Soviet régime Taras, the faithful watchman in the South of the 'Russian faith' and the 'Russian Czar', once again killed Andriy when he became attracted by the West and ready to desert both faith and 'Czar'.

Krushchov as party secretary went on to kill 'Andriys'. His first victims were leaders of the Ukrainian Communist Youth League who were removed from their posts in December 1938, having been apparently overlooked in previous purges. Khrushchov rarely killed in the physical sense; he rather weeded out all influences and tendencies not in conformity with the narrow views which a Soviet Taras Bulba may have on history, literature, education, etc.

COMINTERN AND 'WESTERN UKRAINE'

SU. 648 563

In all its internal fights against Ukrainian nationalism the Soviet régime never forgot the 'other Ukraine' beyond the frontiers of the Soviet Union. A geopolitical gesture in the summer of 1934 was especially intended for the attention of this 'other Ukraine'. It was the removal of the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev, which was equivalent to the transportation of the centre of gravity of the country from the Eastern Ukraine to the Western Ukrainian areas near the Polish border.

S.U. [361]

Kharkov had been made the capital of the Soviet Ukraine in December 1919, in an attempt to link the administrative centre of the country as far as possible with the labouring masses of the Donets Basin; but Kiev was the historic capital and Ukrainian nationalists, therefore, liked to play up Kiev against Kharkov. This too was checked by the transfer of the capital. An official Soviet commentator said that the removal of the Ukrainian Government to Kiev, which was celebrated with music and dancing, had an 'extraordinary significance' both for the Ukraine and internationally, and that it was a more important event than the transfer of Russia's capital from Petrograd to Moscow after the October Revolution.[8]

S.U. [728] [635]

This latter remark was true in so far as the shifting of the capital constituted a prelude to the annexation by the U.S.S.R. of the Ukrainian territories of Poland.[2] This annexation carried out in 1939, it should be well noted, was by no means a triumph of political strategy but was due to the use of force alone. The failure to win over the population of the Western Ukraine by peaceful means was probably the greatest defeat which the Soviet nationalities policy had suffered on Russia's frontiers.

1 [Cf. category 116, p134, R1 Sov. Union - - Analyst]
2 [Cf. category 116, pp. 136 ff --Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

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S.U. 563 648 208 There was hardly any other territory on the Russian border where the Soviet régime stood such an excellent chance of exploiting social grievances and the discontent of oppressed minorities as in Eastern Poland. Yet the Ukrainians and Byelorussians of Eastern Poland, who according to all logical calculations were bound to become a natural prey to Soviet propaganda, turned away from Russia in protest against compulsory collectivization, political purges and anti-religious propaganda.

UK. 665 668 648 The sympathies which the Soviet Union enjoyed among the poor peasantry of the Western Ukraine in the first years after the October Revolution had almost completely died out by the end of the twenties. Moscow could not even rely on its own 'Communist Party of the Western Ukraine' which frequently took its lead from the anti-Russian 'national deviationists' in the Soviet Ukraine. When the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine split at the beginning of 1928 into 'loyal communists' and Ukrainian nationalists, the latter, led by Vasilkov, had the majority in the Central Committee. The Vasilkov group, said the Comintern organ, *Communist International*, 'was consciously counter-revolutionary and carried out wrecking work and provocations'.[9]

The Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had hardly been reorganized when several party groups again fell victims to Ukrainian anti-Soviet nationalism. In 1935 the official Comintern organ complained about the absence of 'a national liberation struggle on a large scale in both the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia', meaning, of course, a pro-Soviet national liberation struggle.[10]

In 1938 the Comintern journal was forced to admit that the nationalist anti-Soviet organization U.N.D.O., which stood for Ukrainian autonomy inside Poland, was backed by broad masses of the people of the Western Ukraine and that the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine had not succeeded 'in penetrating the organizations of Ukrainian nationalists'. The Western Ukrainian Communist Party finally found itself compelled to exchange its demand for self-determination for a demand for autonomy which had been originally branded as a 'bourgeois counter-revolutionary slogan'.[11]

The full extent of the political defeat suffered by Soviet Russia and Comintern propaganda in the Western Ukraine can be realized if one takes into account the active persecution which the Polish authorities conducted against Ukrainian nationalism, the punitive expeditions which they carried out against recalcitrant Ukrainian villages and the almost total disregard of the Polish Government for the cultural needs of the Polish Ukrainians. All these hardships which the Ukrainians of Poland suffered in the inter-war period were insufficient to promote any major co-operation between them and the Soviet régime.

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S.U. 728

The history of the Western Ukraine between the two wars thus contains abundant evidence that the union of Western Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine had nothing in common with the spontaneous wishes of the populations concerned.

UK 060

The annexation of the Western Ukraine was carried out in three stages. First, 1939 saw the occupation by the Red Army of the Ukrainian territories of Poland with 7,000,000 Ukrainians according to Ukrainian statistics, and 5,000,000 Ukrainians according to Polish statistics. Secondly, 1940 brought the establishment of Soviet Ukrainian rule over 1,000,000 Ukrainians of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia following an ultimatum to Rumania. Finally, in 1945 the union with the Transcarpathian Ukraine was established and 500,000 more Ukrainians were 'liberated'.

S.U. 433 315

The economic importance of the 50,000 square miles which the Soviet Union annexed as 'Western Ukrainian territories' is comparatively slight. The only real assets were the oil and natural gas riches of Eastern Galicia. The Eastern Galician oil-wells were, however, showing clear signs of exhaustion, since their production had sunk from 1,047,000 tons in 1913 to 601,000 tons in 1929 and to 353,000 tons in 1938. Soviet economists thought at first that this decrease was simply due to Polish capitalist inefficiency and predicted that the establishment of the Soviet régime in Eastern Galicia would lead to an increase of the oil production.[12] But in this they seem to have been mistaken, since the oil target figure for 1950 for the whole of the Ukraine was but 325,000 tons. The Soviet régime was more lucky with the natural gas deposits of Dashava than with the oil of Drogobych and Borislav as was shown by the building of a 300-mile-long gas pipeline linking Dashava with Kiev.

S.U. 728

From the geopolitical point of view two of the new Ukrainian territories deserve particular attention: Southern Bessarabia – now the Izmail Province of the Soviet Ukraine – securing Soviet Russia an access to the Danube Delta, thus making her a Danubian power, and the Transcarpathian Ukraine, allowing her to be a factor in the Danubian basin.

TRANSCARPATHIAN UKRAINE

The annexation of Southern Bessarabia simply meant that Russia had recovered one of the territories which she had lost after the October Revolution, but Transcarpathia was a new asset which the Russian Empire had never before possessed.

S.U 721

Militarily, Russia obtained an area south of the Carpathians big enough with its 4,400 square miles for large-scale troop concentrations and an ideal initial basis for operations against a hostile Slovakia or

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

721 Hungary. Transcarpathian Ukraine in the hands of Soviet Russia meant approximately the same in gain of military power that an Italian frontier province beyond the Alps or a Spanish frontier province beyond the Pyrenees would mean for the strategic strengthening of France if she were awarded either of them.

Politically, the Transcarpathian Ukraine constitutes a permanent challenge to the Slovak and Hungarian neighbours, a warning to them that Russia would remain at their doorsteps if they ever wanted to shake off communist rule.

664 When Russia annexed the 'Transcarpathian Ukraine' in July 1945,
728 Soviet propaganda made the point that this annexation fulfilled an
208 urgent desire of the Transcarpathian people to join their 'Ukrainian motherland'. Soviet authorities referred in particular to a petition of the 'First Congress of Peoples Committees' (Soviets) of the Transcarpathian Ukraine demanding the union of the territory with the Ukrainian S.S.R. This Congress which held its meetings guarded by Red Army troops in November 1944, was, however, a self-appointed body just as the 'peoples committees' were self-appointed. Approximately at the time the Congress of Peoples Committees decided to join the Soviet Union, the pro-Soviet Czech Exile Government in London expressed the conviction that 'the Slav people of Transcarpathia desires to be reunited with Czechoslovakia'.[13]

208 After having successfully exploited the slogans 'Union of the Ukrain-
563 ians of both sides of the Carpathians' and the 'longing of the Transcarpathian Ukrainians to join the Ukrainian motherland', the Governments of Moscow and Kiev realized that there was a considerable difference between the so-called Ukrainians of Transcarpathia and Ukrainians from their side of the mountains, not to speak of the Ukrainians of the Eastern Ukraine. The Soviet authorities in dealing with this new Soviet territory became aware that many people in the Transcarpathian Ukraine considered Russian rather than Ukrainian as their written language, showed Russian rather than Ukrainian national consciousness and looked upon the Russian Pushkin rather than the Ukrainian Shevchenko as their greatest national poet. Soviet newspaper reporters soon joyfully recorded the discovery of a village, 'Pushkino', which was advertised as one of the many evidences of 'irresistible and profoundly touching love of everything Russian and of the Russian land' which could be met in the Transcarpathian Ukraine.[14]

563 The truth about Transcarpathian Ukraine is that its Slav inhabitants – there is also a substantial Hungarian minority – have not fully made up their minds whether they are Ukrainians, Russians or something in between the two. This was no secret to anyone familiar with the conditions of the territory, but the Soviet Government, misguided by its own propaganda, ignored it. After discovering the real state of

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affairs, Soviet policy in Transcarpathian Ukraine kept a certain balance between Russian and Ukrainian cultural work in the new province. Russian books and Russian newspapers are now being printed there side by side with Ukrainian ones. S.U. 563

COMMUNISTS AND ANTI-COMMUNISTS IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE

The annexation of the Western Ukraine, whilst increasing on the one hand the might of the Soviet Empire and improving its strategic position, at the same time delayed the internal political consolidation of the Ukrainian S.S.R. UK. 728

Owing to its notable past failures the Communist Party machinery found it difficult to take root among the people of the Western Ukraine – even after its incorporation into the U.S.S.R. In each of the nine Western Ukrainian provinces (six from Poland, two from Rumania and one from Czechoslovakia), the Communist Party could rely only upon a few thousand loyal Bolsheviks. Thus in the large province of Rovno (formerly Polish), the Communist Party early in 1948 had but 6,000 members of whom more than half joined during the war and in the post-war period.[15] In the Transcarpathian Ukraine the party had in December 1946 only 4,000 members, about one-half per cent of the entire population.[16] This figure included not only local communists but also party and state officials who had come to the province in considerable numbers from beyond the Carpathians. UK. 665

Together with a minute number of people who could be considered reliable from the Soviet standpoint, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic in absorbing the new territories took over a large number of people with a Western anti-Soviet outlook, particularly anti-Soviet and anti-Russian intellectuals. This fresh accession of Ukrainian nationalist elements also encouraged the opposition forces in the 'Old Ukraine'. The great prominence of the historic vanguard role of the Western Ukraine in the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound to make itself felt inside the Soviet Ukraine as well. Years of Rumanian and Polish oppression had been unable to obliterate the importance of Western Ukrainian cultural nationalism which had unfolded itself before 1918 under the liberal rule of the Hapsburg monarchy. The Ukrainian nation was, indeed, a recognized political and cultural fact inside the Austrian Empire at a time when Czarist Russia denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation. UK. 668

Lvov in Galicia and Chernovitsy in the Bukovina had been centres of a legal Ukrainian national movement and of an openly professed Ukrainian culture long before Kiev and Kharkov. The Western Ukraine had not known that revolutionary Ukrainian-Russian comradeship-in-arms

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UK. 668 which had existed in Ukraine proper, and the Western Ukrainian, quite understandably, never felt that he owed anything to Russia and to the Russians. This mentality of the Western Ukrainian, who had outspoken leanings towards independence, was bound to create considerable difficulties inside the Soviet Ukraine.

The Soviet Government set itself the task of counteracting the recalcitrant Western Ukrainian spirit and of levelling out the differences existing between the 'liberated Western Ukraine' and the rest of the Ukraine in the cultural, economic and political sphere.

RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE UNIATE CHURCH

UK. 795 S.U. 795 After the liquidation of all openly anti-Bolshevik movements in the Western Ukraine and the annihilation of the 'class enemy' in the form of the bourgeoisie and the 'kulaks', there still remained for subjection to the 'levelling-out process' one important bulwark of Westernism: the Uniate Church with over 3,500,000 followers in Eastern Galicia and several hundred thousand in the Bukovina and the Transcarpathian Ukraine.

The Uniate Church had come into existence at the end of the sixteenth century in the interest and under the influence of the Polish State. As time went on the Uniate Church developed into something more than the artificial creation of a ruling caste. It was, in the end, the true expression of an area which is neither West nor East since the Uniate Church combined Eastern rites with a Western cultural and ecclesiastical orientation symbolized by the recognition of the Roman Pope.

S.U. 175 The struggle between Poland and Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though essentially a political one, was largely conducted under the cloak of religious differences. Russia claimed that her aim was to emancipate the Orthodox population of Eastern Poland from 'temptation and humiliation' by the Poles. To push back the influence of the 'Polish' Roman Catholic Church and to carry out the liquidation of the Uniate Church were thus major objectives which Russia pursued in the three partitions of Poland. The Empress Catherine II proclaimed in 1794 that resistance to the reunion of Uniates and Roman Catholics with the Orthodox Church in the territories conquered from the Poles was a criminal offence; and thus about 2,000,000 Roman Catholics and Uniates were 'persuaded' to embrace the Orthodox Church of their ancestors in the course of a few weeks. A church council of the Uniates held in Polotsk in Byelorussia (White Russia) in 1839 brought 1,500,000 Uniates together with their bishops back into the fold of Orthodoxy. In 1874 the last Uniate diocese of Kholm was abolished and 500,000 Uniates willy-nilly transformed into Orthodox congregations.

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Thus in Russia itself the 'Uniate heresy' was liquidated and it survived UK 795
only in the Ukrainian territories which until 1918 belonged to the S.U.
Austrian Empire and after 1918 to Poland, Czechoslovakia and 795
Rumania. It was only after the final establishment of the Soviet power in Lvov, the see of the Ukrainian Uniate Metropolitan, that the great historical opportunity presented itself of accomplishing the work of Catherine II and Nicholas I with regard to the Uniate Church.

Soviet interference in Ukrainian church affairs proceeded as follows. S.U.
In April 1945 the Metropolitan Slepoy, four bishops and several priests 659
of the Uniate Church, all opponents of Orthodoxy and faithful supporters UK.
of the Pope were arrested as 'accomplices of German occupants'. 659
One month later a 'Central Initiative Group for Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church' was formed and in April 1946 a Synod in Lvov solemnly proclaimed the union of the two churches. Considering the conditions prevailing in Russia the 'initiative group' could not have been set up, nor could the Lvov Synod be summoned without the active support of the Soviet authorities, and particularly of the 'Plenipotentiary for Religious Affairs of the Ukrainian S.S.R.'. The decisions of the Lvov Synod were not accepted by a number of parish priests who despite official pressure refused to abandon the Uniate Church. By January 1948 the resistance, according to official Soviet reports, seemed on the whole to be broken.

The Synod of Lvov was an ecclesiastical event only in name. In reality its decisions constituted a victory of the Russian State over Western tendencies in a frontier territory and the Orthodox Church was nothing but the accidental instrument by the help of which the victory was achieved. The Synod was merely an episode in the repression of the Western influences which after the end of the Second World War challenged Bolshevism in almost every sphere of Ukrainian life.[17]

UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD

Apart from receiving additional strength from the Western Ukraine, UK
Ukrainian nationalism of the war and post-war period derived inspiration 186
from two diametrically opposed sources. On the one hand, Ukrainian nationalism was encouraged under the German occupation. Without granting to the Ukrainian people the slightest shadow of an independent status, the German occupants favoured and consolidated the negative anti-Russian and anti-Jewish features of Ukrainian nationalism.

On the other hand, official Soviet propaganda also gave a fresh impetus to Ukrainian nationalism by allowing some expression to Ukrainian national hero-worship, for instance, by the creation of a war decoration commemorating the popular Ukrainian Cossack Hetman

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186 of the seventeenth century, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. The Kremlin, like Hitler, had no intention of satisfying the essence of Ukrainian national aspirations; all it wanted was to secure a greater degree of Ukrainian co-operation in the war effort, in guerilla fighting and sabotage behind the enemy lines. The Soviet Government could not prevent its war-time emergency measures from being misunderstood and mistaken for some sort of *carte blanche* for future nationalistic deviations.

669 The full extent to which Ukrainian nationalists may have betrayed the Soviet Union during the war with Germany is, of course, impossible [272] to estimate. The Ukrainian Soviet Government indirectly recognized, however, that the militant anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalists must have constituted a fairly considerable body by proclaiming an amnesty in 1944 for the members of the U.P.A., the 'Ukrainian Insurgent Army'. This amnesty is unique in the history of the U.S.S.R. since it applied collectively to an entire group notable for its fanatical hatred of the Soviet régime and its contempt for the Russians.

This amnesty offer was so unusual for Soviet conditions that many U.P.A. members refused to take it seriously. The U.P.A. continued to terrorize the Soviet Ukrainian-Polish-Czechoslovak border areas, and in 1945–47 carried out daring raids deep into Czech and Polish territories. The members of the U.P.A. detachments were often referred to as 'Banderovtsy' after their leader Stephen Bandera.

[728] The 'Banderovtsy' exploited for their ends the fact that a comparatively small strip of land in Eastern Poland which was inhabited by Ukrainians was not included in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the area of Kholm and Hrubeshov. According to the nationalities programme of the Comintern the Kholm area was to be included in the Soviet Ukrainian State. The Ukrainian State President, M. S. Grechukha, in a Supreme Soviet debate on February 7th, 1944, also demanded the incorporation of this 'Ukrainian Far West' into the Ukrainian S.S.R.[18] However, the Soviet central Government apparently found it impossible to convince the Western Allies and even the Polish communists that another slice of Poland should be cut off. Thus the Ukraine was denied its 'Far West' and a repatriation of the Ukrainians of the Polish areas concerned was carried out instead.

The activities of the 'Banderovtsy' found particular support among the peasants of the Ukrainian villages of the Polish border area earmarked for evacuation; for one of the foremost tasks of the U.P.A. detachments was to render the evacuation impossible and to prevent by terrorist acts any Polish colonization on former Ukrainian farmland. It has been asserted that the Banderovtsy enjoyed support from local Ukrainian Soviet authorities in the border areas because of their anti-Polish character. This allegation is difficult to check. It is certain, however, that the U.P.A. detachments could not possibly have maintained themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry.

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themselves so long without assistance from a part of the Soviet Ukrainian peasantry. 000

While the armed struggle of Ukrainian nationalists was confined to 186
a small fringe along the Ukrainian border, the Soviet Government had 814
to face more subtle forms of opposition throughout the Soviet Ukraine. 661
One of the outstanding features of the post-war development in the Ukraine was that the same cultural institutions which in the purges of the thirties had been compelled to change their nationalistic Ukrainian personnel from top to bottom, were again involved in difficulties with the Soviet authorities.

This was particularly true of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and especially of its Institute for Language and Literature and its Institute for History. The former produced in 1945 an *Essay on the History of Ukrainian Literature*, whose authors stressed the dependence of Ukrainian literature on the West and 'concealed that Russian and Ukrainian literatures exercised a mutual fertilizing influence on each other in the course of centuries'.[19]

Even more serious 'nationalist excesses' were committed in the field of history writing. It seems that practically all major historical works which the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences published in 1941–5 contained 'serious mistakes of a nationalistic character'. For several years the party and state authorities did not pay much attention to the works of Ukrainian academicians; but after 1946–7 the leading party organs restarted to analyse Ukrainian historical writings and pointed out that Ukrainian historians had never, in fact, succeeded in overcoming the influence of the nationalistic-bourgeois school of Professor Hrushevsky.[20]

In the light of official Soviet admissions the ideological consolidation of the Ukraine seemed not to have advanced by a single inch since the days when Hrushevsky was still the teacher of the historians and Khvylovy^ the authority for those dealing with problems of Ukrainian literature. Twenty years after Khvylovy's first expulsion from the Communist Party, and fifteen years after his suicide, orthodox Ukrainian Bolsheviks were still haunted by the fear of 'Khvylovy-ist ideas' and were active in opposing them.

The first step in the purge of Ukrainian literature in the post-war 186
period was the replacement of the editorial boards of the three leading 661
Ukrainian literary journals *Vitchizna* (Fatherland), *Dnipro* (Dnieper) 538
and *Radyansky Lviv* (Soviet Lvov). All three journals had been accused of systematically printing nationalist novels and articles. As the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers was obviously responsible for ideological offences committed in literary journals published on Ukrainian territory, the purge had to be extended to this organization as well. The leading personalities of the writers' union, including its president,

^[Cf. cat. 116, pp. 30-31, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
UKRAINE RD1

186 Maxim Rilsky*, were dismissed in November 1946. Rilsky, one of the
661 most outstanding poets of the Soviet Ukraine, was charged with being a
538 'prisoner of bourgeois nationalism'. He had not only 'sinned' in his works but he had also delivered a particularly objectionable lecture, 'Kiev in the history of the Ukraine', in which he 'idealized the old patriarchal order and depicted in rosy idyllic colours the conditions under the rule of landowners and bourgeois'. Together with Rilsky a whole group of Ukrainian writers was accused of nationalism, 'Khvylovy-ism' and reactionary tendencies, including I. Senchenko, Y. Yanovsky and P. Panch.[21]

Maxim Rilsky was replaced as president of the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers by A. Y. Korneichuk, author of a large number of political plays, who had always accurately interpreted the party line and had earned nothing but praise from the supreme Soviet leadership. It was Korneichuk's task to lead Ukrainian literature on the road of strict Soviet Patriotism and 'Socialist Realism'. Indeed, Ukrainian writers, publishing houses and literary journals became more careful and it appeared during a certain period as if Korneichuk had really succeeded in his assignment. The 'Festival of Ukrainian Art and Literature' held in Moscow in June 1951 showed, however, that this was a deception. The festival gave the members of the Bolshevik Politbureau an opportunity of getting a closer look at Ukrainian cultural life. They found that Ukrainian authors and artists had still not overcome their ideological mistakes. Even Korneichuk himself who was expected to give a good example to his fellow-writers had committed a serious offence. He had written a libretto for the opera 'Bogdan Khmelnitsky', which, from the official point of view, was not sufficiently anti-Polish and not eloquent
[626] enough in its pro-Russian bias. Through its mouthpiece, *Pravda*, the Politbureau not only denounced Korneichuk and other writers for ideological distortions but also reprimanded the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party for having neglected the political education of the Ukrainian intellectual élite. The Ukrainian Central Committee, mindful of what had happened to the Ukrainian Communist leaders in the thirties, immediately pledged itself to remedy the situation.[23]

THE UKRAINE AS A FACTOR IN SOVIET 'WORLD POLITICS'

648 After having fulfilled its original mission of bringing all Ukrainian lands
645 into the fold of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Ukraine was given a new task.

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* Rilsky, like most great poets of the Soviet Ukraine, has a 'nationalistic past'. In 1934 he and another poet laureate of the Ukraine, Pavel Tychina, were rebuked for their 'hesitation' in the artistic expression of themes and ideas new to them. Yet another contemporary Ukrainian poet, Mikola Bazhan, who is not only like Tychina a member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet but also a Vice-Premier of the Ukrainian Government, used to be likewise blamed for the 'nationalistic soil in which his creations have been rooted'.[22]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

She was to serve Soviet diplomacy in the wider international arena. UK. 648
The turning point in the mission of the Ukraine came early in 1944 645
with the setting up of a Ukrainian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Ukrainian Foreign Office came into being under the decree of S.U.
February 1st, 1944, providing for the establishment of People's Commis- 635
sariats (later Ministries) for Foreign Affairs in all the sixteen Soviet 648
Republics. It was clear, however, that this decree, despite its general character, had the primary object of giving the Ukraine a new formal status in international affairs. To a much lesser extent this was true regarding Byelorussia, whilst little practical use was made of the foreign offices of the other Soviet Republics.

For a short while the real meaning of the creation of a Ukrainian and of a Byelorussian Foreign Office was not quite clear. At first it looked as if the central Government intended to make a real concession to the two Soviet Republics which had so heavily suffered by the war. The impression was confirmed by a statement of the veteran Ukrainian Bolshevik, Dimitry Manuilsky. Speaking in his capacity as Ukrainian Foreign Minister he announced in 1945 that the Ukrainian S.S.R. was 'ready at any time to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with any country'. Addressing over 400 foreign journalists, at a press conference in San Francisco, Manuilsky added that the Ukrainian Government would 'consider with gratitude any proposals by other States with regard to foreign relations'.[24] Soon after this statement had been made the Kremlin apparently regretted its generous gesture and the Ukraine was not allowed to establish consular and diplomatic missions abroad. A British offer to exchange consular representatives between the United Kingdom and the Ukrainian S.S.R. was turned down.

While the Ukraine is not supposed to have consuls and diplomats she UK.
has been encouraged to send delegates to international conferences [648]
and to the United Nations. These delegates do not defend the interests of even a communist Ukrainian State, but only those of the centralized Soviet Empire. The Ukrainian delegation to the United Nations has frequently been ordered to effect this or that tactical move whenever the delegation of the U.S.S.R. desired to remain in the background.

NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE UKRAINE

During the inter-war period the Ukrainian S.S.R. was still a multi- UK. 563
national State despite the clear preponderance of the Ukrainians. S.U.
National minorities represented about 20 per cent of the total popula- 563
tion of the Ukraine in its pre-war frontiers. With the two most important minorities, Russians and Jews, we are dealing in another context. It suffices to underline with regard to both these minority groups that they acted as a brake on separatist Ukrainian tendencies, thus fulfilling a

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

[Greeks] UKRAINE RD1

[Bulgarians]

UK 563

S.U. 563

useful function from the point of view of the central state authorities.

The smaller minorities such as Bulgars, Greeks and Germans were of little political importance but their survival constituted an interesting reminder that the Ukraine and particularly its southern parts owed a great deal to foreign colonists.

For the non-Ukrainian population of the Ukraine twenty-seven national districts had been called into being, including eight Russian, nine German, one Polish and three each for Bulgars, Greeks and Jews. Besides, there were twelve Czech and three Albanian National Village Soviets.

The events of the war left the Russian minority in the Ukraine more or less untouched but led to the annihilation or considerable reduction in size of most of the other minority groups such as the Germans, Greeks, Jews and Bulgars and only a few remnants of the previous elaborate system of National Districts and National Village Soviets persisted.

1. GREEKS. Most Greeks of the Ukraine had been subject to an enforced exodus similar to that of the German colonists. They had played a remarkable role in colonizing the south-eastern corner of the Ukraine, the area north of the Azov Sea. They had not only established a large number of villages but had also founded the town of Mariupol in 1775. Right up to the beginning of the twentieth century Mariupol still had a considerable number of Greek inhabitants.

Under the Bolshevik régime, Mariupol, one of the big centres of Soviet heavy industry, lost not only its Greek inhabitants but also its Greek name, and in 1948 assumed that of a Russian communist, A. A. Zhdanov, a native of the city.

The All-Union Communist Party tried to educate the 'Soviet Greeks' into reliable Soviet citizens. Although more than half of the 285,000 'Soviet Greeks' lived in the Ukraine, it was considered preferable to concentrate the work of cultural and political enlightenment in the Greek language not on Ukrainian territory but in the city of Rostov-on-Don, within easy reach of both the Greek settlements of the Ukraine and the Greek minority groups scattered in the Northern Caucasus region. Rostov became the headquarters of a Greek communist publishing house from which the Greek language newspaper *Kommunistis* and Greek communist pamphlets were dispatched both to the 'Azov Sea Greeks' and to the Northern Caucasus Greeks.

However, this propaganda seems to have been of little avail since the 'Soviet Greeks' appeared to have been 'unreliable' at the time of the German military advance. Many of them were deported by the Soviet authorities, most probably to Soviet Asia.

2. BULGARIANS. The 'Soviet Greeks' had never been of much use for propaganda intended for Greece proper; their National Districts were created for reasons of administrative convenience only. The Bulgarian

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1 \

[Bulgarians] UKRAINE RD1

[Albanians]
[Poles]

National Districts were a different matter. The most important of these Bulgarian National Districts received the name of Vasil Kolarov, a Bulgarian communist leader, who, after the abortive Bulgarian communist *coup d'état* of 1923, lived as an exile in the Soviet Union. The creation of the 'Kolarov District' in the Dniepropetrovsk Province with the 'capital' Kolarovka was thus a deliberate gesture to stimulate the illegal Communist Party in Bulgaria and to show its supporters that a little Soviet Bulgaria was alive inside the U.S.S.R. even if Bulgarian reaction frustrated the establishment of a Soviet Republic in the real Bulgaria for the time being. UK. 563 S.U. 563

During the German occupation of the Ukraine many Russian Bulgars – they numbered 114,000 in 1939 – were repatriated to Bulgaria. After the end of the war at least a part of these evacuees were brought back to the Soviet Union, but there is no evidence of a survival of the Bulgarian National Districts.

3. ALBANIANS. There has been definite news that the 3,000 Albanians of the Soviet Ukraine have survived the war and have maintained their three Village Soviets in the Azov District of the Melitopol Province. The best evidence that this small minority remained in favour with the authorities was the fact that a fairly comprehensive study of their customs was published after the Second World War.[25] Also at least some of the Czech Village Soviets and collective farms of the Ukraine seem to have remained and their example was used as propaganda for collectivized agriculture in Czechoslovakia proper.

THE 'POLISH POLICY' OF THE UKRAINE

The most important nationality problem for the pre-war Ukraine was the Polish problem, just as the Ukrainian problem was the most serious nationality problem of pre-war Poland. S.U. 162

UK [162]

However unfavourable the drawing of the Soviet-Polish frontiers of 1921 had been from the Ukrainian point of view, 782,334 Poles lived, according to the 1926 census, within the borders of the U.S.S.R., of whom 476,435 were in the Ukraine itself, 97,948 in Byelorussia, and 197,827 dispersed over the R.S.F.S.R. Polish statisticians, and apparently also some Polish communists in Russia, have never accepted this figure, and have asserted that the total number of Poles amounted to 1,500,000.[26]

During the inter-war period Soviet policy considered the 'Soviet Poles' primarily as a potential revolutionary vanguard. The official Soviet view was that however small the Polish minority in the Ukraine, it was its duty to develop a proletarian Polish culture within the U.S.S.R. which could influence the Poles on the other side of the border. This idea was rejected by some prominent Polish communists who thought that the S.U. 563

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

[Poles]

563 Poles of Russia – mainly peasants who had settled in the Ukraine and in Byelorussia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – should choose between assimilation or cultural community with the toiling masses of Poland without having the ambition of playing that 'vanguard role' which Soviet nationalities policy sought to attribute to them.

563 634 Of the various manœuvres for which the Polish minority of the Ukraine was used, the most interesting was the formation of a Polish National District in 1925. This district was situated in a boggy area of Volhynia on the Polish-Ukrainian border. It was named after the Polish communist leader, Marchlewsky, and its little centre, the township of Dovbysh was renamed 'Marchlewsk'.

[648] The most prominent Bolshevik of Polish origin, Feliks Dzerzhinsky, the head of the Cheka, left no doubt that the Polish National District was meant to be a challenge to 'bourgeois Poland' when he wrote to the workers of Dovbysh on March 14th, 1926, 'your work in the small Polish district can have tremendous importance for the cause of liberation of the proletariat and peasants of Poland'.[27]

The National District was not only intended to attract the sympathetic attention of the workers and peasants of Poland but was also designed to show the glaring contradictions between the Polish oppression of minorities and the skilful handling of Russia's own Polish minority problem. The practical importance of the 'Marchlewsky District' was negligible and very few politically-minded Poles of Poland proper heard of its existence. Moreover, the name of Marchlewsky could hardly attract anyone outside the Polish Communist Party. Even inside the
[665] communist camp Marchlewsky was a much discussed figure owing to the complete neglect of the national issue to which he was inclined as a disciple of Rosa Luxemburg. Julian Marchlewsky (1866–1925) was an international revolutionary who worked in the Russian, Swiss, Polish and German revolutionary movements and was even for a short time a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany. His job as 'President of the Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee', a kind of Polish Communist Exile Government set up in 1920, was for him no more than another Comintern assignment. He was also Russian consul in Berlin, rector of the University of the Peoples of the West, president of the M.O.P.R. (International Society for the Assistance of Revolutionaries) at various stages of his career.

Apart from its awkward name the Marchlewsky District was doomed to failure since its thirty Polish villages, which accommodated only 10 per cent of the Ukrainian Poles, could hardly become the centre of a proletarian Polish culture. Even all the 170 Polish Village and Township Soviets in the two Western Soviet Republics put together – 150 in the Ukraine, 20 in Byelorussia – could neither play a creative cultural role nor become a springboard for the conquest of Poland.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

[Poles] Moldavia RE1

The failure of Soviet Russian and Soviet Ukrainian 'Polish minority policy' in the inter-war period could be in particular gauged from the fact that the number of Poles in Russia diminished in thirteen years by almost 20 per cent, numbering 626,905 in 1939. S.U. 563

The real chance for a Polish minority policy in a big way came for Russia in October 1939, when she annexed temporarily 4,794,000 Poles with the drawing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop demarcation line partitioning Poland between Germany and the U.S.S.R. However, the policy of co-operation with Germany, the general anti-Polish mood prevailing in the Soviet Union and especially the strength of Ukrainian nationalism prevented the Soviet Government from putting the 'Leninist solution of the nationalities problem' into practice as far as the Poles were concerned. Discrimination against the Poles was particularly shown by the small number of Polish candidates put up during the first Soviet elections held in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia in October 1939, and by mass evacuations of Poles to the East.

Through the Yalta decisions Russia obtained former Polish territories, including probably more than 3,000,000 Poles, but she showed herself completely unwilling to tackle a Polish minority problem and disposed of it largely through the population exchange agreements which the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Lithuania concluded with Poland. Though not completely liquidated the Polish minority in the Western Russian borderlands ceased to be a serious political problem. S.U. [228]

II. SOVIET MOLDAVIA

MOLDAVIA AS A.S.S.R.

On October 12th, 1924, the All-Ukrainian Executive Committee decided to set up an Autonomous Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic on the left bank of the river Dniester which was then the border between the Soviet Union and Rumania. The new A.S.S.R., the only one which ever formed a part of the Soviet Ukraine, included a number of Moldavian villages, but the great majority of the population was made up of Ukrainians (48·5 per cent), Russians (8·5 per cent) and Jews (8·5 per cent). The Moldavians themselves accounted for as little as 30 per cent of all inhabitants. S.U. 634 648 Mo. [162] [642]

The new republic was so artificial in character that there were no postal, railway and other communications between its northern and southern half, and the newly-appointed government of the Moldavian A.S.S.R., the 'Revkom' (Revolutionary Committee) had to wait two months before it was able to start its job. The foundation of a Soviet Moldavia did not correspond to any internal needs of the Soviet Union, but was dictated by considerations of Soviet foreign policy. By setting up

SU. 634 648 a Moldavian Republic the Soviet Government tried to avenge in a subtle way the annexation of Bessarabia by the Rumanian State. In creating the tiny Moldavian Republic the Soviet Government pursued the immediate objective of influencing internal developments in Bessarabia and bringing the latter at a given moment into the Soviet orbit. Soviet Moldavia's long-term mission consisted in furthering the liquidation of an independent Rumania and in driving a communist wedge into the Balkans.

Mo. 665 The greatest problem for the rulers of Soviet Moldavia was to find Moldavian or at least Moldavian-speaking communists.[1] In 1925 the 500,000 inhabitants of Moldavia included but 600 communists of whom [623] only a few were Moldavians. In the first village council elections, after the proclamation of the Moldavian autonomy, only 9 per cent of the elected candidates were members of the Communist Party. Many of the elected Moldavian village council chairmen were deeply religious [248] peasants devoid of any sympathy for the communist ideology. During a few years the Soviet régime could rightly claim that it had given land to the peasants by distributing the large estates. The collectivization of agriculture, however, made this claim null and void, and the Sovietization of Moldavia's peasantry became then an even harder task for the local communists.

Mo. 661 645 625 In consolidating the Soviet régime in Moldavia in the years following collectivization, the local communists treated the population more harshly than did their comrades in many other parts of the U.S.S.R. For a long time the terror exercised by the communist rulers of Tiraspol, Moldavia's capital in the inter-war period, went on unchecked. Finally, however, the rulers of Moldavia went too far even for Soviet conditions by carrying on with purges in their territory after Stalin had ordered that they should end. So it happened that the N.K.V.D. chiefs of Moldavia were punished for offences which for a long time had been considered as virtues elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. The case of the Moldavian People's Commissar for the Interior, Shiroky, became famous throughout the Soviet Union and even abroad, because he had done the right thing at the wrong moment. In co-operation with five local Soviet police chiefs he had invented a counter-revolutionary Fascist Youth Organization in Moldavia. By using criminal methods, so an official statement of January 1939 asserted, Shiroky and his accomplices extracted confessions from ten Moldavian school teachers to the effect that they had belonged to the imaginary organization.

MOLDAVIA AS A SOVIET REPUBLIC

Su. 635 Mo. 642 A new period in the history of Soviet Moldavia started in the summer of 1940 when the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia. On August 2nd,

[1] [Cf. category 642, p.149--Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Moldavia RE1

S.U. 635 Mo. 642

1940, five weeks after the occupation of Bessarabia by the Red Army, the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Republic was transformed into a Soviet Republic. This republic was created by the amalgamation of North and Central Bessarabia with less than half of the original Autonomous Soviet Moldavia. The greater part of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic – over 1,910 out of 3,200 square miles – was on that occasion re-united with the Ukraine. In carrying out this operation the Soviet Government implicitly admitted the propaganda character of the Moldavian Autonomous Republic as it had existed between the world wars.

Mo 665 369

After the Rumanian re-occupation of Bessarabia during the war, Soviet control over the territory was finally established in 1944. The communist régime had then to start right from the beginning. Again there were hardly any communists in Soviet Moldavia, particularly in the rural areas. The total number of village communists at the beginning of 1945 was but 130 for the whole of Moldavia and thirty-eight for the formerly Rumanian Western Moldavia. The Communist Party therefore, tried to strengthen its position in Moldavia by switching party members from the towns to the villages, and from Eastern to Western Moldavia. In this way 1,000 communists were dispatched to the Moldavian rural districts on special assignment in 1948 alone. In 1949, 80 per cent of the organized communists of Moldavia were still concentrated in towns, which make up only 10 per cent of the entire population of the republic.[28]

SU 635 438 Mo 433

Although seven Soviet Republics have fewer inhabitants than the Moldavian S.S.R. the latter is the least viable of all the so-called 'member states' of the Soviet Union. Soviet Moldavia makes no sense either geographically or ethnically or historically. The economic importance of Soviet Moldavia is similarly negligible. There are no minerals in the Moldavian S.S.R., industrial activity is slight and the only economic assets the country may have for the Soviet Union as a whole are its good potentialities for wine and tobacco cultivation.

S.U. 635 648

From a geopolitical point of view Soviet Moldavia has outlived its mission. The Moldavian A.S.S.R. and later the Moldavian S.S.R. had been created on the assumption of the existence of a hostile Rumania and an anti-Soviet Balkan peninsula. The more communist and the more sovietized Rumania and the Balkans in general became, the less use was there in having a special Moldavian S.S.R. The difference between Moldavians and Rumanians, and between Moldavia and Rumania, is largely, but not altogether, a fiction which Moscow may not want to uphold indefinitely. This distinction makes even less sense, as the Rumanian province situated next to the borders of Soviet Moldavia is also called Moldavia.

Mo 177.81 814

The Soviet régime worked out for the Moldavian Soviet Republic a special conception of history – chiefly, of course, a history of Russian-

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Moldavia RE1

[Gagauz]

1778/814 Moldavian military comradeship-in-arms, political alliances and cultural interdependence throughout the centuries. The main stress is laid on the contacts established between Moldavian rulers and Russian Czars, notably since the fifteenth century, but the friendly character of Moldavian-Ukrainian relations is also underlined. The heroes of Moldavian history as adjusted to the needs of Soviet propaganda are the gallant medieval ruler, Stephen the Great (1457-1504), who defended the Christian Balkans against the onslaught of the Turks, and Dimiter Cantemir, who concluded an alliance with Peter the Great in 1711 and went to St. Petersburg as a refugee when his policy of co-operation with Russia against Turkey miscarried. Both Stephen the Great and Cantemir are not simply figures of the history of the territory forming the Moldavian S.S.R.; they belong to the history of Moldavia as a whole (most of which lies within the boundaries of Rumania proper) and, when all is said and done, to Rumanian history. Nothing can better demonstrate the ideological weakness inherent in the Moldavian S.S.R. than the fact that its history can be nothing but a somewhat contorted Rumanian history.

563 The only conceivable *raison d'être* of a Soviet Moldavia side by side with even a communist Rumania is the strong racial intermixture existing in the Moldavian Soviet Republic and the considerable number of Ukrainians and Russians living there. The Ukrainians, together with the Moldavians, belong to the original population of the country and Ukrainian peasants are scattered over almost the entire republic. Russians live mostly in the towns. The capital of Moldavia, Kishinev, had a predominantly Russian-Jewish character before the Second World War. Finally, the Moldavian S.S.R. together with the adjoining Izmail Province of the Ukraine, the former Southern Bessarabia, have a curious minority problem of their own, the problem of the Gagauz.

The Gagauz, of whom there are 100,000 in the Soviet Union, speak a language which is basically a Turkic one, but they are Christians originally hailing from Bulgaria. Together with thousands of Bulgars proper they fled from Turkish persecution to Bessarabia after 1812. The Gagauz who remained in Bulgaria largely lost their national characteristics, but those in Bessarabia preserved them although they do not possess a literary language. The All-Union Academy of Sciences and the Moldavian Soviet Government have studied the problem of the creation of such a language but in the meantime Gagauz children go to Russian schools.[29]

[555] The most prominent Soviet citizens originating from Soviet Moldavia are not Moldavians but either Slavs or Jews. Among them are Marshal Timoshenko; L. S. Berg, the famous Russian geographer, a former president of the All-Union Geographical Society; the prominent scientist, Professor N. D. Zelinsky; and the great Russian architect, A. V. Shchusev, builder of the Lenin Mausoleum.[30]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
BeloRussia RC1

III. BYELORUSSIA

Be. 101/186 The development of Soviet Byelorussia is essentially a copy of the history of the Soviet Ukraine. In many respects it is a very poor copy. Byelorussia is considerably smaller than the Ukraine, it has no outstanding economic wealth such as the Ukraine has and the national consciousness of the Byelorussian people has crystallized far less than that of the Ukrainians. The Byelorussians, it is true, can boast of an illustrious past and can claim for themselves the Lithuanian State of the Middle Ages, whose most important documents were couched in the Byelorussian language. However, the Byelorussians did not produce a Hetman Mazeppa, a vigorous rebel whose memory could inspire the present generation. The modesty of the Byelorussian national movement is almost touching. Nothing could characterize its spirit better than the title of the first Byelorussian publishing company founded in 1906 – 'In our windows also shall the sun shine'.

Be. 186 642 Be. [182] Byelorussian nationalism in Czarist times was so weak that no Byelorussian succeeded in getting elected to the Duma. The landowners voted for Polish candidates, and the peasants, in their ignorance, for extreme Russian nationalists. The October Revolution found the Byelorussians still too inarticulate as a nation to be able to cope with the great tests of the revolutionary years. Without much external pressure Byelorussia, or rather, what might have become Byelorussia, fell to pieces. The few Byelorussian intellectuals had no clearly defined political aim and turned from one extreme to another, wavering between a Polish, Lithuanian and Russian orientation and thus aggravating the chaos in which the Byelorussian people found themselves. By the end of 1920 the Byelorussians were under five different Byelorussian governments and National Committees, and in addition, had a Minister for Byelorussian Affairs in the Lithuanian Government.

Be [728] At last the Peace of Riga concluded between Poland and Soviet Russia in 1921 determined the division of Byelorussia: Western Byelorussia with about 2,000,000 Byelorussians went to Poland, while Central and Eastern Byelorussia became part of the Soviet Union.*

SOVIET POLICY IN EASTERN BYELORUSSIA

SU. 635 Be 642 131 161 At first the Soviet régime found it rather difficult to decide which territories to allocate to the Byelorussian S.S.R. When the B.S.S.R. was formally constituted on January 16th, 1921, the Russian communists

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* The estimate of 2,000,000 is halfway between Polish and Russian statistics. According to the official Polish census there were but 1,123,000 Byelorussians in 'Western Byelorussia'. Molotov mentioned the figure of 3,000,000 when proclaiming the incorporation of Western Byelorussia into the U.S.S.R. on October 31st, 1939.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

BeloRussiaRC1

S.U. 635 Be. 642 131 161 had such a poor view of the strength of the Byelorussian national consciousness that they confined the Republic to a small border strip of 20,000 square miles and 1,500,000 inhabitants. Important Byelorussian districts with the towns of Vitebsk, Gomel and Mogilev remained within the R.S.F.S.R.

It took the Soviet central Government three years to transform the 'token republic' of Byelorussia into one which comprised the bulk of the Byelorussians living in a coherent territory in the western part of European Russia. On March 3rd, 1924, the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. issued a decree on the 'unification of all territories of the U.S.S.R. having a majority of Byelorussian population'. As a result of this decree the B.S.S.R. was able to enlarge its territory to 42,000 square miles and its population to 4,200,000.

Even after the 'unification decree' certain Byelorussian areas of the Soviet Union remained outside the B.S.S.R. and on December 6th, 1926, a new decree was published to rectify this situation by adding to Byelorussia some further territories including the town of Gomel. Through this second operation Byelorussia became a country of 48,000 square miles with nearly 5,000,000 inhabitants.

Be. [101] The 1926 census showed that great confusion persisted in Byelorussia as to who was a Byelorussian and who was not. Thus out of 4,017,000 ethnical Byelorussians only 3,350,000 declared their language to be Byelorussian. On the other hand the census recorded only 383,000 Great Russians in Byelorussia, although 1,165,000 people considered Great Russian as their language.

Be. 565 464 The basic difficulty which the Soviet régime encountered among the Byelorussians was, however, not the language question, but the fact that the Byelorussian people had hardly any 'revolutionary vanguard' in the form of an industrial proletariat worth mentioning. The five predominantly Byelorussian Governments ('Gubernyas') of the Czarist Empire had in 1913 but 69,000 industrial workers of whom by no means all belonged to the Byelorussian people.

Be. 162 369 Although Soviet statistics claimed that Byelorussian industry increased twenty-one-fold between 1913 and 1937, industrialization and urbanization made less progress in Byelorussia than in most other parts of European Russia. The major Byelorussian towns did not share in the general speedy growth of Soviet cities, nor did any new 'mushroom towns' emerge. Of the 174 towns of the Soviet Union which in 1939 had over 50,000 inhabitants only five were in Byelorussia and the largest Byelorussian town, Minsk, occupied the thirty-second place among the cities of the U.S.S.R. Byelorussia's towns were in the inter-war period only partially Byelorussian from the ethnical point of view, since they all had very large Jewish populations and included also a considerable number of Great Russians. In 1926 Minsk had 43·6 per cent Jewish

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
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inhabitants against 40·8 per cent Byelorussians and 7·3 per cent Great 162 Russians. In Vitebsk, the second largest town, there were 45 per cent 369 Jews, 30 per cent Byelorussians and 20 per cent Great Russians. Gomel, the third largest, had 40 per cent Jews, 29 per cent Great Russians and 22 per cent Byelorussians, and Mogilev 52·5 per cent Byelorussians and 39 per cent Jews.

The insignificance of Byelorussian industry and the absence of any Byelorussian town life worth mentioning explains to a great extent the difficulties which the Soviet régime experienced both on the political and on the cultural front in the Byelorussian S.S.R.

For a long time the communist leadership was unable to convince the 517 more outstanding representatives of the Byelorussian people that class 186 struggle had to be conducted in Byelorussia just as anywhere else in the [565] Soviet Union. The leading Byelorussian intellectuals, who had close ties with the destitute peasant masses of their people, proclaimed the so-called *Bezburzhuaznost* (the non-existence of a bourgeoisie) of the Byelorussian nation. At the same time the Byelorussian nationalists or *Natsdemy* (National Democrats), as they were officially nicknamed, were profoundly pro-Western and anti-Russian in their outlook. They [10] did not even like to be described as 'Byelorussians' or 'White Russians' since these terms simply degraded them, in their view, into a species of 'Russians'. They advocated in the twenties that the Byelorussians should be called *Krivichi*, thus identifying themselves with a Slav people inhabiting the territory of Byelorussia 1,000 years ago. The central Government opposed this suggestion. The Byelorussians had to keep the name which already externally associated them with the Great Russians. Nevertheless, the Byelorussian intelligentsia persisted in cultivating an ideology which maintained that no close relationship existed between the Byelorussians and Great Russians and that the former did not belong to the Eastern Slavs owing to their different origin, history and the character of their culture.[31] This Western orientation of the Byelorussian [92] intelligentsia also had repercussions in the field of linguistics and led to the attempt to create a Byelorussian scientific terminology different from the Russian.

During the twenties, the communist régime did comparatively little [517] against the nationalist tendencies in Byelorussia. In the absence of any 186 communists capable of making a contribution to Byelorussian cultural 661 life, the régime was forced during a certain time to leave the artistic and scientific activities of the nation in the hands of 'bourgeois nationalists'. Only towards the end of the twenties did the régime start purging the various cultural institutions of the country, and it was only in 1933 that the persecution of Byelorussian nationalism assumed major proportions. The year 1933 saw the discovery of the 'Byelorussian National Centre' which was charged with aiming at the establishment of a 'Byelorussian

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661 Democratic Republic'. The 'Centre' was reported to receive its intruc-
186 tions from Vilna and to recruit its membership from among 'remnants of
Kulaks, White Guards and counter-revolutionary nationalists'.

665 According to the then First Party Secretary of Byelorussia, Gikalo,
186 the party was forced to fight not only against an outside organization but also against nationalist agents in its own ranks. These nationalist agents, said Gikalo, had penetrated into the party in the early thirties and had apparently succeeded in occupying a large number of positions in the local government machinery. As in the Ukraine, the offensive against the nationalists inside the Communist Party was launched on the express orders of the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party.
[171] The All-Union Central Committee intervened in Minsk not only to secure the purity of communist principles in Byelorussia but also to protect in that republic the interests of Russian culture and the Russian language.

Moscow's intervention was precipitated by what became known as the 'Stsepuro Affaire'. A teacher with the name of Stsepuro had written a letter in Russian to a Byelorussian village council. Stsepuro's action led to a nationalistic outcry in which the local communist organizations and Soviet officials sided against the teacher, who in their view, ought to have written in Byelorussian. The matter was taken up by the Moscow newspaper *Pravda* and finally prompted the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party to draw attention to the 'distortion of Soviet nationalities policy' in Byelorussia. The statement of the Central Committee said that any ban against the Russian language and any persecution of persons using Russian were offences 'profitable only to the class enemy'. The Central Committee of the Byelorussian communists drew the necessary conclusions from the rebuke of the Moscow leaders and at a plenary meeting in December, 1933, proclaimed Byelorussian nationalism as the 'main danger'.[32]

Moscow had thus won the first round in the struggle against the local nationalist forces in Byelorussia. The second part of the fight reached its climax in the summer of 1937 when all prominent Byelorussian com-
[661] munists were charged with conducting a nationalist policy. They included Alexander Grigoryevich Chervyakov, President of the Byelorussian Soviet Republic who committed suicide, the Prime Minister, Nikolai Matveyevich Goloded and the First Party Secretary and arch-purger of 1933–34, Gikalo. Both Goloded and Gikalo were executed. The main charge directed against them was that 'they had tried to tear away the Byelorussian people from the socialist culture of the Great Russian people'. The men around Chervyakov, asserted an official publication, 'were determined to oust the Russian language from the schools, to do away with Russian revolutionary plays, with Russian belletristic literature and works of music. They thus made it difficult for

the Byelorussian people to acquire both the inexhaustible cultural 665
treasures of the Russian people and the great cultural values created by 186
the Socialist Revolution'.

At the same time,* Stalin's opponents among the Byelorussian com- 563
munists were accused of having been too liberal to the Polish minority in Byelorussia, a strange accusation from a party which professes to adhere to an internationalist ideology. The 'polonizing activities' of the Byelorussian 'Trotskyites, Bukharinites and national-fascists' consisted in having allowed a number of localities in Byelorussia to conduct their business in the Polish language and in having sanctioned the existence of a number of Polish schools.[33]

The purge of the Byelorussian communists terminated the policy of tolerance which the Byelorussian Government had shown towards its
national minorities. This tolerance had been symbolically expressed in [186]
the coat of arms of the Byelorussian S.S.R., which contained the inscription 'Workers of the World Unite' in four languages: Byelorussian, Great Russian, Yiddish and Polish. The coat of arms in use since 1937 shows the same inscription in Byelorussian and Great Russian only. Together with the Polish inscription in Byelorussia's coat of arms the 'Polish National District' of the Byelorussian S.S.R. likewise disappeared. This district had served purposes similar to those of the 'Polish National District' of the Ukraine. It was called after Feliks Dzerzhinsky.

KOLAS AND KUPALA – BYELORUSSIAN LEADERS

The history of the fight between the Kremlin and Byelorussian nation- 186
alism includes the interesting case of the two prominent poets and 538
writers, Yanko Kupala (1882-1942) and Yakub Kolas, whom the Soviet régime drew over to the side of the 'proletarian revolution'. Both belonged to the petty bourgeois Byelorussian nationalist movement grouped around the weekly *Nasha Niva* (Our Cornfield) which long before the October Revolution was the first publication to advocate autonomy for the Byelorussian people.

Kupala was the son of an impoverished nobleman unable to pay for a higher education for his son. Kolas was of peasant origin. Kupala and Kolas had in common their violent hatred of the Polish landowners who owned over 6,000,000 acres of Byelorussian soil in 1914. As a symbolic challenge to the Poles they both threw off their Polish-sounding family names of Lutsevich and Mitskevich respectively and became known under their literary pseudonyms.

Kupala and Kolas found it difficult to overcome their 'bourgeois prejudices'. In their innermost feelings they remained nationalists however hard they tried to be 'good Soviet citizens'. In one of his poems

*[Cf. category 186, pp. 155-157--Analyst]

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Be. 186 538 Kupala avowed his incapacity to become a real Bolshevik poet, thinking in terms of the whole Soviet Union and of all mankind:

> 'My Fatherland – it is the whole world,
> I have torn myself away from my native soil!
> Yet still I am not free from it – in sleep
> I dream of Byelorussia!'

The role which Kolas and Kupala played in Soviet Byelorussia is unparalleled throughout the U.S.S.R. No Byelorussian Bolshevik ever assumed the role of a national leader of the Byelorussians – the leadership was in the hands of Kolas and Kupala. Instead of 'removing' the two poets, the Soviet régime tried to direct their poetic creation into the 'right channels' and to use them for communist propaganda. Kolas and Kupala were often criticized, at times they seem to have been in disgrace but they never disappeared, as did many excellent writers and poets of almost all the major peoples of the Soviet Union.

S.U. [661] The purge of Kolas and Kupala[1] would have been tantamount to the bankruptcy of the Soviet cultural policy in the B.S.S.R., since the two were not only outstanding literary figures but actually cultural 'awakeners' of their people. Byelorussia could do without its 'national democrat' historians and folklorists, it could do without its leading communist politicians. Kolas and Kupala, however, were indispensable. Their case showed that there are limits even to purges in the Soviet Union. The purge in Byelorussia could not be carried so far as to endanger the cultural foundations of the third largest people of the Soviet Union. This is why Kolas and Kupala were spared despite all their 'sins' and 'deviations'.

The Soviet régime needed Kolas and Kupala not only as pillars of Byelorussian culture in the U.S.S.R. but also as the political heralds of Byelorussian irredentism which might evoke a response among the oppressed Byelorussian population of Poland. The two poets did indeed fulfil this task not as Bolsheviks but as nationalists and denounced most violently the partition of Byelorussia. Most typical in this respect was a poem by Kolas in which he cried out: 'Our homeland has been broken up by foreign robbers . . . Away with their frontiers! Down with their barriers! To us belong the fields and woods! Let us rise together with one mind and one will, happiness and freedom will not come to us of themselves! Long enough have we been hunted and driven from our homeland!'

'GREATER BYELORUSSIA'

Be. 131 728 In September 1939 came the triumph for people like Kolas and Kupala,[2] who by the force of circumstances had abandoned national democracy and embraced some sort of Byelorussian national communism–Byelo-

[1] [Cf. cat. 116, pp. 157-158 -- Analyst]

[2] [Cf. category 538, pp. 157-158 -- Analyst]

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russia became reunited at the price of Western Byelorussia accepting the 131
Soviet totalitarian régime. The B.S.S.R. increased its territory from 728
48,000 to 80,000 square miles and almost doubled the number of its inhabitants. The merger of Western and Eastern Byelorussia created a State of over 10,000,000 inhabitants uniting almost the entire Byelorussian people. The annexation of Western Byelorussia enabled the Soviet Union to push nearer to Central Europe, but from a merely economic point of view the territory was a liability. Western Byelorussia [133]
was easily the most backward part of the Polish State as it existed in the inter-war period. The territory is devoid of any large industry, its agricultural soil is poor and there are but few rail and road communications. Marshes cover a considerable part of Western Byelorussia. In the [133]
annexed former Polish province of Polesia which is 14,000 square miles in area, the famous Marshes of Pinsk or Pripet Marshes form 56 per cent of the total territory.[34]

There are but few small towns in Western Byelorussia; only two 361
localities have about 50,000 inhabitants each, Grodno and Brest Litovsk. Originally 'Western Byelorussia' as it had emerged from the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal for the partition of Poland, had one town of 100,000 inhabitants, Bialystok, a centre of the Polish textile industry and the only place in the whole of 'Western Byelorussia' possessing a fairly large industrial class. For this reason, Bialystok was chosen as a kind of emergency capital of Western Byelorussia during the weeks between its occupation by the Red Army and its full incorporation into the B.S.S.R. The 'Peoples Assembly' of Western Byelorussia which on October 28th, 1939, formulated its 'request for admission into the U.S.S.R.' also met in Bialystok.

The new 'centre of Western Byelorussia' had the drawback that it had 563
no Byelorussian population; it had only Polish and Jewish inhabitants and the outskirts of the town were Polish. In view of the national compo- [728]
sition of Bialystok and its surroundings the Soviet Government was unable to maintain its claim to the Bialystok area after the end of the war, particularly since it was located to the east of the Curzon line which Russia adopted in principle as the Polish-Russian frontier. The area of Bialystok covering roughly 5,800 square miles was thus re-allocated to Poland. This transfer was advantageous for the Soviet Union since the B.S.S.R. rid itself thereby of a Polish population of 1,000,000 and thus considerably reduced the seriousness of the minority problem within its boundaries.

After the annexation of Western Byelorussia the minority issue threatened to cause considerable worry to the Minsk Government, since half of the annexed population were either Poles or Jews. In the post-war B.S.S.R. this problem no longer arose not only because of the substantial frontier rectification in Poland's favour in the Bialystok area, 21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union Belorussia RC1

563 but also, as in the case of the Ukraine, because of the transfer of Poles and Hitler's extermination of the Jews.

Another important task resulting from the annexation of Western Byelorussia still remains to be carried out by the Government of the B.S.S.R. A large proportion of the Western Byelorussians have little or no Byelorussian national consciousness, and they speak some sort of [197] local Slav dialect which they themselves do not identify as Byelorussian. This applies in particular to the population of Polesia where Polish statistics counted over 700,000 such 'local Slavs'. 'Greater Byelorussia' is now about to round off the formation of a Byelorussian nation by amalgamating the various brands of Byelorussians, not only formally in a purely administrative sense, but also politically and spiritually.

177.56 This process, intended to effect the transformation of the Western 563 Byelorussians into a full 'sovietized' people, has encountered consider- [795] able opposition, particularly among the Roman Catholics who had formed 20 per cent of the entire Byelorussian minority of the former North-Eastern Poland. The Roman Catholic Byelorussians had always most violently opposed the thesis of the 'brotherhood' between Byelorussians and Great Russians and their political organization under the Polish régime, the Christian Democratic Union, significantly called itself 'Byeloruthenian' instead of 'Byelorussian'.

186 Byelorussian opposition to the Soviet régime is dictated not only by economic and religious motives but also by national considerations. Although it has united Western and Eastern Byelorussia, the Soviet Government has offended Byelorussian nationalism by leaving the city of Vilna outside the Byelorussian 'State'. The Western Byelorussians looked upon Vilna as their national cultural centre and there may have been indeed a good case for including it in Byelorussia, but it was politically more expedient to make it the capital of Soviet Lithuania.

The difficulties which the Soviet régime had to face in post-war Byelorussia were not confined to the new western territories. The whole of Byelorussia had been occupied by the Germans for two to three years, and it was only natural that Soviet propaganda had to start in many respects right from the beginning when the Red Army re-entered Byelorussian territory. A statement by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party heralding the new propaganda campaign admitted indirectly that German Nazi propaganda had been successful among Byelorussians. The Communist Party organizations of Byelorussia were instructed in this statement to overcome 'the anti-collectivist and anti-state tendencies' with which the German occupants had indoctrinated the Byelorussian people.[35]

Many expressions of Byelorussian nationalism, however, existed quite independently of the moral consequences of German occupation. Judging by official Soviet admissions, Byelorussian nationalism, particularly

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in literature and the writing of history, has, despite its youth, a very tenacious life, and its strong emphasis on Byelorussia's ties with the West is one of its principal elements.

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VI

THE JEWS - A PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

Czarist Russia had the largest Jewish population of the world. In 1909, 563 out of a total of 11,500,000 Jews, nearly half, or 5,215,000, lived in the Russian Empire. The second largest 'Jewish State' was Austria-Hungary with over 2,000,000 Jews, followed by the United States with 1,770,000 Jewish citizens.

The large-scale Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe to the United States and the new frontiers drawn in Eastern Europe after the First World War radically changed the geographical distribution of world Jewry. By 1927 the number of Jews in the United States had grown to 4,228,000; Poland, which inherited a part of the western provinces of the Czarist Empire with their strong Jewish population, had over 3,000,000 Jews and the Jews of Soviet Russia numbered 2,600,000 only. [728]

Russia's territorial annexations of 1939/40 made her once more the world's largest 'Jewish State'. Over 2,000,000 Jews were living in the territories which Russia occupied after the beginning of the Second World War – Eastern Poland, Bessarabia and the Baltic states. As the number of Jews within Russia's pre-1939 frontiers had increased to 3,000,000 the Soviet Union in 1940 then had over 5,000,000 Jews altogether, which exceeded the total of the Jewish population of the United States by some tens of thousands.

The comparative importance of the Russian Jews was again completely altered during the Second World War, when 3,000,000 Jews perished on the territory of the U.S.S.R. Russia, it is true, is still the home of the second largest Jewish community, but this represents considerably less than one-fifth of world Jewry.

As a national community the Soviet Jews never developed into a serious political factor. This is due to the fact that the Jews are dispersed, that they form minorities everywhere, even if these are sometimes fairly important minorities as in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia and in Moscow. Nor was there at any time a national Jewish culture in the U.S.S.R. which might have corresponded to the large number of 5,000,000 or even of 3,000,000 Soviet Jews. On the contrary, the Yiddish language, which must necessarily form the basis of a Jewish

563 culture in the U.S.S.R., has been steadily declining and more and more Soviet Jews are gravitating towards Russian and Ukrainian culture.

JEWS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY

563 While the Soviet Jews were never able to acquire any importance as a
665 national community, they succeeded in playing an outstanding part as
[555] individuals inside the state and party apparatus. This must be attributed in the first place to the share which the Jews had in the fight against Czarism. The Jews formed almost a quarter of the membership of the 'All-Union Society of (former) Political Prisoners and Exiles'. Figures which the Society published on January 1st, 1927, showed indeed that Jews accounted for 23 per cent of its members, ranking in strength next to the Russians, who with 51 per cent had a narrow majority. Other nationalities were less strongly represented. They included Ukrainians (8 per cent), Latvians (6 per cent), Poles (5 per cent). The three Caucasian nationalities had only 4 per cent, and all other nationalities combined, 3 per cent. Many of the Jewish resistance fighters against Czarism, it is true, fought in the ranks of non-Bolshevik organizations such as the Mensheviks, Anarchists, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Jewish left-wing groups. There was, however, a large number of Jewish Bolsheviks as well, since the Society of Old Bolsheviks had 10 per cent of Jewish members.

The strength of the Jews inside the Communist Party was always greater than that of the much more numerous Asiatic nationalities and it always used to be out of proportion to the number of Jews in the total
[369] population of the U.S.S.R. However, this comparison is unfair since the Communist Party membership is essentially confined to urban areas and the Jews being predominantly an urban element quite naturally came into greater prominence in the Bolshevik movement than other national minorities made up primarily of rural populations. In the twenties, when the Jewish influence in the party had reached its climax, 8 per cent of the total town population of the U.S.S.R. were Jews, but in the party there were only 5·2 per cent Jews in 1922 and only 4·3 per cent in 1927. Between 1922 and 1927 the number of Jews in the party increased from 20,000 to 50,000, but as there was a general growth of party membership in that period the Jewish proportion had decreased relatively. No further figures of the strength of the Jews within the party were published after 1927, but it can be taken for granted that the same tendency continued: the absolute number of communists of Jewish origin grew, but their relative importance declined.

The influence of the Jews inside the party was more important in quality than in quantity. A considerable percentage of the Jewish communists – in 1927 roughly one-seventh – were concentrated in the

capital, Moscow, where they were able to occupy key positions not only 563
in the local party organization – the Moscow Committee of the C.P. –
and the municipality – the 'Mossovet' – but also in the central state 665
apparatus. In the early days of the Soviet régime the leading communist Jews included such personalities as Sverdlov, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Radek.

This prominence of Jews among the Bolshevik old guard* proved fate- [661]
ful to Soviet Jewry during Stalin's big purge in the thirties. Jews formed a more than average proportion of the victims of the drive against the Trotskyite and right-wing oppositions, and in some of the big trials the majority of the defendants were of Jewish origin.

POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION OF SOVIET JEWRY

Most of the Jews active in the Communist Party had cut themselves off 563
from the Jewish masses and had become part of the Russian working- 668
class movement and implicitly in many cases part of the Russian nation. [77]

However prominent some individual Jewish Bolsheviks may have become, the great majority of the politically conscious Russian Jews stood in the anti-Bolshevik camp and at the same time in the Jewish national camp. Western Russia was the cradle of the Zionist working-class movement. Almost all the Jewish labour leaders who have taken a leading part in the inauguration of the State of Israel were born in the territory of the U.S.S.R. On the other hand Russia was also the home of the socialist anti-Zionist Jewish mass movement known as the 'Bund', or by its full name, the 'General Jewish Labour League of Lithuania, Poland and Russia'.

In its persecution of Zionism and particularly of 'Bundism' the Bol- 661
shevik leadership proved to be more ruthless than in the suppression of
national deviations among many other peoples of the U.S.S.R. There 668
was hardly any political group, unless perhaps the Georgian Menshe- 563
viks, which Stalin hated so much as the Jewish 'Bund'. His first long ideological article on 'Marxism and the National Question' written in 1913, was largely a polemic against Bundist Jewish nationalism. Stalin felt so strongly about the 'Bund' that he never stopped persecuting its followers. Even in the winter of 1941 when Russia was engaged in a life and death struggle against a foreign invasion, Stalin found time to continue his special little war against the Jewish socialists. He then ordered the execution of two outstanding 'Bund' leaders, Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter.

In the early years of its existence the Soviet régime had created special 563
organizations for the annihilation of Zionist and non-Zionist anti-com- 661
munist tendencies among the Russian Jews. A so-called Jewish Com- 208
mission, the 'Yevkom', which was attached to Stalin's Commissariat of

*[Cf. category 665, pp. 164-165 -- Analyst]

563 Nationalities, terrorized Jewish communities throughout the country [661] and replaced their freely elected leaders by communist Jews. 'Yevkom 208 was abolished in 1923 but a Jewish section within the Communist Party, the 'Yevsektsia' carried on anti-religious propaganda amongst Soviet Jewry and repressive measures against Jewish 'deviationists' until 1930. From that year on, the state security organs and the League of Militant Godless continued the fight against Jewish nationalism and religion [798] respectively. Ever since its foundation in 1925 the League had engaged in systematic campaigns against the Jewish religion. It agitated against the observance of the Passover and published a special organ in Yiddish called *Der Apikoires* or 'The Heretic' devoted to derision of Jewish religious customs, religious history and rabbis. In the predominantly Jewish townships of the Ukraine the League pressed for the closing of synagogues and for mass resignations from the Jewish religious communities.

Jewish anti-religious propagandists in their zeal had the most absurd ideas. A prominent Jewish communist linguist earnestly suggested that the word 'God' should be eliminated from the Yiddish vocabulary. There were long arguments for and against. Finally it was decided to retain the word for the quaint reason that it was necessary for the conduct of anti-religious propaganda.[1] While the Soviet authorities tried to influence the vocabulary of Yiddish, they put a total ban on Hebrew. [191] The ban, which was part of the Soviet fight against Zionism and the Jewish religion, had symbolic rather than practical importance, since Yiddish and not Hebrew was the language of the Jewish masses in Eastern Europe.

SOVIET JEWRY IN THE WAR AND POST-WAR PERIOD

563 Soviet Jewry had a particularly difficult time between 1939 and 1941, the period of Soviet-Nazi co-operation. The Soviet Government ordered the Yiddish press to omit even the slightest allusion to the Nazi persecution and generally ignored the feelings of Russia's Jewish population as much as possible. The régime was particularly anxious that the Jews of the new Soviet territories annexed on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop deal should remain in the background. The substantial Jewish minorities of the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia were thus almost completely 'overlooked' when Eastern Poland was incorporated in the U.S.S.R. For example, they were refused the share in the administration of the new Soviet provinces which might have been their due in accordance with their numerical strength.[2]

782 The German invasion of Russia created a completely new situation 528 for Soviet Jewry. The Soviet Government suddenly showed an interest 563 in fostering among them nationalist feelings of the most romantic and

even most aggressive type. Yiddish literature, which with great efforts 563
and after many purges had been brought on the road of strict inter- 538
nationalism, had to change its character completely and its representa- 722
tives became the spokesmen of Jewish national pride instead of working-class solidarity. A Jewish author hastily wrote a play commemorating Bar Kochba, 'The champion of the Jewish people in the revolutionary war against the Roman Empire'. The play was performed in 1942 by the Yiddish State Theatres of Byelorussia and the Ukraine which had been evacuated to Siberia and Kazakhstan, respectively. The communist Yiddish poet, Itzik Feffer, wrote a poem 'I am a Jew' in which he expressed the new ideological creed of Soviet Jewry in most passionate terms. He evoked the memory of both Bar Kochba and the Macabees as examples for Soviet Jewry. He voiced Jewish pride in Heinrich Heine, Spinoza, Karl Marx and Yehudah Halevi. He also named two Jewish Bolsheviks, Sverdlov, who was the first president of Soviet Russia and 'Kaganovich, Stalin's friend', whilst making, of course, no mention of those other prominent Jewish communists who had been liquidated in Stalin's purges.

The Soviet Government made these concessions to Jewish nationalism 208
in an attempt to influence world Jewry. In the months and years of 648
the Second World War, in which Russia was struggling for its existence, the Kremlin wanted to be in a position to appeal not only to a Jewish communist vanguard in the capitalistic world but also to conservative and religious-minded Jews.

Thus, tolerance towards Jewish religion became an element in Russian political warfare in the same way as the new Soviet approach towards the Orthodox Church. Manifestations of the 'New Jewish Policy' of the Soviet Government included a goodwill mission by the two Jewish cultural leaders, Professor Solomon Mikhoels, the great actor, and Itzik Feffer, to the United States and Britain and the foundation of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow which was supposed to lead the struggle of world Jewry against Hitler. It was characteristic that the Mikhoels-Feffer mission not only got in touch with left-wing Jews, but was allowed to contact both rabbis and leaders of the Jewish Agency, including Chaim Weitzmann, who used to be its president.

The officially-sponsored Jewish nationalism was stopped imme- 563
diately after the end of the war and so were the contacts which had been established between Soviet and world Jewry. The war had, however, altered the outlook of the surviving Russian Jews and had created the conditions for a genuine national revival of Soviet Jewry – a revival which all official endeavours were unable to suppress completely. The Nazi acts of cruelty towards the Jews of Western Russia had affected the minds of even completely assimilated Ukrainian and Russian Jews and of Jewish Soviet citizens who had been brought up in the Com-

563 munist Youth League and had many years of Communist Party membership to their credit. On the other hand, Nazi anti-semite propaganda had had a profound effect on the peoples of the occupied Soviet territories and made them more Jew-conscious, which again led indirectly to the strengthening of some sort of national solidarity among the Soviet Jews. Many Soviet Jews may even have arrived at the conclusion that the Jews of the capitalist world were nearer to them than their Ukrainian and Russian fellow-citizens.'

563 186 Jewish national feeling in Soviet Russia was further[1] stirred by the foundation of a Jewish State in Palestine. For reasons of power politics the Soviet Union suddenly reversed a thirty-year-old hostility to world Zionism and supported the establishment of the State of Israel in the United Nations General Assembly. At the same time the Soviet Government was determined to prevent the new Russian 'charity' towards Zionism from starting at home. The Soviet authorities feared that the foundation of Israel would inspire nationalist feelings among the Jews of Russia. Therefore, a particularly energetic check was put on 'Jewish' bourgeois nationalism' within the U.S.S.R. from the second half of 1947 onwards.

661 563 The fight against Jewish bourgeois nationalism was conducted with exceptional violence in the Ukraine. The first admission about the emergence of Zionist tendencies in the post-war period was made in September 1947 during the plenary session of the Union of Soviet Writers of the Ukraine where 'the existence of nationalist Zionist views in the work of a number of Jewish writers' was unmasked.[3] This 'unmasking' did not stop Jewish nationalist tendencies from making themselves felt and early in 1949 it was announced that the Yiddish almanac *Der Shtern* had been banned for ideological mistakes. These included amongst others the belief of some authors of the almanac that Jews inside and outside the Soviet Union formed a single national body.

Yiddish authors were not alone in finding themselves in trouble; two well-known Ukrainian poets of Jewish origin, Savva Golovanivsky and Leonid Pervomaisky were involved. Both were publicly rebuked for having shown Jewish bias, Pervomaisky in particular for having mentioned Mount Sinai and Moses in one of his poems.[4]

In Moscow too an extensive campaign was conducted against Jewish nationalism, although it received less official publicity than the Anti-Zionist measures applied in the Ukraine. Practically all important Jewish cultural institutions in the Soviet capital were closed down in 1949, including the publishing house *Der Emes*, the newspaper *Aynikeit* and the Jewish theatre. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was disbanded.

[1] [Cf. category 563, pp. 167-168--Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 RI Soviet Union RI

THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF SOVIET JEWRY

While traditional national and religious ideas still survive among 643 Soviet Jews, the Soviet régime has succeeded in changing their economic structure most radically. The inclusion of the Jews in socialist reconstruction work meant not only the encouragement of class struggle within the Jewish people, but the destruction of the economic foundations on which Russian Jewry was built. The work of the Soviet régime, however, was not a purely negative one since the Jews of Russia were also given new functions in the economic life of their country.

It is true to say that the Soviet régime has changed the Jews even more thoroughly than any other people of the U.S.S.R. In the case of the other peoples the Soviet régime struck at the ruling strata, but the social status of the bulk of these peoples, made up of peasants or cattle-breeders, remained unchanged. With the Jews it was different. As they had been excluded under the Czarist régime from the ordinary economic and social life of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Russian peoples, 38·65 per cent of all Russian Jews were forced to be traders and middlemen, 35·43 per cent were artisans, 5·49 per cent had 'unproductive and undetermined professions' and only 3·55 per cent were engaged in agriculture.

The Soviet régime completely destroyed Russian Jewry as it had [463] existed before 1917 and created a new Soviet Jewry, which in 1939 included 30 per cent manual workers, 41 per cent employees and members of liberal professions, 20 per cent artisans, 6 per cent farmers and 3 per cent people of miscellaneous professions.[6] Of the Jewish manual workers of the Soviet Union 28 per cent worked in metallurgy and machine-building industries, whilst only 17·5 per cent were employed in the food industry and 17·2 per cent in the garment industry which are usually looked upon as the more typical 'Jewish industries'.

The new social structure of Soviet Jewry, though an improvement on the conditions in the pre-revolutionary period, is far from reflecting a solution of the Jewish problem. The fact that over two-fifths of all Soviet [647] Jews are either state officials and employees or belong to so-called liberal professions (which in Soviet Russia is a synonym of officialdom), still reflects an unsound situation encouraging anti-semitism.

Those Jews of the Western Ukraine, Western Byelorussia and Bessarabia who survived the war are still subject to the same process of social transformation which their co-religionists in the territories originally belonging to the U.S.S.R. have undergone already. This [441] transformation was not easily achieved, since Jewish traders still flourished in the Soviet Union in the middle of the twenties, during the period of the N.E.P. when capitalism was tolerated within certain limits. At that time over 18 per cent of all private traders of Soviet Russia were Jews.

000 At that time over 18 per cent of all private traders of Soviet Russia were Jews.

563 641 For the retention of a moderate portion of private property and private economic activity the Jews had to pay by the loss of political rights. The number of disfranchised persons, of 'Lishentsy', as the Soviet jargon called them, was higher among the Jews than among any other people of the Soviet Union. Thus in eighty-five small Jewish townships of the Ukraine there were 42 per cent 'Lishentsy' in 1927–8. In some places more than half the population were disfranchised, like Teofipol with 54·4 per cent 'Lishentsy'. The importance of these figures can only be properly assessed if one bears in mind that the percentage of 'Lishentsy' in the whole of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was not more than 4·5 per cent.[6]

THE EASTWARD MIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS

Disfranchisement ceased only after the liquidation of the non-proletarian classes including the Jewish traders. This social transformation went together with a migration of the Jews from the Ukrainian and Byelorussian townships to the big industrial cities.

563 166 The Jews not only moved into larger cities of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, but also went eastward and settled down in larger numbers among the Great Russian people. This was a natural outcome of Jewish [48C] emancipation. The Jewish youth in particular wanted to escape from the ghetto of the 'Pale of Jewish Settlement', the twenty-five governments of Western Russia to which the law had confined the bulk of Russian Jewry under the Czarist régime.

The Jewish migration also corresponded to the interests of the Soviet State. About 800,000 Ukrainian and Byelorussian Jews lived near the Polish and the Rumanian frontier. They formed a huge agglomeration of hungry and destitute people who directly or indirectly were bound to harm in many ways the economic and political interests of the U.S.S.R. in the border regions. In the case of a war between Russia and Poland or between Russia and Rumania – an eventuality which was always taken into account in the twenties and early thirties – these border Jews might have supported the enemy. Many of the Jews in question were smugglers and sabotaged the foreign trade monopoly. The dissatisfaction among the Jewish border population of the Soviet Union also served as a means of anti-Soviet propaganda in Poland and Rumania among their border population which was likewise largely made up of Jews.[7]

Thus both for their own sake and for reasons of State the Jews left their Ukrainian and Byelorussian ghettos. As a result of this migration the number of Jews in the Ukraine diminished between the 1926 and

1939 censuses from 1,574,000 to 1,532,000 and in Byelorussia from 563
407,000 to 375,000. During the same period the Jews increased in the 166
territory of the R.S.F.S.R. from 566,000 to 969,000, of whom 400,000 alone lived in Moscow. The migration of the Jews from the Ukraine and Byelorussia was, as a rule, accompanied by a cultural transformation of the migrants and their children. In the Ukraine and in Byelorussia the Jews had plenty of opportunity for education in the Yiddish language. More than half of all Jewish children in these two Republics attended Jewish schools, but there were practically no Jewish schools in the territory of the R.S.F.S.R.[8]

The number of Jews in Transcaucasia and in the Central Asiatic Soviet Republics also increased considerably between the two world wars, and a large-scale Jewish migration to Asiatic Russia took place in 1941–2 on account of the mass evacuation of Jews from Western Russia to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Not all evacuated Jews seem to have returned after the war to their homes in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic Republics.

While the Soviet régime welcomed the increase of Jews in the industrial centres of the U.S.S.R., it attached even greater importance to their recruitment into the new agricultural colonies which were set aside for the Jewish population.

JEWISH AGRICULTURAL COLONIES

Jewish agricultural colonies had already existed under the Czarist régime in the areas of Kherson, Dniepropetrovsk (Yekaterinoslav) and Kiev. The number of Jewish persons living in these colonies in the Czarist period was at no time higher than 90,000 and considerably below that maximum figure on the eve of the First World War.

Soon after the October Revolution the Soviet Government set itself 563
the task of expanding greatly the experiment with Jewish agricultural 575
colonies and founded two special organizations for the encouragement 166
of a Soviet Jewish peasantry. These organizations were the 'Komzet' – abbreviation for 'Committee for the agricultural settlement of Jewish toilers' and 'Ozet', which stands for 'Society for the agricultural settlement of Jewish toilers'. Komzet, founded in 1924, was an official body which worked under the central Government of the U.S.S.R. and was responsible to the latter for the administrative side of the Jewish agricultural settlement. The Ozet, which had existed since 1925, was a mass organization mobilizing public support for various Jewish agricultural settlement schemes. Ozet was not an organization of Soviet Jewry alone; at one time 60 per cent of its members were non-Jews. Ozet cells which were established in many big Russian factories and in the Red Army fought the surviving anti-semite tendencies in the

[Gypsies]

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U.S.S.R. and collected money for Jewish settlement purposes. Ozet furthermore kept in touch with left-wing Jewish organizations abroad which also provided funds for the Jewish agricultural settlements-to-be.

Through the combined efforts of Komzet and Ozet three Jewish National Districts of an agricultural character were set up in the Ukraine – Kalinindorf, Stalindorf and Novozlatopol. Of these Kalinindorf with forty-five collective farms in 1937 was the most important as it contained the highest proportion of Jews. In the Crimea the Jews had two more National Districts, Fraydorf and Larindorf, the last one named after the pioneer of Jewish agricultural settlement, Yury Larin. Soviet propaganda made especially great play of the Fraydorf District, which was about 190,000 acres in extent, included thirty-three collective farms with 1,692 families and had thirty-eight schools and seven reading-rooms.

The total number of Jewish collective farms in the U.S.S.R. in the middle thirties amounted to 500 and there were 225,000 Jewish persons engaged in agriculture of whom 90 per cent lived in the Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Crimea. This figure diminished, however, in the years just before the Second World War. In view of the great efforts involved the Jewish agricultural settlements in the Western part of the Soviet Union can hardly be considered a major success either materially or even morally. The fact that Jews became agriculturists did not diminish anti-semite feelings but, on the contrary, stimulated them. Many Russians attacked the very formation of Komzet and put the 'poisonous question' why the Government had to create a committee for the settlement of Jews if there were no such committees for other nationalities.[9]* The Crimean settlement project in particular provoked a great deal of jealousy among Russian and Ukrainian peasants. The communist peasant newspaper, *Bednota*, received many letters from land-hungry peasants who said the following: 'When we apply for our resettlement into the Crimea we get a refusal and are told that we should go to Siberia. Why do Jews deserve such attention since they are allowed to go to the Crimea?'[10] Official propaganda quietened down these protests by making the point that Jewish landowners like Baron Ginzburg had owned under the Czarist régime more land in the Crimea than the Soviet régime was allocating to Jewish farmers.

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* These critics were mistaken. The Soviet Government had organized in August 1926 a similar committee for the Russian gipsies – the 'Committee for the Settlement of Gipsies on the Land'. This Settlement Committee was connected with another organization, the 'All-Russian Union of Gipsies', founded in 1925 and disbanded in 1928 by the People's Commissar of the Interior. 'Reactionary' elements had apparently gained the upper hand in the leadership of the 'Union'. The settlement of the gipsies on the land was not entirely unsuccessful. One thousand gipsy families were induced to join collective farms, at least temporarily. In 1935 there were forty gipsy collective farms in various parts of the U.S.S.R. (18 in Uzbekistan, 4 in the Ukraine, 5 in West Russia, 4 in the North Caucasus, etc.).

In the thirties the Soviet authorities even considered the formation of a Gipsy National District which was to include over half of the 60,000 Soviet gipsies. The project did not come off since no province in the country was willing to provide land for the experiment.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

The anti-semite opposition which Jewish colonization schemes in 563
the fertile regions of South Russia had encountered induced the chiefs 166
of the Komzet to turn their eyes towards Asia. So the Komzet sent a commission to the vast spaces of the Soviet East which finally recommended that an area on the Russian-Chinese border should be set aside for Jewish agricultural settlement purposes. The area concerned later became known under the name of Birobidzhan.

THE CHOICE OF BIROBIDZHAN AS PROSPECTIVE 'SOVIET JEWISH STATE'

Birobidzhan – the original spelling was Biro-Bidzhan – derives its name 563
from the two tributaries of the Amur river – Bira and Bidzhan. The 634
whole territory is 14,800 square miles in extent, being thus considerably 166
larger than the whole of Palestine.

Three principal reasons guided the experiment which led to the establishment of a Jewish territorial unit in the Soviet Far East:

1. To bring about a solution of Russia's Jewish problem[1] by giving the Jews a real homeland and thus creating a Jewish nation. According to the official Stalinist definition there can be no nation without a territory of its own. Thus if the Jews were given a district in Russia where they could establish a compact settlement and a cultural centre, so the Bolsheviks argued, they would automatically become a nation.
2. To arouse sympathy among the Jewish people throughout the world [208] for the experiment of a 'Soviet Jewish State' and for the Soviet Union in general or at least to neutralize anti-Soviet Jewish elements abroad.
3. To increase the defence potential of the Soviet State by recruiting settlers for an exposed Far Eastern border sector and to provide more manpower for the Soviet Far East in general. It was assumed that Jewish settlers would be as reliable as Russian ones at an important strategical point where the decisive struggle for the domination of the Far East might flare up one day.

The security aspect of the Birobidzhan experiment can hardly be [721] overstressed. The Soviet Government felt uneasy at the existence of a practically empty frontier zone bordering on a populous Manchuria. Already the Czarist régime had recognized the necessity of colonizing the area between the rivers Bira and Bidzhan. From 1908 onwards Ukrainians were sent to the territory, but during the First World War Ukrainian colonization practically collapsed since the male colonists were drafted into the army and their womenfolk returned to the Ukraine.

The Soviet régime restarted the colonization of Birobidzhan in 1926–7 when about 3,000 new settlers, again mostly Ukrainians and Byelorussians, went to that territory. This accession of population was, how-

[1] [SEE Cat. 116, p163-173 for discussion -- Analyst]

563 166 634 ever, utterly insufficient, for at the beginning of 1928 Birobidzhan had a population of 34,000 only, including 80 per cent Russians, 6·8 per cent Ukrainians, 1·6 per cent Byelorussians, 10 per cent Koreans, 1·6 per cent Chinese and 1 per cent Nanai and Evenki.

There were less than three people per square mile in Birobidzhan and it was, therefore, highly desirable from the point of view of the Soviet State that somebody should fill the empty space of that fertile corner of the Russian Far East, where climate was healthy, arable soil excellent and the land rich in timber, coal and minerals.

KALININ DECLARATION VERSUS BALFOUR DECLARATION

634 563 The Jewish Autonomous Province of Birobidzhan could not simply be created by a stroke of the pen as other Autonomous Provinces and Republics had been. The Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the U.S.S.R. had to proceed by stages. The settlement of Jews in Birobidzhan had to be encouraged before the formation of a Jewish territorial unit became possible. The first step taken by the TsIK was the decree of March 28th, 1928, 'reserving' Birobidzhan for Jewish colonization.

The second move was made on September 30th, 1931, when the Soviet Government pledged its word that a special Jewish administrative territorial unit would be formed in Birobidzhan if settlements of Jewish toilers developed successfully in that area. Only on May 7th, 1934, was the Jewish Autonomous Province actually created. Soviet propaganda 60 8 described the decree bringing the Jewish Province into being as the 'Kalinin Declaration' to demonstrate that Birobidzhan was to be a challenge to 'Bourgeois Zionism' and to the Balfour Declaration on which the Jewish National Home in Palestine was based.

[643] The name of Kalinin, 'the President of the U.S.S.R.', was by no means wrongly associated with the Birobidzhan scheme. Kalinin was, indeed, the only important Soviet leader who took a really active and constructive interest in Birobidzhan and in the Jewish question in Russia in general.

Whilst Stalin, the great specialist on nationality problems, seemed to ignore the Birobidzhan project completely, Kalinin would always speak with great warmth of what he looked upon as the nucleus of a Soviet Jewish State. Kalinin, a peasant's son, advocated more than anybody else in Russia the return of the Jews to the land. He thought that the Jews could never develop into a fully-fledged nation so long as they lived in towns only, least of all the Moscow Jews living in an international city where national pecularities were bound to be effaced. Kalinin was by no means sentimental about the Jewish question. In his persistent efforts to create the Jewish territorial unit within the U.S.S.R.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

he was guided by a sober appreciation of the importance of the Jewish 563
factor within the capitalistic world. For him the Jews constituted 'one of 634
the most lively and politically most influential nations', and it was, therefore, important for the cause of the revolution that the Jewish middle classes throughout the capitalistic countries should be inspired by a friendly feeling toward the Soviet Union.[11] Kalinin's hopes were perhaps not altogether vain, for the Jews abroad, particularly those in the United States, contributed financially towards the Birobidzhan experiment.

The Soviet Government was clearly determined to make the most of 208
Birobidzhan in its propaganda both inside and outside Russia. Within 563
the Soviet Union Ozet* organized mass meetings in the early thirties 166
voicing the slogan 'The whole Soviet Union is building the Jewish Autonomous Province'. For both foreign and home consumption Soviet propaganda stated that the foundation of the Jewish Autonomous Province heralded the dawn of a 'splendid future' of the Jewish people.[12]

A statement by the TsIK published on August 29th, 1936, under the visible influence of Birobidzhan's great protector, Mikhail Kalinin, even said that for the first time in history the Jewish people saw their burning desire fulfilled, namely, 'to create for themselves a homeland, to have a national State of their own'. After recalling that the deeds by which Jewish collective farmers received land in perpetuity were written in the Yiddish language the statement added 'The Jewish Autonomous Province will become the centre of national Jewish culture for the entire Jewish working class of the Soviet Union'. According to the official plan the greatest and most popular Jewish artists, writers and scientists of the Soviet Union were to leave Moscow, Leningrad and other big Russian cities and go to Birobidzhan 'for permanent work in the Autonomous Province'. Jewish historians and linguistic scholars in particular were urged to settle down in Birobidzhan 'to build up scientific Jewish institutions, for research into Jewish history, language and literature and into the Jewish Autonomous Province itself.[13] In short, Birobidzhan City, Birofeld and Waldheim, the major localities of the Autonomous Jewish Province, were to become the centres of Jewish life of the Soviet Union instead of Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev and Kharkov.

A considerable section of Soviet Jewry and even a number of prom- 563
inent communist Jews were from the outset hostile to the Birobidzhan experiment. The critics of the Birobidzhan settlement project considered it as an unnecessary concession to anti-semitism in European Russia and as contrary to the interests of the Jewish people of the Soviet Union. They pointed out that the money allocated to Birobidzhan could be spent more fruitfully on the strengthening of the Jewish agricultural colonies in the Ukraine and the Crimea. They further stated that

*[SEE cat. 116, p171-172 --Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

563 Birobidzhan might be a suitable country for pioneer settlers with agricultural traditions, but not for a people like the Jews which had only just started to engage in farming.

The discussion about the merits and disadvantages of Birobidzhan was conducted in the late twenties with a great deal of frankness which ten years later would have been unthinkable. Thus Yury Larin, the chief protagonist of the Crimea scheme, stated bluntly that the 'unsound noise around Birobidzhan was in reverse proportion to the real importance which that area has for the Jewish proletariat'.[14] The reality in Birobidzhan showed that sceptics like Larin were right and not the enthusiasts of the project.

JEWISH COLONIZATION IN BIROBIDZHAN

563 Until Birobidzhan became an Autonomous Province, Jewish settle-
166 ment in the territory had been negligible. In 1928, 850 Jewish settlers came, in 1929 – 1,420, in 1930 – 1,186, in 1931 – 3,230. Not all were real pioneer settlers; a number went to villages which had been founded by Ukrainian colonists but had since been abandoned.

In 1932 Jewish immigration into Birobidzhan for the first time assumed a mass character. Eight thousand two hundred Jewish colonists arrived in the territory, but the inability of the authorities to cope with them led to a crisis in the Birobidzhan experiment. The mass immigration into Birobidzhan turned into a mass flight of Jews from that territory. Over 50 per cent of the Jews who came to Birobidzhan between 1928 and 1932 left the prospective Jewish Province again and went to various Far Eastern towns, if they did not return to Europe. When the number of Birobidzhan colonists dropped, the Soviet Government sacked the leaders of Komzet and replaced them by new people who were supposed to bring about a speedier and more efficient Jewish settlement. The Government of Byelorussia also came to the rescue of the Birobidzhan experiment and took over the 'patronage' or 'shefstvo' over socialist reconstruction in the Jewish territory.

634 In 1933, the year when Hitler came to power in Germany, only
162 3,130 Jewish settlers went to Birobidzhan. This brought the total number of Jews in the Province to 7,500 although over 18,000 had immigrated between 1928 and 1933. The total population of Birobidzhan was then 51,000 of whom the great majority were Russians.[15] In the years 1934–36, special efforts were made to increase the number of Jews in Birobidzhan, but the control figures of the settlement plan were never reached. In 1934, instead of the scheduled 9,000 immigrants, only 5,267 arrived and in 1935 only 8,347 instead of the 10,500 estimated in the plan. The Province was still 'too ill-prepared' for the absorption of new immigrants.[16]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

In 1936 the population of Birobidzhan was 64,000 strong of whom 634
19,000 were Jews. The population of Birobidzhan City – before 1928 166
a little Russian settlement, Tikhonkaya or 'quiet place' – had increased between 1934 and 1936 from 7,400 to 18,000 which suggests that only a few of the Jewish newcomers went into agriculture as they were supposed to do, but most preferred to become workers and employees in their new homeland.

This induced Kalinin to make a rather critical comment on the 661
'leaders' of the Autonomous Province whom he blamed for not appreciating the importance of agriculture and for paying insufficient attention to settling Jewish colonists on the land. Kalinin made this statement in August 1936. In the next month a meeting of the active membership of the Communist Party of Birobidzhan discovered a 'serious defect in the work of the local party organization' and unmasked both the President of the Provincial Executive Committee, Liberberg, and one of the top-ranking Communist Party officials, Volobrinsky, as 'hidden Trotskyite nationalists'.[17] These two were not the only ones to serve as scapegoats for the failure of the Jewish colonization in the Far East. After Liberberg two more 'Presidents' of Birobidzhan – Kattel and Geller – were sacked and four party secretaries of the Autonomous Province were liquidated as 'Trotskyites' or even as 'Japanese spies'. The two organizations in charge of Jewish settlement too, were, in the official view, full of 'enemies of the people' and after a new purge of the leadership both were dissolved in 1938.

Prospective Jewish immigrants were discouraged from going to Biro- 166
bidzhan not only by the severe purge conducted in that Province, but 563
also by the tense situation in the Far East which had transformed the 'quiet haven' into a dangerous outpost. Although Birobidzhan had become more and more unpopular with the Jews the Soviet Government still refused to abandon the project of a National Jewish State within the U.S.S.R. Kalinin continued to promise the Jews that the Province would be transformed into an 'Autonomous Republic' as soon as its Jewish population should reach the 100,000 mark. According [85]
to the official plans, Birobidzhan was to have not less than 150,000 Jewish settlers at the end of the third Five Year Plan (1942) including 40 to 50 per cent collective farmers. Notwithstanding all plans and promises Jewish colonization in the Far East petered out in 1939 and was stopped altogether during the war except for 3,000 Jewish war orphans who found a new home in Birobidzhan. After the war, Soviet Jews showed for a short period greater willingness to support the Jewish autonomous territory. The new approach towards the Birobidzhan settlement scheme was prompted by the revival of Jewish national feeling and the increase of anti-semitism in the Western parts of the U.S.S.R. The number of applications for travel facilities to Birobidzhan

563 166 among Ukrainian Jews became far larger than the capacity of the Province for the absorption of new settlers. In 1947, 1,500 families went to Birobidzhan from the Ukraine and the Crimea and 1,200 families in the first three months of 1948, but since then the Soviet Government has ceased to publicize Jewish migration to the Far East.

In 1942 Birobidzhan had but 100,000 inhabitants of whom less than half were Jews, but in 1948 the Province was said to have a population of 185,000. The number of Jewish colonists had undoubtedly considerably increased, but Birobidzhan had not become a land of Jewish agriculturists. Birobidzhan's urbanization proceeded at a quick pace and more than a quarter of its population lives in the capital alone.

BIROBIDZHAN – SUCCESS OR FAILURE?

[634] 563 Birobidzhan failed to fulfil two of its main objectives; it did not solve the Jewish problem in Russia nor did the experiment contribute to the increase of Soviet prestige among world Jewry. With regard to this second point it ought to be mentioned that Birobidzhan was intended to become a kind of Soviet Palestine attracting not only Soviet Jews but Jews from all over the world. The presence of Jewish workers in Birobidzhan from the United States, Argentina, Belgium, France, Germany, in larger numbers from Poland and Lithuania and even from Palestine was, indeed, reported on various occasions in the Soviet press.[18]

[167] Foreign Jewish immigration into Russia was not to be left to chance, but was to be fostered systematically. On April 4th, 1932, TsIK ordered Komzet to take special measures for the recruitment of foreign Jewish workers with qualifications for colonization work in Birobidzhan. According to the original plan about one-quarter of the Birobidzhan settlers were to be foreign Jewish workers. The settlement plan for 1936 even provided that 40 per cent of all colonists were to come from 'capitalist countries'. The real number of foreign colonists remained always greatly behind the targets. Ultimately their admission into the U.S.S.R. was considered as politically too risky and was abandoned altogether.

464 Birobidzhan did fulfil, however, at least to a certain degree, the third purpose which was pursued by its creation. Small though the Jewish settlement in Birobidzhan was in relation to the whole Jewish population of the Soviet Union, it nevertheless constituted a contribution toward solving the manpower problem in the Soviet Far East. A school for railway engineers in Birobidzhan City prepared highly skilled personnel for Russia's Siberian railway system. Spinning and weaving mills, footwear, clothing and food factories, a big furniture factory and even metallurgical plants came into being in the Province, supplying their goods to the major towns of the Soviet Far East.[19] However, this side

1 [Cf. category 116, pp. 171-172 for discussion -- Analyst]

of the Birobidzhan experiment is primarily an advantage to the Russian State and not a major contribution to the solution of the Jewish [444] problem.

For the Jews of the Soviet Union it is a great pity that the Birobidzhan 563 colonization experiment was not more successful since the lives of many Jews of the Ukraine and Byelorussia might have been spared had there been a greater immigration into Birobidzhan and had the responsible representatives of Soviet Jewry supported the idea of a Jewish autonomous territory. The reluctance of the Soviet Jews to move from Europe to the Chinese borders, and their unpreparedness for agricultural work may have been contributory reasons for the failure of a great experiment. The main reason for the failure was, however, the lack of encouragement given by the communist leaders of Jewish origin to Birobidzhan. This applies equally to Stalin's prominent Jewish opponents in the communist hierarchy and to nearly all of his Jewish collaborators like L. M. Kaganovich whose name was given to the municipal theatre of Birobidzhan. Not one of the big communist leaders of Jewish origin ever thought or felt as a Jew. All stood for complete assimilation of the Jews and the idea of a separate Jewish territorial unit within Russia was, therefore, completely alien to them. Their ideal was the amalgamation of the Jews with the workers of all other nationalities of the U.S.S.R. into one Soviet nation linked together by Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Russian language. They claimed to work and to fight for all the peoples of the Soviet Union and, therefore, could not and did not want to pay special attention to the Jewish problem. Moreover, communist leaders of Jewish origin have become rare in the Soviet Union. Those belonging to the older generation are gradually dropping out and no prominent communist leaders of Jewish descent have emerged from the new Soviet generation.

Also the appeal to leading Jewish writers, artists or scientists to go to Birobidzhan contained an unrealistic proposition. Soviet Jews of some standing in the cultural and artistic world like the famous violinist, Oistrakh, the scholars Grinberg and A. Frumkin, the poets Marshak and Pasternak, the publicist Ilya Erenburg, the Russian poetess Vera Imber, and many others are unthinkable in other than Russian surroundings. This inevitable absence from Birobidzhan of the most prominent Jewish cultural workers of the Soviet Union will condemn the Autonomous Province for all time to a kind of cultural backwater existence.

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21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union

Caucasia RH1

VII

THE NORTH CAUCASUS PEOPLES

RUSSIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The Caucasus means more to the Russians than either Russian Central 101 Asia or the Russian Far East. The bonds between Russia and the Caucasus are strong and real and no official propaganda efforts are needed to prove their existence. The idea of the 'Russian Caucasus' will be alive among the Russian people as long as they continue to honour and read their great poets, because the Caucasus has become part and parcel of Russian national tradition through the works of Pushkin, Lermontov and Tolstoy.

Lermontov's works in particular show that the Russians have interpreted the word 'Caucasus' not as a purely geographical notion, but as a whole period of Russian history and a political programme strongly flavoured with romanticism. While deploring the end of the primitive freedom of the Caucasus peoples Lermontov, like Pushkin, considered the final triumph of Russian civilization over the Caucasus tribes to be an unavoidable historical necessity. Thus the two greatest Russian poets gave to the Caucasian peoples identical advice, namely to reconcile themselves to the victory of the Russians.

Pushkin has expressed this conviction in the phrase: 'Humble thyself, Caucasus, for Yermolov* is coming'. Lermontov, on the other hand, predicted to the Circassians that one day they would proudly say 'We may truly be slaves, but at least we are slaves of the ruler of the Universe!' Since Lermontov's time Russia's power has grown considerably and the service of a great master has indeed become the dubious consolation not only of the Caucasian peoples but of many others besides, throughout the Soviet Union.

The peoples of the Caucasus did not act in accordance with Push- 175 kin's and Lermontov's admonitions; they stubbornly fought Russia and struggled desperately for their freedom, because they did not realize the tremendous odds they were facing. They were too remote from the world of political and diplomatic realities of the nineteenth century to understand either the hopelessness of their own situation or the power of the Russian Empire. They deceived themselves by the erroneous supposition

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* General Yermolov (1772–1863) was the principal Russian hero of the Caucasus conquest.

[Adike] Caucasia RH1

[Cherkess]

Ca. 175 that Russia would not fight for the barren Caucasus mountains if she were really as great and mighty as was sometimes asserted by some mountaineers who had seen her immensity and later returned to their own people.[1]

THE FIRST EXODUS OF THE MOUNTAINEERS

Ca. 175 167 The mountaineers of the Western Caucasus – the Circassians or the Adyge – who had lived close to the shores of the Black Sea, occupied particularly important strategic positions. In every war which Russia waged against Turkey the fearless Circassians had constituted a grave menace in the immediate rear of the Russian Caucasus front. The alternatives, from the Russian point of view, therefore, could only be either the total surrender or the total annihilation of the Circassians. As only a minority of the Circassians were ready to accept surrender, a mass migration of the Circassians to Turkey appeared the only possible 'solution', both to the Russian conquerors and the Circassians themselves, whose indomitable spirit of freedom could not be reconciled with Russian rule.

Thus between 1861 and 1864 about 500,000 Circassians left the Caucasus; but owing to starvation, disease and the hardships of the journey in overcrowded vessels, it is said that only half of them ever reached Turkey alive. Referring to this trek of the Circassians a semi-official Russian publication admitted that 'a calamity of such proportions has rarely befallen humanity'.[2] This great exodus of the Circassians disposed of the problem of nationalities in large areas of the western part of the North Caucasus region and opened them up to Russian, Ukrainian and Armenian colonization.

After the departure of the Circassians a great deal still remained to be done in the North Caucasus region from a Russian national point of view. Although thousands of Chechens, Nogai Tartars and Ossetins had likewise participated in the great exodus, these and other peoples of the Central and Eastern Caucasus continued to be a source of uneasiness to the Russian State. Complete Russian victory over the rebellious mountaineers was achieved only under the Soviet régime.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE CHAOS IN THE SOVIET CAUCASUS

S.U. 634 563 Ca. 642 The Russian communist leaders came to the Northern Caucasus with progressive ideas and plans for raising the material and cultural level of its peoples. The Soviet Government was originally even determined to give the small mountain peoples a chance to combine their forces and thus become a political factor of some importance. In accordance with the wishes of the more advanced mountaineers the Soviet Government decided that there should be one United Northern Caucasus

Republic aggregating approximately 1,500,000 inhabitants. This Republic – officially called 'Autonomous Mountain Socialist Soviet Republic' – (Gorskaya A.S.S.R.) – was formed by a decree of January 20th, 1920. Its capital was the city of Vladikavkaz. The Republic* comprised no fewer than seven different Caucasian peoples: Kabardinians, Chechens, Circassians (Cherkess), Ingush, Ossetins, Balkars and Karachay. S.U. 634 528 Ca. 642 [169]

In its original form the Mountain Republic remained in being for only about twenty months. The Russian communist rulers apparently felt that the promotion of unity among the North Caucasus peoples was not in the interest of Soviet centralism and that it was safer to have them split up again into several single units. The disintegration of the Mountain Republic started in September 1921 when the Kabardinians were given a special Autonomous Province. In January 1922 three more peoples seceded from the Republic. The Balkars were made to join the Kabardinian Autonomous Province and the Karachay and the Cherkess were given a joint Autonomous Province. In December 1922 the Chechens were induced to set up an Autonomous Province of their own, which left only the Ossetins and the Ingush, in the Mountain Republic. In July 1924 both these peoples were endowed with separate territorial units of their own. The experiment of a united North Caucasus Republic was thus finally terminated. Administrative changes in the Northern Caucasus continued even after the end of the Mountain Republic. In April 1926 the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Province was divided into two provinces; and in January 1934 the Ingush merged with the Chechens into a single Autonomous Province. S.u. [631]

The autonomy which the Northern Caucasus peoples had enjoyed existed very largely on paper. In reality they were administered up to 1934 from Rostov, the capital of the huge North Caucasus Territory, which was almost as large as Great Britain and Eire combined. The Executive Committee of the North Caucasus Territory (Krayispolkom) was entitled to overrule any decisions taken by the various Autonomous Provinces. In 1934 the Soviet bureaucracy administering the multinational parts of the North Caucasus region moved from Rostov to Vladikavkaz. Only in December 1936 did the mountaineers gain a greater say in the management of their affairs through the transformation of three Autonomous Provinces into Republics (Kabardinian-Balkar A.S.S.R., Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R.).

The repeated shifting of the Northern Caucasus peoples from one territorial unit to another had left untouched the real problem: how to make the mountaineers into reliable Soviet citizens and how to associate them with the socialist transformation of society. The continual changes in the administrative boundaries had hindered rather than encouraged these tasks. They had rendered particularly difficult the recruiting of administrative personnel from among the local peoples and the intro-

*[Cf. category 642, p.182 --Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Caucasia R#1

S.U. 634 523 Ca. 442 E477

duction of their languages for official use. In other words, the Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus remained unsuccessful, and an endless stream of statements, ordinances and recommendations issued by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) in Moscow had been unable to remedy the situation to any major extent. On May 10th, 1931, for instance, TsIK circulated a decree to the effect that Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus should operate at a quicker pace. The decree stipulated that by the end of 1932 at least 70 per cent of officials in the Autonomous Provinces should be recruited from among the local nationalities, and that local languages should be introduced into the administration. On July 5th, 1934, TsIK issued a statement recognizing that the decree put into force over three years earlier had remained a dead letter. A further decree which Kalinin signed on January 7th, 1936, again denounced the non-implementation of the Soviet nationalities policy in the Northern Caucasus and revealed that the Russian language dominated everywhere in local government bodies, from the provincial administration down to the village councils. Of 1,310 officials in the Northern Caucasus Territory only seventeen belonged to the mountain peoples. According to the new decree the local languages were supposed to come into official use in 1936 and 1937, but it is open to doubt whether that order had any greater practical results than its predecessors.

THE SECOND EXODUS OF THE MOUNTAINEERS

Ca. 669 S.U. 687 672

The Russo-German War fully revealed the discrepancy existing between propaganda and reality with regard to conditions in the Northern Caucasus. One could hardly find a better example of the former than the optimistic and distorted picture which Mikhail Kalinin gave in October 1942 when the German troops were approaching the Caucasus Mountains. Kalinin then said: 'The Caucasus is the most enlightening demonstration of the reforming, beneficial effect of the Soviet sytem on the psychology and character of people who, not without reason, saw danger to themselves everywhere. The Caucasians have now become a social people who see in the collective system their bulwark, the foundation of material prosperity and a higher intellectual life. . . . The whole Caucasus has become one mountain village for its peoples. The whole Soviet land, from border to border, has become their beloved home. National enmity has given way to mutual understanding, estrangement to co-operation. . . . Is not everything that has taken place in the Caucasus during the twenty-five years of Soviet power a miracle? Yes, it is a miracle. It is that for which Lenin fought all his life, that for which Stalin fought and is fighting, that to which our party has always aspired.' And Kalinin went on to say that the peoples of the Northern Caucasus were

[Chechen]

displaying worthy resistance to the enemy, derailing trains, blowing up bridges, destroying ammunition and fuel depots.[3] Ca. 669

Only a few weeks after Kalinin had made his panegyric statement little was left of the Caucasian 'miracle', and of the idyllic situation which the Soviet President had depicted. When the German armies occupied the Northern Caucasus region many mountaineers manifested their hostility towards the Soviet régime. They attempted to use the retreat of the Red Army to free themselves from what they considered the 'Russian yoke'. Over twenty years of Soviet rule had not altered their ingrained conviction that Russia's foes were their friends. These peoples apparently thought that they owed as little loyalty to Russia as the Indonesians deemed themselves to owe to the Dutch and the Vietnamese to the French when their respective countries were occupied by Japan. In the official Soviet view, of the seven peoples who in 1920 had formed the Mountain Republic four had shown themselves particularly unreliable in the crucial winter of 1942–43. They were the Chechens (407,600 according to the 1939 census), the Ingush (92,074), the Balkars (42,660) and the Karachay (75,737). After the North Caucasus region had been cleared of the invaders, the Soviet Government found itself unable to forgive these nationalities for their disloyalty or even their indifference. It also abandoned all [further attempts to transform them into good citizens of the U.S.S.R.[1] and expelled them from the 'happy family of Soviet peoples'. All of them lost the special territorial administrative[2*] units which the Stalin Constitution of 1936 had bestowed on them. Early in 1944 they were rounded up and deported to far away places in Siberia. For all practical purposes they ceased to exist. Thus were abolished the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous S.S.R. and the Autonomous Province of the Karachay. The Kabardinian-Balkar A.S.S.R. was transformed into the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. after having been relieved of the 'burden' of the Balkar traitors. S.U. 687 672

Soviet policy in the Northern Caucasus differed to some extent from Czarist policy since it resulted in the building of schools, theatres, libraries and hospitals, but for the four deported nationalities all this had been of little use. From their point of view there is hardly any difference between the policy of General Yermolov and that of Generalissimo Stalin. Indeed, the Soviet régime deprived at least as many Caucasian mountaineers of their homes as did the Czarist régime.

CONTINUITY OF RUSSIAN CAUCASUS POLICY: THE CHECHENS

The Chechens, as the most numerous nationality left in the Northern Caucasus after the emigration of the Circassians, offer a particularly good example of the continuity of Russian policy. The Large Soviet Encyclopædia rightly summed up the historical role of the Chechens by Ca. 563 175

[1] [Cf. category 116, pp. 182-184, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]
[2*] [Cf. category 116, p. 183, R1 Sov185 Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

563 describing them as the 'most active and strongest opponents of the 175 Czarist Government during the conquest of the Caucasus'. The Russians suffered extensive and costly disasters at the hands of this people, who were unequalled in forest warfare.

Ever since the time of Peter the Great, the Chechens have challenged the Russian Empire, but from 1818 onwards their resistance to Russian rule assumed major proportions. In that year General Yermolov built 1031 a fortress to subjugate more easily the land of the Chechens. He called the new fortress 'Grozny', meaning 'menacing' and 'formidable'. The name of Grozny had a deeper meaning than might appear at the first glance: it was the symbol of a political programme that Yermolov defined in the following words: 'I wish that the terror of my name should guard our frontiers more potently than chains of fortresses, that my word should be for the natives a law more inevitable than death'. Grozny became Yermolov's headquarters, and it was from Grozny that countless Russian expeditions set out 'to punish raiders, avenge defeats, establish new posts, relieve beleaguered garrisons, or rescue retreating bands and armies'.[4] The Russian campaign against Chechenia reached its climax in 1840, at the time of the great Chechen rising under the leadership of Imam Shamil. The breakdown of Shamil's fanatical Moslem movement led to the gradual submission of the Chechens in the years 1857-59.

175 167 The Russian authorities knew well that these new subjects of the Czar, after all the trouble they had caused, would not easily reconcile themselves to the loss of their freedom; so an attempt was made to settle the 'Chechen problem' by a double transfer of population. Immediately after the conquest the inhabitants of forty-four auls (mountain villages) were transplanted from the mountains to the plains, where they could more easily be controlled. The more rebellious ones were forced to emigrate to Turkey, where they were given hospitality on the express demand of the Russian Government. In the summer of 1865, 39,000 Chechens, one-fifth of the entire Chechen population at that date, left Russia. Those who stayed behind did not remain quiescent. In 1877 there was another wave of unrest following the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War, and more trouble in 1886. A Russian monograph on the Chechens, published in 1894, said that they could not yet be considered 'fully pacified'; they still looked across the border to Turkey whither many more dreamed of emigrating.[5] The emigration of the 39,000 had not eliminated the 'Chechen problem', for the birthrate of these Chechens was particularly high, far above the average in the Russian Empire.

CHECHEN-INGUSH MOSLEM OPPOSITION

669 The immediate consequence of the October Revolution in Chechenia was a revival of violent nationalism and religious fanaticism among the

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union

[Chechen-Ingush] Caucasia RH1

Chechens. They at first accepted the leadership of the Sheikh Uzun Hadji who proclaimed himself Imam and Emir of the Northern Caucasus. The Emir was the ally of the communists in the struggle against the White Guards of General Denikin. Having vanquished the White armies, the Bolsheviks dropped the Imam, but they were unable to cope with Chechen nationalism. The Chechens demanded the expulsion of all Russians who in the course of the last century had settled in their 'living space'. Pending a positive answer to this request Chechen nationalist bands terrorized the Russian population of the area beyond endurance. In the early twenties the Russian settlers in Chechenia sent a complaint to Moscow on account of the endless raids and murders perpetrated by Chechen bands, and petitioned that they be disarmed. Mikhail Kalinin went personally to the Caucasus and attempted to calm down both Russians and Chechens. With carefully chosen words he tried to persuade them to live together in peace, to intermarry and to respect each other's customs.[6] 669

Whilst in consequence of Kalinin's personal intervention banditry stopped in Chechenia, it would seem that Moslem opposition to the Soviet régime was never quite suppressed. In 1931 the little country still had 2,675 mosques and Arab schools, as well as 1,250 mullahs, 34 sheikhs and 250 religious elders. The mullahs who were powerful opponents of the Soviet régime even managed to keep alive the illegal Shariah courts which were camouflaged as 'reconciliation commissions'. 668 [692]

The hostile attitude of the Chechens towards the Soviet Russian régime was often manifested in the readiness to credit the most fantastic anti-Russian rumours. Thus, in the early thirties, there existed a widespread belief that Kunta Hadji – the head of a popular Moslem sect who had died at the end of the nineteenth century – was still alive and was soon to return to Chechenia, where he would found a State based on Moslem religious law. Apparently the Chechens did not differentiate between Czarist and Bolshevik Russia in their hopes that Kunta Hadji would appear as Messiah, for it was he who had led them in the risings against Czarism in 1864 and 1877, for which he was exiled to Novgorod. [795]

The Ingush, whose fate Soviet policy had coupled with that of the Chechens, showed themselves no less loyal to Islam. A delegate who represented Ingushetia at the 'Second All-Union Conference of Godless Pedagogists' in 1931, stated that the influence of the Moslem clergy was still so strong among the Ingush that children refused to learn from books which they believed to be anti-religious. Whenever a teacher tried to introduce anti-religious propaganda he encountered a hostile attitude among school children and there were cases in which teachers had even to leave the school for having criticized Islam. The work of the secular Soviet schools, where the children were taught in the winter, was counteracted by the Moslem schools where the young Ingush would learn 771 871

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
[Chechen-Ingush] Caucasia RH1

Ca.
771 during the summer holidays all that the Soviet authorities wished them
[870] to disregard. A number of Ingush party and Communist Youth League members, instead of working against the influence of religion, used themselves to go to the mosques to pray.[7]

Ca.
647 The difficulties existing between the Soviet authorities and the Chech-
191 ens and Ingush[1] were not exclusively due to the Bolshevik failure to understand the importance of the religious factor in the life of the mountaineers. There were also extraordinary difficulties of a technical nature, due to the fact that the directives of the central administration were issued in the Russian language and therefore did not reach the Chechen-Ingush masses. Being unable fully to understand the orders received, the local Soviet organs either could not carry them out, or falsified the decisions of the party and of the administration.[8]

GROZNY – THE OIL CITY

Ca
178 It was the tremendous dead weight of the predominantly Russian capital of Chechenia that prevented the implementation of any genuine Chechen autonomy and finally spelled the doom of the Chechen people. The actual liquidation of the Chechens would probably not have occurred had not the largest town in their homeland become an oil city, and indeed, one of the most important oil centres of the U.S.S.R.

Ca
315 This oil city had developed out of the little fortress of Grozny.[2] Al-
S.U. though Grozny oilfields had been discovered as early as 1833, they were
315 hardly exploited at all in the nineteenth century. In 1912, however, they already supplied 11·5 per cent of the entire Russian oil. Between 1913 and 1917 this figure had risen to 16·7 per cent, and in the following four years to nearly 25 per cent. By 1937 the proportion of Grozny oil to total Russian oil production had fallen to 9·25 per cent, but in terms of absolute figures this output represented an increase of 234 per cent,
Ca. compared to that before the First World War. The development of
361 Grozny as an oil centre made for an increase of the population on an
162 'American scale'. In 1890 the place had no more than 6,000 inhabitants, against 34,067 in 1913, 97,095 in 1926 and 172,468 in 1939. It need hardly be added that the Chechens and Ingush, peoples consisting of shepherds and peasants, could not contribute anything worth mentioning to the rise of the town which was styled, almost ironically, 'Capital of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.'. Among the oilworkers of Grozny there were probably at no time more than one-tenth of 'natives', and until 1936 there were but 9·7 per cent.

Ca
177 Unlike so many cities in the Soviet Union, Grozny never changed its
S.U. name under the Soviet régime, despite the imperialistic history connected
563 with it. As a matter of fact, it was the Soviet oil city of Grozny which spelled the doom of the Chechens and not the little fortress which

[1] [Cf. category 116, pp. 186-188, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz—Analyst]
[2] [Cf. category 116, p. 186, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz Analyst]

Yermolov had founded to spread terror among the mountaineers. The Ca. struggle which Czarist Russian officers had begun was terminated by 177 Soviet Russian police officials, who finally ensured Russian domination S.U. over the northern slopes of the Northern Caucasus by expelling the 563 Chechens bag and baggage. It is questionable whether the crimes officially attributed to the Chechens – particularly the help which they had given to the Germans – would have been a sufficiently weighty reason for exterminating them as an organized community, had not the Grozny oil been involved. To protect the Grozny oil-wells against all future risks the Soviet authorities removed the Chechens from Grozny's hinterland and transformed the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. into the Grozny Province.[1] Grozny is another instance of the danger which the existence of oil-wells can bring to a small people. Whether in Latin-America, the Middle East or in the Soviet Union, national self-determination, independence, autonomy and national rights count little as soon as oil interests are at stake.

Almost up to the very moment of their suppression as an ethno- SU. graphic unit,[2] Russian propaganda made considerable use of the 563 Chechens in its attempt to impress the public abroad with the Soviet 208 nationalities policy. Even a year after the outbreak of the Second World War the Chechens were still regarded as a 'good people'. In August 1942 they were said to have played a prominent part in a 'big anti-fascist meeting' in the town of Ordzhonikidze where 3,000 mountaineers pledged their 'boundless devotion to our beloved motherland – the Soviet Union – and the great Russian people'. Delegates of the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars – all peoples whom the Soviet Government later deprived of their national existence – addressed the meeting and spoke about their strong friendship towards the Russians.* Data made available on October 5th, 1942, showed that forty-four Chechens had been awarded decorations for valour in the field, not a bad record considering that far larger national units like the Turkmenians, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz and Estonians had not won many more by that date.

Paradoxically, the Chechens and Ingush continued to serve the pur- S.U pose of Soviet propaganda even after their liquidation as political 814 entities.[2] Their removal from their homeland enabled the Soviet régime 563 to rewrite the entire history of the Northern Caucasus. This rewriting consisted in blaming the Chechens and Ingush for all acts of anti-Soviet resistance perpetrated in the years following the October Revolution in the Caucasus region, and in whitewashing all other nationalities. This new interpretation of Caucasus history was even elaborated in a statement of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. It dealt with the opera *The Great Friendship* the libretto of which had not taken into account the official reorientation with regard to the history of the Caucasus. The Central Committee statement of February 10th,

[1] [Cf. category 116, p. 185, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]
[2] [Cf. category 627, pp. 184-185 for discussion -- Analyst]

[Karachai]

814 563 1948, said: 'The plot of the opera is historically false and artificial. It pretends to depict the struggle for the establishment of Soviet power and of friendship between the peoples in the Northern Caucasus in the years 1918-20. The opera conveys the erroneous impression that such Caucasian peoples as the Georgians and Ossetins had been hostile during this epoch towards the Russian people. This is historically false since the obstacle to the establishment of friendship between the peoples in the Northern Caucasus was during that period the Ingush and Chechens.'[10][*]

This pronouncement was a most authoritive exposition of the new Soviet theory about 'good' and 'bad' peoples.

THE ABOLITION OF THE KARACHAY PROVINCE

563 634 Another Caucasian people who, together with the Chechens and Ingush, came to lose their territorial administrative unit were the Karachay, a people of the Western Caucasus who had suffered greatly in the nineteenth century under the pressure of Russian Cossack colonization. The Karachay had been driven out into the mountains by the advancing wave of the Cossacks who took possession of the Caucasus foothills. Confined to the rocky mountain area the Karachay lived in conditions of great misery and earned a scanty livelihood through nomadic cattle-breeding.

[166] Before the war the Soviet Government considered that the resettlement of the Karachay into the plain was one of the great achievements of Bolshevik Caucasus policy. It was just that resettlement which in 1942 [687] offered to the Karachay the opportunity of getting into touch with the German armies and rendering service to them.

From the point of view of its ethnical composition the abolition of the Autonomous Province of the Karachay was hardly justifiable, since Slav colonization in the province was insignificant. In 1926 the Russians represented only 1·7 per cent and the Ukrainians 4·4 per cent of the population, while the Karachay themselves formed over three-quarters of the inhabitants in the province. As neither Russian nor Slav national interests were affected the Soviet Government decided to accompany the abolition of the Karachay Province by a friendly gesture towards the Georgians. Only the northern part of the Karachay Province was added to the Russian province of Stavropol, while the southern part with the 'capital' Klikhori,[†] was included in Georgia. The annexation of this

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[*] Before the Chechens and Ingush fell into disgrace the official Soviet history of the October Revolution and the Civil War attributed to these two peoples the most daring exploits in support of the Bolsheviks. This is what an official Soviet publication for foreign consumption said about the Ingush in 1937: 'In the Revolution this people covered itself with undying glory. During the Civil War, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, pursued by the enemy, was driven to seek refuge with the Ingush. The Ingush faithfully protected him'.[11]

[†] Klikhori was originally called 'Mikoyan Shakhar'. The town was built in the late twenties to give the Karachay people an administrative centre.

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Caucasia RHL

[Osset]

territory comprising 1,200 square miles was a national triumph for S.U. 93
Georgia, for it enabled her, for the first time, to spread out to the north 634
of the Caucasus.

A 'GOOD' PEOPLE – THE OSSETINS

After the expulsion of the Chechens from their homeland the Ossetins Ca. 101
became the largest mountain people of the Northern Caucasus. In 1939 [62]
there were altogether 354,000 Ossetins in the U.S.S.R. of whom slightly 642
less than two-thirds lived in the Autonomous Republic of Northern
Ossetia, with which we are here primarily concerned, and about one- S.U.
third in the Southern Ossetin Autonomous Province of Georgia. The 563
two Ossetin territories adjoin each other and it would have been logical 631
to amalgamate them into a single Autonomous Republic. Representatives of the two Ossetias went to Moscow in October 1925 to discuss the unification of their people with the Soviet central Government and personally with Stalin whose own mother is of Ossetin origin. This discussion which is briefly referred to in the seventh volume of Stalin's complete works, was inconclusive. The unification of the Ossetins would have been possible only at the expense of Georgia and the Kremlin was apparently not prepared to harm the interests of one of the constituent republics of the U.S.S.R. for the sake of a minor nationality.

Ca. 181
Czarist and Bolshevik authorities agree in their appraisal of the comparatively peaceful and placid Ossetins, no less than in their judgment on the turbulent Chechens. Of course, both régimes had encountered difficulties among the Ossetins, too, but never on the same scale as in the case of other Caucasus mountain peoples.

Czarist Russia started the conquest of the Ossetins in the period of Ca. 175
Catherine II and skilfully exploited the class differences among them as 177
well as their hostility toward their western neighbours – the Kabardinians. Many Ossetins considered the establishment of Russian rule as a safeguard against the danger of attacks by more warlike mountain peoples. Ossetin folk-songs of the early epoch of Russian conquest reflect a pro-Russian spirit and state unequivocally that living under Russian rule was identical to living in peace.

The Ossetins appreciated that Russian occupation and protection enabled them to settle in the plain from which they had been driven by the Kabardinians. Part of that re-settlement had already started in the second half of the eighteenth century. The major part of the re-settlement action was, however, carried out much later, between the twenties and the forties of the nineteenth century.

The Ossetins were of use to Russia not only as settlers, but also as soldiers. As early as the last years of the eighteenth century a number of Ossetin officers distinguished themselves in Prince Potemkin's army in

Ca. 175 actions against the Turks. An Ossetin Major-General, K. Zankisov,
177 fought in Poland against the insurgents of 1863–4 and he was by no
means the only Ossetin Major-General of that epoch. Furthermore, an 'Ossetin Division' became famous in the course of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877–8, when General Skobelev described its 'chivalrous gallantry' as being 'above any praise'.[12]

Ca. 177 Russian cultural work among the Ossetins started much earlier than
538 among other mountain peoples. The first book to appear in the Ossetin language was printed in Moscow in 1798; its object was to serve as a kind of introduction to the study of the Bible. A long period of fruitful association with the Russians and the general peaceful approach of the Ossetins towards Russian military and political rule made them more open to the acceptance of Russian preponderance. The Ossetins were, as a matter of fact, the only people of the Northern Caucasus to produce a great writer in the person of Kosta Khetagurov (1859-1906) who was half Russianized himself and wrote in both the Ossetin and Russian languages. The Soviet régime greatly popularized Khetagurov as a symbol of Russian-Ossetin synthesis, which he undoubtedly was. He had a complete Russian education, had studied at St. Petersburg and was strongly influenced by such progressive Russian writers as Herzen and Chernishevsky, which makes him particularly acceptable from the
Ca. Soviet point of view.

423 Until the Ossetins gave proof of their loyalty to Russia during the war
668 the Soviet régime had had to overcome Ossetin resistance to both the
474 establishment of collective farms and the suppression of tribal customs.
681 During the period of the collectivization Ossetin peasants waged a sort of guerilla warfare against 'socialist property' and while outwardly accepting collectivization, tried to transform the Kolkhoz into an instrument of their respective clans. Ossetin chairmen of collective farms and officials of local Soviets seem to have acted on the principle 'I decide who is a kulak and an enemy of the State and who is not'. Thus, at least during its initial stage, collectivization in Ossetia became a downright farce. Persons belonging to a rival clan were rendered innocuous by being denounced as kulaks; real kulaks, on the other hand, were promoted to the rank of respectable Soviet citizens if they happened to belong to the clan dominating the local village council or the collective
Ca. farm concerned.[13]

[725] All such 'incidents' were forgotten when the Ossetins redeemed their
631 reputation by their brilliant war record. In the fighting which resulted
162 in the dislodgement of the Germans from the approaches to the Cauca-
S.U. sus, Ossetin partisans operating from behind the enemy lines greatly
563 assisted the Red Army.[14] As a mark of appreciation for their loyalty,
634 the Soviet Government allowed the Ossetins to increase substantially the territory of their national republic. A decree of April 8th, 1944, stipulated

that three districts were to be added to the Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R. in their entirety as well as parts of three other districts. The major portion of this new Ossetin territory was sliced off the Stavropol Territory, but a section of it came from Ingushetia, which had occupied the western border area of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. In this way the Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R. grew from 2,390 square miles before the war to 3,250 square miles. This territorial change altered the ethnographic character of the Republic, for together with its new territories Ossetia received a fairly large number of Russians who mostly lived in the two new 'Ossetin' towns, Mozdok and Malgobek. Russian communists thus obtained a greater say in the running of the Northern Ossetin A.S.S.R. at the expense of their Ossetin comrades. In the small Northern Ossetin Republic of the inter-war period (an Autonomous Province until 1936) the Ossetins had formed 84 per cent of the entire population against 13·4 per cent Russians and Ukrainians. In 'Greater Ossetia' however, the percentage of the Ossetins may have dropped to about 60 per cent while the Slav share may have increased accordingly.

Ca. 631 162 S.U. 563 634 Ca. [131]

In addition to the territorial expansion of Ossetia the Soviet Government made still another 'concession' to the Ossetins. The capital of the republic, Vladikavkaz, was allowed to assume the Ossetin name of Dzaudzhikau – a worthless gesture since Russian predominance in the town was not affected by the change of its name. Dzaudzhikau remained that which was implied in its former name of Vladikavkaz, meaning 'Ruler of the Caucasus'. It continues to be one of the centres from which Russian administration exercises its control over the mountaineers.

Ca. 103 633

RE-EDUCATION OF THE KABARDINIANS

The Chechens and the Ossetins represent the two extremes in the attitude of the local Caucasus peoples towards the Russians – the most irreconcilable resistance in the case of the Chechens, and the most far-reaching appeasement in the case of the Ossetins. The Kabardinians, forming part of the once powerful Circassian group which had been broken up by Russian colonization and conquest, stand between these extremes. In the Second World War their attitude was not beyond reproach. The Kabardinians had their deserters and traitors, but the Soviet Government did not consider they were bad enough to justify the abolition of their Autonomous Republic.

Ca. 609 687

During the important administrative reorganization which took place in the Caucasus towards the end of the Second World War, the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. was diminished by only 300 square miles, which were incorporated into Georgia. This, however, was not meant to be a punishment for the Kabardinians, but was directed against the Balkars who had inhabited the area in question. The small administrative reform

Ca. [631] [131] S.U. 563 634 687

*[Cf. category 116, pp. 185 ff., R1 Sov. Union —Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

[Kabardin] Caucasia RH 1

S.U. 563 634 687

achieved a dual purpose. In addition to punishing the Balkars it served as a warning for the Kabardinians, who from then on hastened to express their loyalty towards Soviet Russia in a very demonstrative, even effusive, way.

Ca. 177.81 814 S.U. 563 814

After the war the Soviet authorities found it advisable to provide for the Kabardinians, as a means of strengthening their allegiance to the Soviet State, a clear conception of history which would unequivocally show that the Russians had always been the protectors of the Kabardinian people. The task of formulating the details of this conception was assigned to the 'Kabardinian Research Institute', whose headquarters are in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. The new conception implied the 'official recognition' of Temryuk Idarovich as the national hero of Kabarda. Kabardinian children are expected to look up to Temryuk with the same awe as Russian boys and girls to Peter the Great or Suvorov. According to the new official thesis Temryuk, a Kabardinian prince who lived around 1550, 'endeavoured to build up a strong centralized State able to resist Turkish and Crimean Tartar oppressors'. Temryuk had realized that the Kabardinians were incapable of withstanding their enemies if they were to rely on their own forces only; establishment of close contacts with Muscovy was therefore the only wise Kabardinian policy.[15]

It is the same story which is told with some variation to all the peoples of the Soviet Union in all their many languages. There is always a grain of truth in the story, but never the entire truth, since history is not so simple and so clear-cut that it would fit the purposes of a one-sided propaganda. It is a historical fact that Temryuk asked Ivan the Terrible for protection and even gave him his daughter for wife. Originally, in the days of greater internationalism, Soviet historians failed to stress this fact, and laid more emphasis on the slave trade in which the Kabardinian feudal lords had engaged with the Crimean Tartar Khanate. However, since events had proved the necessity of increasing the attachment and loyalty of the Kabardinians to the Russians and the Soviet State, Temryuk had to be brought to the forefront of Kabardinian history.

Ca. 177.53 538

Kabardinian post-war literature also pursued the aim of re-educating the Kabardinian people. The central theme of the first Kabardinian literary almanac consisted in showing that it was 'the friendship with the Russian people that led the Kabardinians towards a better life.'[16]

Ca. 871 191

While a great deal was done for 're-education' in the sense required by the Russians, education as such had been neglected during the first post-war years, at least as far as the Kabardinian language was concerned. The so-called 'national' schools in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. were Kabardinian in the first four forms only; from the fifth form onwards teaching was in the Russian language exclusively. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party issued in 1948 a state-

ment on 'serious shortcomings and mistakes' committed in Kabarda in 871
the field of national policy. It stressed that conditions in Kabardinian 191
education were in conflict with the constitution of the A.S.S.R., which stipulated the right of the Kabardinian people to schools in their own language.

Although the Kabardinians are by far more numerous and advanced 875
than the peoples of the Soviet Far North, they suffer from the same acute shortage of national teaching-personnel which has been fatal to the national culture of many a minor Soviet nationality. Thus in 1948, the Kabardinian teachers' training college at Nalchik had but fifty-six Kabardinians out of a total of 559 students.[17]

It is to be expected that the survival of a truly Kabardinian culture 167
and Kabardinian language will become even more remote with the 162
increasing pressure of Slav colonization. Between 1926 and 1935 alone the number of Russians and Ukrainians in the Kabardinian A.S.S.R. more than doubled; it increased from about 37,000 to 93,000. This increase was partly due to immigration, partly to the inclusion in Kabarda of a number of Cossack villages in 1932. After the war the numerical relation between 'natives' and colonists changed to the detriment of the former, owing to the forcible departure of the Balkars.[1] Moreover more Russian colonists came into the country to staff new factories springing up around Nalchik.

[1] [Cf. category 631, p. 193--Analyst]

THE CIRCASSIANS – A RESERVE OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY

For the benefit of the remnants of the Circassian people,[2] the Soviet 631
Government set up two Autonomous Provinces in the western part of 162
the North Caucasus area; the Cherkess Province in the Caucasus foothills and the Adyge Province in the Kuban plain.

Surrounded as they are on all sides by Russian territories these two national units have little chance of long-term survival. This applies in particular to the Adyge Province, whose capital – Maikop – used to be [361]
the third largest Russian oil centre after Baku and Grozny, before the development of the 'second Baku' between the Volga and the Urals.

Originally, Maikop was not included in the Adyge Province, which had a small Adyge majority in its initial stage (55·7 per cent various branches of Adyge, 42·7 per cent Russians and Ukrainians, and the rest made up of other Europeans and Armenians). The size of the Province was increased, however, before the war and the Adyge thus found themselves in the position of a minority. In 1930 the Adyge Province [141]
won doubtful 'fame' owing to its extraordinarily high percentage of disfranchized people. This was due to the arbitrary action of the local Soviet authorities, who had indiscriminately interpreted the terms of 'kulak', 'capitalist' and 'reactionary' with the result that 12 per cent of the entire adult population of the Province were deprived of their civic rights. — [2] [Cf. CAT. 116, p. 182, R1 Sov. Union-Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
[Cherkess] Caucasia RH1
Daghestan RH8

ooo entire adult population of the Province were deprived of their civic rights.

Ca. 162 The Circassian (Cherkess) Autonomous Province is inhabited by three small Northern Caucasus peoples – the Cherkess, the Nogai Tartars and the Abazintsy, apart from Slav colonists. In 1933 the three indigenous peoples had a narrow aggregate majority over the Russians and Ukrainians.

Ca. 167 S.U. 563 648 Although the Circassians, as a people, have no political future in Soviet Russia itself, they may still be of service to the Soviet diplomacy. There are Circassians living in Turkey, Palestine, Syria and Transjordan. They are all descendants of the very Circassians whom the Czarist authorities forced to leave Russia in the sixties of the nineteenth century. In Turkey the Circassians have largely become one with the Turkish people, but in the Arab countries they still form distinct communities. In Palestine they have kept to their own customs and language, and do not inter-marry with the Arabs. The Syrian Arabs dislike the Circassians, of whom both Turks and French had made use against the indigenous population of the country. In Transjordan, too, the Circassian minority has preserved its individuality.[18]

S.U. [208] The survival of Circassian national sentiments in Syria, Palestine and Transjordan may tempt the Soviet Union to create a 'Circassian problem'. Soviet propaganda may try at a given moment to arouse interest for the 'old country' among the Circassians in the Arab world. It should not be too difficult for Russia to spread among the Middle Eastern Circassians the story of the rebirth of the Circassian people in the U.S.S.R., and of the existence of 'Circassian States' therein. Having done this preparatory work Russia may either encourage Circassian re-immigration into the Caucasus or she may use the Circassian on the spot as one of several trump cards Russian imperialism holds in reserve in the Middle East.

RUSSIA'S MOST POLYGLOT COLONY: DAGHESTAN

S.U. 634 563 [103] Da. 103 Daghestan represents the most difficult problem which the Soviet nationalities policy has to face, not only in the Caucasus, but in the Soviet Union as a whole. The very name of the Daghestan A.S.S.R. indicates that the country occupies a special position in the U.S.S.R. It is the only Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic which does not bear the name of a people but of a territory.

Da 563 131 ooo Daghestan is one of the most polyglot countries of the world. Ethnologists record that its roughly 1,000,000 inhabitants are split up into thirty-two nationalities, in a territory of only 14,600 square miles.* The

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* In its original form Daghestan covered 19,800 square miles. In 1938 the Soviet Government separated from Daghestan parts of its lowlands with their predominant Ukrainian-Russian population, and its territory was thus reduced to about 13,000 square miles. After the war, Daghestan 'inherited' from Chechenia 1,600 square miles.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Dagestan RH8

language and nationality issue in Daghestan is a new and superficial one. The The fundamental problem is that of religion; and religion unites the 795 668 Daghestani mountaineers under the green banner of Mohammed.

Under the Czarist régime Russian penetration into Daghestan was 175 incomplete. The country had been a Russian possession since the Treaty 648 of Gulistan which Russia and Persia concluded in 1813, but there was no real pacification of Daghestan until 1859, the year which ended the 'Gazavat', the Holy War which the mountain peoples waged against Czarist Russia under their national and religious leader Shamil. Even during the pacification process these peoples were largely left to themselves. The Russians were concentrated in the small Daghestani towns of Temir-Khan-Shura, Derbent and Petrovsk, and did not interfere with the internal autonomy of the mountain villages. Only half-hearted efforts were made to impose Russian civilization upon the mountaineers. By [871] 1914 only fifty-four Russian schools existed in the whole of Daghestan. In the same year the country had more than 800 religious schools where children learnt the Arabic language, the Koran and the Shariah. In 1917 the sketchy attempts at Russification broke down completely; the Russian schools were closed and mountain localities which had introduced [191] Russian as the official language reverted to Arabic.

Thus Bolshevism had to start in Daghestan right from the beginning 669 with the imposition of Russian rule and Russian civilization. The Bol- 177 shevik Party found it extremely difficult to gain a foothold in the isolated, deeply religious, mountain country. As an ideology Bolshevism has not conquered the mountaineers yet. The technical establishment of Bolshevik rule was, however, achieved in the greater part of Daghestan by the late autumn of 1920, when the Russian White Guards were routed and the Moslem nationalists withdrew to certain centres of resistance in the south of the country.

THE TWO FACES OF SOVIET POLICY IN DAGHESTAN

In November 1920 Stalin came personally to Temir-Khan-Shura, the 642 temporary capital, and proclaimed the autonomy of Daghestan. Stalin 671 addressed an 'extraordinary congress of the peoples of Daghestan' and solemnly promised on behalf of the Soviet Government that the Shariah would be respected.

'Daghestan', Stalin said, 'shall be free to administer itself according to its own conditions, its ways and its customs. We are informed that the Shariah has great importance for the peoples of Daghestan. We are also informed that the enemies of Soviet power are spreading rumours that the Soviet régime would ban the Shariah. I am entitled to declare here on behalf of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic that these rumours are lies. The Government of Russia

Da. 642 671 leaves to every people the full right to administer itself on the basis of its own laws and customs. The Soviet Government considers the Shariah as customary law of the same standing as that in force among other peoples living in Russia. If it is the desire of the people of Daghestan their laws and customs shall be preserved'.[19]

Stalin's statement on the respect which the Soviet régime intended to show towards the Shariah reassured many mountaineers as to the good intentions of the new régime. Considered retrospectively this credulity is not surprising. At a later stage similar pledges which the Soviet Government gave in various instances as to the preservation of foreign institutions and non-interference in national customs have blinded other more advanced nations and their statesmen.

S.U. 563 771 The Daghestani, of course, did not know that a month before his visit to Temir-Khan-Shura[1] Stalin had already defined his Daghestan policy to a Russian communist public in a different way. Writing in the newspaper *Pravda* on October 10th, 1920, Stalin recommended with regard to Daghestan that 'the direct method of combating religious prejudices must be replaced by indirect and more cautious methods'. Instead of 'Cavalry raids' with the object of immediately communizing the backward masses of the Daghestani peoples, Stalin added, 'there must be a cautious and well-conceived policy of gradually drawing these masses into the general stream of Soviet development'.[20]

Da. 668 671 Thus Stalin wanted to give Daghestan only a short respite[2] but there was no question of Soviet Russia observing genuine tolerance for any length of time. As Stalin's real motives were not known to Daghestan his proclamation of Daghestan autonomy in Temir-Khan-Shura bore fruit and weakened the Moslem resistance movement led by Imam Nazhmuddin Gotsinsky who had raised the old banner of Shamil. By January 1922, the anti-Soviet revolt had completely petered out and the 'rebels' had reconciled themselves to the Soviet régime, which at that early stage seemed to adhere to the promise to respect the religious customs of the local population. A 'People's Commissariat for the Shariah' ('Narkomshariat') was set up in 1921 under the old Sheikh, Ali-Hadji Akushinsky.

Da. 671 793 At the time of the establishment of Soviet power Daghestan had about 40,000 people who could be described as 'clergy' in the widest sense of the word – Mullahs, Kadis, Sheikhs, etc. It would have been unwise to antagonize such an important group of Daghestan's population. The Communist Party decided, therefore, to bring about a split in the religious front and encouraged the establishment of a 'progressive' pro-Soviet Moslem group advocating the revision of the Shariah. Quite a number of Moslem ecclesiastic dignitaries walked into the communist trap. In 1923 a congress of over seventy Sheikhs and Mullahs met in the locality of Kakhib and sent a message of allegiance to Lenin and

[1] [Cf. cat. 116, pp. 197-198 for details -- Analyst]
[2] [Cf. cat. 671, pp. 197-198 for background -- Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union

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Stalin. The message, drafted in Arabic, ran as follows: 671 793

'To Lenin and Stalin, Moscow.

The congress of the clergy and the Sheikhs of mountain Daghestan comprising seventy-six people greets thee, leader of the great army of the toilers, liberating the whole world from the chains of slavery and disgrace. We believe in the victory of thy army. We believe that Islam will be freed from oppression with its help. Together with the poor people of our villages we are waiting for thy recovery.* We shall help thy army.

Sheikh of Kakhib, elected chairman of the congress'.

The Sheikhs and Mullahs who had tried to make a pact with the [659] Soviet régime found out in due course that Bolshevism had deceived them. As soon as Soviet rule had been to some extent consolidated, the Communist Party branch of Daghestan came out with a strong anti-religious line and gradually did away with anything that recalled its momentary weakness and apparent readiness for concessions. The 'Narkomshariat' was soon abolished. In 1925–26, death, birth and marriage registrations were taken away from the Kadis and handed over to the Soviet state authorities. The 'medresse', the religious schools, were also liquidated.

Despite all external measures the deep-rooted religious feelings of 771 the Daghestan people could not be wiped out so easily. Religion re- [665] mained triumphant even in the communist ranks. As late as 1930 up to 80 per cent of the communists in certain Daghestan districts observed religious customs. Even responsible party officials thought it necessary to practise the outward forms of religion so as not to give offence to the believers.[21]

Samursky, who was both the secretary of the Daghestan Committee of the Communist Party and the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Daghestan A.S.S.R., admitted in 1935 that there was then still a large number of believers in the country although, he added, the power of the priests had been broken and the new generation did not fill the posts of Mullahs and Kadis.[22]

Samursky himself, who had done his best to annihilate Islam in 661 Daghestan, finally fell into disgrace with the Kremlin because his anti- 793 religious policy had been so unsuccessful. In 1937 he was executed as a 'bourgeois nationalist' and 'enemy of the people'. He was charged with having wilfully kept alive the 'counter-revolutionary activities' of the ecclesiastics. Under Samursky's rule, so the official charge went on, the Mullahs had been able to appeal for the observance of the reactionary customs of the Shariah, spread anti-Soviet literature, and agitate against collective farms.[23] Fritjof Nansen, who during a trip to the Caucasus

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* The message was sent at the time of Lenin's illness. It is reproduced from Samursky's book *Dagestan* (Moscow 1925, p. 136).

Da. 661 793 had met Samursky personally, said about the Daghestani politician that he was a clever man, a good speaker and evidently had great influence among the local people.[24]

THE FIGHT AGAINST THE SHAMIL CULT

Da. [668] 786 814 S.U. 814 After the death of Samursky* the religious resistance continued. The small Daghestani town of Buinaksk remained, together with Baku, Tashkent and Ufa, one of the four most important centres of Islam in the whole Soviet Union. Not only did the Bolshevik fight against religion fail in Daghestan, but Soviet power was equally unsuccessful in eradicating the historic traditions of the mountaineers centred around the great Imam Shamil.

Shamil is the unchallenged national hero of the mountain peoples of Daghestan and Chechenia, whom he led in the fight against Czarist Russia between 1834 and 1859. In Daghestan his memory is so universally respected that even the Soviet régime had to accept the Shamil cult. During over thirty years Soviet historians tried hard to interpret Shamil in accordance with communist ideology. Some went so far as to depict him almost as a forerunner of communism, and practically all agreed that he was the leader of a progressive national liberation movement. In all history textbooks as used in Soviet schools Shamil figured as a brave and capable military leader, a skilful organizer, a promoter of trade and an opponent of local feudalism.[25]

After the Second World War the Soviet leaders became more and more convinced that the benevolent attitude towards Shamil had been a mistake, and that it was time to put an end to all concessions to Daghestani anti-Russian nationalism. In 1947 members of the Institute for History of the All-Union Academy of Sciences were summoned for a long discussion on the Shamil problem. Most of the historians participating in it could find no possibility of reversing their judgment on the progressive and democratic character of Shamil.[26] Although the party leadership might have been expected to disagree with the attitude of the Academy, it waited till 1950 for its formal denunciation of the Shamil cult. The campaign was then conducted by the party secretary of Azerbaidzhan, Bagirov, and by his opposite number in Daghestan, Daniyalov. In separate statements, each about 10,000 words long, the two officials declared that practically everything written during the Soviet régime concerning Shamil had been wrong from beginning to end. Bagirov's statement was published in the party organ *Bolshevik* and Daniyalov's in *Voprosy Istorii* (Problems of History), an organ of the Academy. Both sought to show that Shamil was no national hero but an agent of British and Turkish imperialism. He was no progressive personality, they said, but had opposed the only progressive solution

*[Cf category 116, p. 199-200, R1 Sov. Union--Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

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Da. 186 814
S.U. 814

for the peoples of Daghestan, namely, union with Russia. Both Bagirov and Daniyalov produced a large number of historical documents referring to Shamil's alleged treacherous and reactionary role. All these documents, most of which were over 100 years old, must long since have been known to Soviet historians, but probably did not seem to them relevant. The Daghestani party secretary went as far as to say that the annexation of Daghestan by Russia was the only way out of stagnation, since it had led to the development of Daghestani economy and brought the country into connection with progressive Russian culture.[27] The communist offensive against the Shamil cult reduced to zero many cultural efforts which had been made in Daghestan under the Soviet régime. Many works which Daghestani and Russian authors had written on Daghestani history became obsolete.

In view of the liquidation of the Chechens, the dethronement of Shamil could not affect Chechenia, which had likewise fought against Czarism under his leadership, but it had repercussions in Azerbaidzhan. Shamil's struggle had been very popular with the Azerbaidzhani people. Many Azerbaidzhani historians and writers had paid tribute to him. The sympathy which Shamil enjoyed in Azerbaidzhan was even the primary reason for the launching of the anti-Shamil campaign. This happened in the following way. An Azerbaidzhani scholar, Geidar Guseinov, had written a learned thesis *History of nineteenth-century social and philosophical thought in Azerbaidzhan*. The thesis was generally believed to have considerable merit as a book of scholarship and was awarded the Stalin Prize in March 1950. Two months later the award of the Stalin Prize was withdrawn by special decision of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. The official explanation of this gesture, extraordinary even for Soviet conditions, was Guseinov's estimate of Shamil's personality. His book had, indeed, contained a few friendly words about Shamil and his movement.[28] Not only was Guseinov himself sharply rebuked but also the reviewers of his book, and in particular the Azerbaidzhani Academy of Sciences, which had recommended it for the Stalin Prize.

DAGHESTAN'S LANGUAGE PROBLEM

Da 198

According to the Bible, mankind became divided into nationalities and started to speak different tongues because Man had challenged God and had built the Tower of Babel. The language problem of Soviet Daghestan originated in a similar way from the Bolshevik challenge to Allah and to Arabic, the sacred language of the Koran. Arabic had acquired a monopoly as a means of education in the mountain country. It was the inter-tribal language which made the mountaineers forget that they belonged to different nationalities.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
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191 [illegible] The difficulty of Daghestan's language problem lies in the fact that there is no local language in the country which can in any way claim priority over others. Even the most widespread of the local languages – the Avar – is spoken by only 158,000 people, just 22 per cent of the total population. The other more important nationalities of Daghestan are Kumyks (95,000), Darghinians (107,000), Lezghians (100,000) and Lakians (40,000).

191 212 The local Communist Party leadership was at first highly sceptical about encouraging literacy in the languages of the Daghestani mountaineers. The party felt that a more highly developed language should be introduced instead, to take the place of Arabic. The question arose whether Daghestan's new lingua franca and official language was to be Russian, which the Czarist régime had tried to impose, unsuccessfully, or Turkic. [192] The Soviet authorities considered that Turkic was for many reasons a more suitable choice. First, Turkic, unlike Russian, was not a language of 'Unbelievers', but one spoken by Moslem peoples, and had thus a better chance to oust Arabic. The selection of Turkic was furthermore a tribute to the culturally most advanced nationality of Daghestan, the Kumyks, a Turkic people, the only ethnical group of Daghestan who had produced a national literature, in Czarist times. Finally, the communist leaders indulged in considerable illusions about the role which Daghestan might be able to play in revolutionizing the East, provided that it adopted the Turkic language.

This is what the party secretary, Samursky, wrote about this aspect of the Daghestani language problem, at a time when he fully reflected the official point of view: 'If one takes the interests of the World Revolution as the departing point one must recognize that education in the Turkic language can render in Daghestan a much greater service than education in Russian. Daghestan, on the one hand, is a land of the Orient which has so far kept up contact with all (Oriental) countries in the vicinity. On the other hand, Daghestan has come within the orbit of the Proletarian Revolution. Daghestan can and must serve as a link between the U.S.S.R. and the Orient better than all other parts of the Soviet Union and it must become a channel of communist ideas in the Near East. The Near East either speaks the Turkic language or understands it. The Turkic language gives the Daghestani the possibility of contact with all nationalities in the Near East and this contact will introduce a revolutionary current into the oppressed colonial and semi-colonial countries'.[29]

198 665 The Communist Party leadership soon found out that the hopes which it had pinned on the introduction of Turkic as Daghestan's lingua franca could not materialize. Daghestan was a bulwark of Oriental ideas in the Soviet Union and could never become a bulwark of Soviet ideas in the East with or without the Turkic language. The Daghestani Com-

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union

Dagestan RH8

[Taty (Mountain Jews)]

munist Party was a tiny and weak body. In 1927 it had only 651 mem- 665
bers from the local nationalities and they were unable to convert their 198
own peoples to Bolshevism, let alone to become missionaries of communism in other Oriental countries.

In 1927–28 a special language commission of the Daghestan Com- 523
mittee of the Communist Party reconsidered the language problem and 191
recommended that more attention should be devoted to the local 871
languages. On the basis of this recommendation a language reform was decreed providing for elementary education in eight languages. A basic political terminology was worked out for all of them. The recognized languages were originally those of the Avars, Darghinians, Lezghians, Lakians, Kumyks, Tabasarans, Nogai Tartars and the Taty.* Later on recognition was withdrawn from the language of the Nogai Tartars,[30] most of whom lived in the territory separated from Daghestan in 1938.

Even after the language reform higher education was based on Turkic and Russian. Finally, however, Russian dominated the field at the expense of both Turkic and Arabic. It was authoritatively stated as early as 1930 that Turkic had already fulfilled its mission of 'diverting the attention of the masses from the Arab language'.[32]

The triumph of the Russian language in Daghestan was not only due 647
to the need of a lingua franca in a multi-national territory; it was also a tribute to the outstanding role which the Russians played in the central administration of the Daghestan A.S.S.R. In the inter-war period the recruitment of Daghestani mountaineers into administrative jobs had hardly made any progress at all. In 1927 the percentage of the Daghestani employed at the headquarters of the Daghestan Government was 21·6 per cent; in 1929 it was 25·3 per cent and in 1936, 20 per cent only.[33] It is not altogether the fault of the régime if it failed to recruit civil servants from among the mountain people. The mountaineers were more interested in exercising self-government over their villages than in going to the towns of the plain to administer their villages from there. The two most important towns of Daghestan, Makhach Kala (previously 000

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* The Taty speak an Iranian language. In Daghestan they are largely identical with the so-called 'Mountain Jews'. According to the 1926 census there were 11,484 of such 'Mountain Jews' in Daghestan and 10,270 in Azerbaidzhan. The returns are hardly correct as far as Daghestan is concerned, where the census took place at a time when the 'Mountain Jews' were exposed to active persecution. In the year of the census the Jews sent a delegation to Moscow to complain about their plight. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee dispatched an 'instructor' to investigate the situation. He reported to Moscow: (1) anti-semite excesses, even murders, were not punished by the administration; (2) the cultural and medical services of the Taty were neglected and the central Government deceived by wrong information; (3) national minority rights of the Taty were not observed in the local Soviets; (4) Taty were not accepted as workers in state enterprises; and (5) lower administrative organs were rude in their behaviour towards the Taty. The situation did not improve after the instructor had left Daghestan and the conditions in which the Taty found themselves remained for a while what a Jewish communist author described as a 'political scandal'.[31]

The two most important towns of Dagestan, Makhach Kala (previously
361 Petrovsk) and Buinaksk (previously Temir-Khan-Shura) are now called
103 after Daghestani communists, but for that reason they have not become
closer to the hearts of the Daghestani, nor are they likely to have changed
their racial composition in which the Russian-Ukrainian elements used
[162] to prevail. The last available figure referring to 1924 showed that 55 per
cent of the inhabitants of Makhach Kala are Slavs while Russians
alone form three-fifths of the population of Buinaksk.

DAGHESTANI LITERATURE

177,53 The language problem which is also the problem of Daghestan's
538 culture is still unsettled. Even if Russian civilization triumphs there will
[212] still remain the cultural heritage of the past, which is an Arabic heritage. Soviet cultural workers are fully conscious of this complication and are trying to solve it in a 'dialectical' way. They cannot ignore the literary documents which the peoples of Daghestan produced in Arabic during the past centuries, but they have tried to deny the existence of a cultural interdependence between the mountaineers and the Arabic Moslem world. The Arabic literary documents of Daghestan are now simply classified as 'Daghestani literature', and the fact that they were written in Arabic is just an unimportant coincidence. The Arabic heritage is still an important foundation stone for cultural activities in Daghestan. The national poet of Soviet Daghestan, Gamzat Tsadasa (1874–1951), a former Mullah, would probably not have embarked on a literary career had he not been under the spell of Arab poetry from his earliest youth. Even an official Soviet publication had to admit that a small library of ancient Arabic texts was one of Tsadasa's most treasured possessions.[34] The Soviet authorities were compelled to overlook Tsadasa's 'Arabomania' as long as he wrote poems in praise of Stalin and the Bolshevik régime.

Tsadasa was the second national poet of Daghestan. The first was Suleiman Stalsky (1869–1937). He, like Samursky, was a Lezghian, and it is not unlikely that this 'enemy of the people' was the first to discover him. Stalsky was built up into one of the most outstanding poets of the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R. His poems were translated into many languages of the Soviet Union. To a remarkable degree they were well-informed as to the official propaganda needs of the moment. At one stage Stalsky's poems attacked the 'kulaks' and hailed collectivization; then they boosted the Stakhanov movement; finally, they exposed the deviationists and bourgeois nationalists – always at the right time. This was the more amazing as Stalsky lived, according to an official biography, in considerable retirement in a mountain village and was unable to get any first-hand information on political matters. Stalsky was illiterate and no 'original version' of his

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works existed. His poems were taken down by people among the audience while he recited them. Maxim Gorky took Stalsky under his wing and described him a 'Homer of the twentieth century'.[35] This well-meaning but somewhat exaggerated tribute was often quoted in the Soviet Union, particularly by the Daghestani themselves, among whom it provoked a certain nationalist conceit. If we have produced a Homer, the young Daghestani Soviet intellectuals argued, we have made an outstanding contribution towards Soviet literature and are entitled to the respect of the Russians themselves. Finally, the Daghestani had to be told that their pride was based on a misunderstanding, since Gorky did not mean to put Homer and Stalsky on the same level, but his comparison only referred to the way in which Stalsky's works were produced.[36] Stalsky's works are still reprinted in Russia, although some of his poems in which he denounced the Russian conquest of the Caucasus are no longer in harmony with the new Soviet patriotic ideology.

Both Stalsky and Tsadasa are poets of the past even if the subjects of their poetry are Stalin and the Five Year Plans. The poet of the future is Effendi Kapiyev. He belongs to the young generation of Daghestan, is a product of the Soviet school, and no longer believes in the romanticism of the *aul*. His homeland is no longer Daghestan but the whole Soviet Union and his language no longer a Daghestani idiom but Russian. The effects of Soviet education on Kapiyev can be gathered from his own words in praise of the Russian language which are included in his novel *The Poet:*

'Oh thou, great Russian tongue, I kneel before thee. Adopt me and give me thy blessing . . . I belong to a very small people lost in the mountains but I find thee and I am no more an orphan. Without thee there was and is no future, with thee we are truly omnipotent'.[37]

These words represent an extreme example of the spirit which the Soviet régime is trying to implant into all non-Russian territories of the U.S.S.R.

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VIII

TRANSCAUCASIA

TRANSCAUCASIA AND RUSSIAN HISTORY

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Russia swept beyond the Caucasus and established her rule in Transcaucasia decades before the peoples of the Caucasus mountains themselves were fully pacified and subjected to Russian rule.

The benefit which Russia derived from taking possession of Transcaucasia is similar to that gained by an upstart ruler through an alliance with a princess of royal blood: namely, making his own a tradition in which he had been lacking.

By becoming linked with Armenian history, for instance, Russian history established a link with antiquity, with ancient Egypt, Assyria and Persia, with Alexander the Great and, finally, with the Roman Empire. Soviet historians indeed proudly recall that it was the Armenians, 'a people of the Soviet Union', who, under the leadership of their king, Tigran the Great, had defeated the 'invincible Roman legions' of Lucullus and this fact could not be altered even if at a later stage Armenia did become a vassal kingdom whose rulers were given the title of 'friend of the Roman Empire'.[1]

Both Armenians and Georgians had their written alphabets more than 1,000 years before the introduction of the Cyrillic script on which the Russian alphabet was ultimately based. The latest discoveries of Soviet scholars have even led to the assumption that the Georgian alphabet originated not later than the seventh century before Jesus Christ.

It is true that the history of the peoples of Russian Central Asia, which was annexed half a century later than Transcaucasia, also goes back to antiquity. However, by incorporating the Georgian and Armenian lands Russia was able to put to her credit not only general historic traditions, as in the case of Central Asia, but also an ancient Christian tradition. Both the Georgians and the Armenians had been converted to Christendom at the beginning of the fourth century, i.e. earlier than most of the peoples in the Occident and about 700 years before the conversion of the Russians.

In annexing Western and Central Transcaucasia the Russians had the proud satisfaction of having brought safely into the orbit of Christian civilization two peoples who for many centuries had been exposed to

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permanent and violent pressure and persecution, on the part of Oriental, Ca. non-Christian powers. The Russians avenged the sufferings and hardships 101 which both Armenians and Georgians had endured from Turkish 175 and Persian overlords. Although the primary motives of the Russians S.U. were hardly of an exclusively humanitarian nature they could claim, 181 with some justification, that they acted in Georgia and Armenia as a protecting rather than as a colonial power.

The case of Azerbaidzhan, which covers Eastern Transcaucasia, is altogether different; unlike the Georgian and Armenian 'protectorates' that country has more the character of a colony. Azerbaidzhan is, indeed, the only part of Transcaucasia where Russian colonization has been conducted on a large scale.

In Western Transcaucasia the influx of Russian elements has always remained insignificant even if Russian cultural influences are promoted there as strongly as anywhere else in the Soviet Union. The two principal peoples of Western Transcaucasia, the Georgians and Armenians, enjoy a special privileged position. They are expected to encourage Russian state interests in their area, as it were, by their own initiative, but without visible interference by Russian colonists who in other Soviet Republics occupy commanding posts in cultural and economic life.

Nominally, Georgia and Armenia have the same status as Kirghizistan Ca. or Uzbekistan, but their actual status is on a higher level. Georgia is the 631 only Soviet Republic, apart from the R.S.F.S.R., forming a miniature federation which includes two Autonomous Republics and one Autonomous Province. Thus the Georgians exercise within the framework of the Soviet constitution a certain guardianship over other peoples, a role which the Russians claim for themselves practically everywhere else in the Soviet Union. Armenia again is not only the State of the Armenians within the Soviet Union but also the spiritual home of the Armenian people scattered all over the globe.

TRANSCAUCASIA AND RUSSIAN MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Politically and strategically the whole of Transcaucasia forms a Russian S.U. wedge driven into the Middle East which has every possible chance of 185 expanding. Lermontov seems to have felt the tremendous implications 539 which the submission of the Caucasus mountains to Russian rule may have for both Russia and the peoples of the East. He may have had a premonition that the conquest of the Caucasus would open a new chapter in the history of many lands situated to the South of the great mountain system. In Lermontov's prophetic poem 'Dispute', two Caucasus mountains, Kazbek and Shat, talk to each other. Shat warns Kazbek of the 'powerful East crowded with people', but he fails to

639 impress Kazbek who looks far to the South and South-East where he
185 sees only dreaming, sleeping, almost lifeless peoples, countries and cities:

Wreathed in hookah-clouds, inclining
   To a gay divan,
By a fountain's pearly playing
   Slumbers Teheran.

Here, beneath the Holy City,
   Wasted by God's hand,
Wordless, wearisome, unwaking,
   Lies a barren land.

There, through regions shunned by shadow,
   Flows the yellow Nile,
Lapping at the sun-scorched soaring
   Of each kingly pile.

Bedouin forgets his forays
   On his tented bed,
Singing, as the stars he numbers,
   Deeds of men long dead.

Seeing all this, Kazbek confidently exclaims: 'No, the old ramshackle East shall not conquer me!' But then Kazbek turns to the North and there he beholds a vast army, a moving torrent rolling towards the Caucasus. Overwhelmed by this formidable spectacle Kazbek becomes silent for ever after.

000 Lermontov did not say in his poem what happened after that, but the conclusion is near at hand: the army – the Russian army – not satisfied with the possession of the subdued Kazbek and its 'fellow-mountains', walked down the Caucasus slopes. Once on the other side of the Caucasus range it would become possible for the army to penetrate into the 'sleeping world' of the East and reach Teheran, the Bedouins, Jerusalem and perhaps, one day, even the Nile. As other powers guarded the sleep of the Eastern peoples Russia made but limited use of the vast potentialities which the Transcaucasian bridgehead might have offered.

Looking towards the East from the oil-wells of Baku in our time, our eyes behold a somewhat different view from the one seen by Lermontov in 1841; a disciplined, strong and self-conscious Turkey; further on the new Israel, a modern Western State in the Middle East; and also the up-to-date installations of British and American oil companies. This, however, is but one side of the picture, for the most characteristic feature of the Middle Eastern scene is still the existence of backward ooo countries far inferior in strength to Russia; and if she wanted to exploit this discrepancy to her advantage she would have weapons of another nature at her disposal than those which conquered the Caucasus.

The economic strength of Soviet Transcaucasia, the unsettled social and nationality problems of the Middle East, the military weakness of most Middle Eastern nations – all this would favour Russia if she wanted to shift her borders towards the South, to enlarge the Transcaucasian bridgehead. In this political-strategic operation each of the three Transcaucasian Soviet Republics has certain clearly defined tasks to perform and each of them is, indeed, conserving a great deal of energy in order to be able to shoulder them.

The dynamic force inherent in any potential political-strategic action centring around Soviet Transcaucasia can only be rightly measured by [643] taking into account the personality of the Caucasian Stalin and his 563 particular interest in the three Transcaucasian Soviet Republics. Not only was Stalin born in Transcaucasia, not only did he start his political career there, but he has a more intimate knowledge of the problems of the three Transcaucasian nations than of any other non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. From his extensive personal experience Stalin can guide the action of the Transcaucasian communists with a surer hand than that of any other sub-section of the All-Union Communist Party. In Transcaucasia more than anywhere else, Stalin knows how far to go in claims concerning neighbouring areas, which arguments to use to cover up his plans, where to stop and when to retreat. Stalin attracted Lenin's attention first as an expert on nationality problems, more precisely as an expert on nationality problems of the Caucasus; and it would seem that later on Stalin simply projected on the whole of Russia and Europe the experience gathered in Transcaucasia in the field of nationality and minority problems.

Certainly some genuine spontaneous manifestations of national ooo aspirations in Transcaucasia would have flared up under any political régime and are not just 'Soviet made'. These aspirations would not, however, have been allowed to express themselves had they not obtained the approval of the Kremlin. As a matter of fact the Kremlin has not only given its blessing to the struggle for Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaidzhani aspirations, but it is even leading it, thus preventing local Transcaucasian nationalism from getting out of control.

The Kremlin knows that Armenian, Georgian and Azerbaidzhani national claims are dynamite which has to be handled with great care if it is to blow up the right things at the right time. The timing of the action cannot be left in the hands of the local rulers of Erevan, Tiflis and Baku, but has to be determined in the light of higher considerations which are the exclusive domain of the central Government in Moscow.

TRANSCAUCASIA

I. ARMENIANS

S.U. 563 648 The Armenian problem constitutes perhaps the most powerful brand of dynamite which the Soviet Union has in store in Transcaucasia for action in the Middle East. Almost their entire history, had prepared the Armenians for the role which they had already played in the Czarist Russian Empire and which they are called upon to carry on in Soviet Russia. This role of the Armenians consisted in serving Russia in many different ways, in working for her material prosperity and consolidating and extending the power of the Russian Empire along one of its most important border marches.

As. 181 The Armenian poet, Ovanes Tumanyan, has said that Armenia's sorrow was a shoreless sea. Indeed, the long history of Armenian adventures and sufferings almost recalls that of the Jews. Both Armenians and Jews are peoples whose sons, by force of circumstances, have had to live scattered over many lands in alien surroundings exposed to the hatred and contempt of their environment. Just like the Jews, the Armenians have displayed great pride in their nationality and religion which has only served to increase the animosity of the outside world against them.

As. 175 167 The decisive fact in the life of the Armenian people was the early loss of their national independence. This independence ended in Armenia proper – the Caucasian Armenia – in 1080 when the country fell under Turkish and Byzantine rule. The 'Little Armenia' which the remnants of the Caucasian Armenian population had established on the Mediterranean coast in Cilicia was subjugated by the Turks in 1376.

The downfall of the two Armenias was followed by great waves of emigration. Thousands of Armenian refugees poured into Cyprus, Rhodes, Smyrna, Constantinople, Italy and France. Being a people who belonged to the Orient as well as to the Occident, the Armenians also went to the East, in that case, however, not as refugees but as merchants, their economic interests and abilities prompting them to leave their small mountain country and seek their fortunes abroad. The Persian Shah, Abbas the Great (1587–1629), took the Armenians under his protection, allowed them to establish a prosperous merchant colony at Ispahan and also used them to develop Persian trade in India. Thus Armenian merchants settled in Madras, Bombay and Ceylon and contributed largely towards the development of Calcutta as a great trading centre. From India the Armenian colonies spread further to the Far East, particularly to Nanking and Canton.[1]

1/ [Cf. category 116, pp. 212-215--Analyst]

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FIRST RUSSIAN-ARMENIAN CONTACTS

Contacts between the Armenians and Russia had started long before 175 their national independence came to an end. Russian-Armenian relations 148 are, indeed, almost as old as the Russian State. The first reference to the Armenians in Russian chronicles goes back to 1062, when the Grand Duke of Kiev invited Armenians to participate in a war against the Poles. Those Armenians who followed the appeal were allowed to settle permanently in Kiev and to have their own Armenian church in that city.[3]

From 1626 onwards Armenian traders began to play a part in Russian trade with the Orient, in particular with Persia. In the initial stage they served individually and informally as intermediaries between Russia and the East. A more organized Russian-Armenian co-operation began in 1667 when Czar Alexey Mikhailovich concluded an agreement with the Armenian Company in Ispahan. This agreement coincided with a turning-point in Russian history. It was approximately from 1667 that the Turkish problem became a predominant factor in Russian foreign policy. In that year Russia had signed with Poland a peace treaty rendering that 'hereditary enemy' innocuous and permitting the Czar to concentrate his attention on Turkey. The agreement with the Armenian Company resulting in a diversion of Persian trade, particularly of Persian silk exports, from Turkey to Russia, was thus a link in the anti-Turkish policy pursued by the Czar.[4]

Under Peter the Great, Russia inaugurated a more coherent and systematic 'Armenian policy'. An Armenian, Israel Orii, was the first ambassador to be sent by Peter to the Persian court of Ispahan (1708). In Peter's name, Orii promised the Armenians in Persia that Russia would liberate them from the 'Persian yoke'.[5] A few years later, in 1716, Peter sent Artem Volynsky, one of his most able collaborators, as ambassador to Persia, entrusting him with the mission of extending trade with that country and also with collecting detailed information about the Armenians and other Christian subjects of the Persian Shah. The most decisive step in Peter's 'Armenian policy' was a manifesto which the Czar issued in 1723 inviting the Armenians of Turkey and Persia to come to Russia where they would enjoy special privileges.

Following Peter's manifesto, Armenians poured into Russia throughout 175 the eighteenth century, not only as traders but as pioneer settlers 167 opening up new territories. Thus Armenians became the economic backbone of the North Caucasus region after its conquest by the Russians. Hard-working Armenian settlers introduced the cultivation of the vine and the silkworm and provided the new Russian towns in

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As. 175 167 the North Caucasus region such as Kizlyar, Mozdok, Stavropol, Vladikavkaz and Armavir with the economically most valuable of their inhabitants.

By the annexation of the Crimea in 1783 another Armenian colony came under Russian rule. At an early stage in their diaspora, Armenians had gone to the South-Eastern Crimean coastal areas in such large numbers that some writers of the fourteenth century described the shore of the Crimea as 'Maritime Armenia'. In the town of Feodosia a substantial part of the population remained Armenian until the twentieth century. Feodosia's most famous son, the great painter of the Russian sea, I. K. Aivazovsky, was the offspring of an Armenian family.

As. [103] Armenians from the Crimea, while still living under Tartar rule, emigrated in 1773 to the mouth of the Don where they founded, opposite Rostov, the town of Nakhichevan. The new place bore the same name as an ancient town in Armenia proper which, popular legends said, Noah himself built after having left the Ark.

RUSSIA – 'PROTECTOR' OF ARMENIANS

S.U. 175 636 As. 175 167 The year 1828 in which Russia and Persia signed the treaty of Turkmanchai brought the Armenian people finally into the Russian orbit. By that treaty Persia ceded to Russia the area which corresponds roughly to the present Armenian Soviet Republic. Erevan, to-day the capital of the Armenian S.S.R., as well as the authentic Nakhichevan and Echmiadzin, the residence of the Catholicos (the head of the Armenian Church), became Russian.

As a consequence of the wars with Persia and Turkey which both ended in 1828, about 100,000 Armenians left the two Moslem countries and settled in the new 'Armenian Province' ('oblast') of the Russian Empire which was formed out of the territories annexed from Persia. About 65,000 Armenians came from Eastern Turkey and 40,000 from Persian Azerbaidzhan while a few hundred families went from the Turkish-controlled Balkans to Russian Bessarabia where a new Armenian centre emerged.

After 1828 Russia fought no further wars against Persia, but the fight against Turkey continued. The Armenian problem was one of the weapons to be used in this fight, particularly during and after the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–78 when Russian troops succeeded in occupying practically all parts of Eastern Anatolia inhabited by Armenians. The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 put a brake on the territorial ambitions of the Russian Empire which was allowed to annex only the Sandjak of Kars. Many thousands of Armenians remained under Turkish rule. The Treaty of Berlin included a minority protection clause, but no sanctions were provided against its violation.

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ARMENIANS

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Instead of bringing liberation to the Armenians of Turkey, the 1877–78 war proved to be the prelude to a new martyrdom of the Armenian people. The welcome which the Armenians of Turkey had extended to the Russian troops and the insistence with which Russia had protected Armenian national interests led directly to the mass slaughtering of Armenians at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. According to Armenian sources more than 1,000,000 Armenians either perished in the savage massacres under Sultan Abdul Hamid or else were exterminated in a more organized way under the régime of the 'Young Turks' during the First World War. Up to Hitler's mass destruction of the Jews, the extermination of the Armenians during the last years of the Ottoman Empire could be considered as the most barbarous crime against humanity committed in modern times. Adult Armenians were shot or burnt alive, children were converted to Islam by force, many of the victims died on their way to the places of banishment in Mesopotamia to which they were being driven from their homes in Turkish Armenia. The luckiest ones were those able to escape abroad at the price of losing all their property.

The unhappy Armenian people who, for reasons of religious affinity, had opted for Christian Russia as the lesser evil, should not be burdened with the reproach of having provoked the massacres, but the unscrupulous policy of the Czarist Government has a share of responsibility. Bolshevik critics in the post-revolutionary period ruthlessly exposed the 'Armenian policy' of Czarist Russia, but such criticism is now no longer popular in the Soviet Union. It is no longer fashionable to recall in Soviet publications that at the time of the worst massacres in the nineties of the last century official Russia categorically refused any intervention in favour of the Armenians. It was only on the eve of the First World War that the Czarist authorities remembered the important role the Armenians could perform for Russia as an auxiliary force in the enemy's rear. On October 10th, 1912, one of the last Russian Viceroys of the Caucasus, Count Vorontsov-Dashkov, advised the Czar Nicholas II to revert to an active 'Armenian policy.' 'An open intervention for the protection of the Turkish Armenians', he wrote in a report, 'is essential, particularly in the present time . . . to prepare beforehand a sympathetic population in those localities which as things are at present may easily find themselves willingly or unwillingly within the sphere of our military operations'.[6]

THE ARMENIAN S.S.R.

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Soviet Russia, even more than the Czarist régime, subordinated the Armenian problem to its general Middle East policy. The Soviet Government supported the Armenian cause whenever it suited its general

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S.U 563 648 political strategy, but it never allowed the Armenian factor to interfere when 'higher considerations' were at stake.

The first statement which young Soviet Russia issued on the Armenian question was an unconditional recognition of Armenian self-determination. The document in question was the Decree on Turkish Armenia of December 1917, and referred to the Turkish territories which the Russian army had occupied in the First World War. The decree called for a 'free plebiscite' of the Armenian people, evacuation of all foreign troops from Turkish Armenia, the formation of an Armenian Peoples Militia and return of all Armenian refugees to their homeland in Eastern Anatolia. The Soviet Government even pledged itself to demand in the peace treaty with Turkey the repatriation of those Armenian refugees whom the Turkish authorities had deported during the war.

The emergence of Kemal Pasha's anti-imperialist national liberation movement changed the whole aspect of Soviet Russia's Armenian policy. The Kemalist revolution was, from the Soviet point of view, a gigantic diversion leading to the consolidation of the Soviet régime in general and to the stabilization of Bolshevik rule in the Caucasus in particular. The national minorities of Anatolia, including the Armenians, had to pay the price of Soviet-Kemalist friendship. There could be no question of Soviet Russia insisting on justice being done to the Armenians of 'Turkish Armenia'. The Soviet régime thus put the Armenian question into cold storage for many years as far as its international aspects were concerned. It had, however, its own Armenian problem to settle. This 'settlement' consisted in Bolshevism defeating the 'Dashnaks', the great Armenian national movement of Western orientation, in depriving the Armenians, essentially a people of shopkeepers and merchants, of their wealth and in granting them in exchange an autonomous administration having the semblance of a State.

Aa. 631 131 [196] S.U. 635 563 634 The Armenian Soviet Republic became the smallest of the 'States' of Transcaucasia, much too small for the liking of Armenian nationalists who complained that the Armenian Soviet Republic covered but a tiny corner of 11,600 square miles out of the total of 75,000 square miles of Transcaucasia. They claimed that the 'real' Armenia within the U.S.S.R. was over 25,000 square miles in extent. Indeed, more than 600,000 Armenians continued to live in Azerbaidzhan and Georgia.

From a geographical point of view little Soviet Armenia had a rather artificial construction and had not the advantage of being a river State like Georgia of which a large part is situated in the Rion valley, or like Azerbaidzhan which roughly covers the basin of the Kura river. The frontiers of Armenia were drawn in such a way as to satisfy the arch-enemy of the Armenians – Turkey. The Soviet-Turkish treaties concluded in 1921 at Moscow and Kars pledged Soviet Russia to exclude an area of 2,100 square miles from Armenia and to put it under the

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Armenia RJ1

Armenians RJ3

'protectorate' of the Azerbaidzhan Soviet Republic. This area[1] which S.U.
the Soviet Government had originally promised to the Armenians 635
became known under the name of A.S.S.R. of Nakhichevan. It has a 563
predominantly Turkic population, but is completely surrounded by 634
Armenian territory. It would have been a more equitable solution if Aa,
Nakhichevan had been granted the status of an Autonomous Province 131
or an Autonomous Republic within the framework of Armenia. On [631]
Turkey's insistence, however, the territory had to become part of
Azerbaidzhan.[7]

While Nakhichevan was handed over to Azerbaidzhan, an Armenian area of about the same size was not permitted to join Soviet Armenia for the reason that it belonged to Azerbaidzhan economically. This area – the mountain region of Karabakh – has the status of an Autonomous Province and is thus placed in an inferior position to that of Nakhichevan. The Autonomous Province covers 1,700 square miles and has 150,000 inhabitants of whom 90 per cent are Armenians. It is separated from Armenia proper by a small slice of sparsely populated Azerbaidzhanian mountain territory.

The Soviet central Government seemed to consider that the Christian Armenians to whom fate had never been kind in the past and who had been preserved from further extermination by the Russians, should be content with whatever the Russians chose to offer them, while a Moslem people, like the Azerbaidzhani Turks, had to be won over by concessions.

However small in size, the Armenian S.S.R. was an extremely impor- S.U.
tant creation of Soviet nationalities policy. Even at the height of Soviet- 513
Turkish friendship the mere existence of a Soviet Armenia was a threat 648
which Soviet Russia kept in reserve if ever the Turkish Republic should
take an anti-Soviet course. No Russian or Armenian communist
mentioned the problem of Turkish Armenia during the inter-war period,
but it was not forgotten and the coat of arms of the Armenian S.S.R.
was a constant reminder that the last word of the Armenian question
had not been spoken. In addition to hammer, sickle and Soviet star,
this coat of arms shows the Ararat Mountain which lies inside Turkish
territory.

ARMENIAN DIASPORA AND SOVIET REPATRIATION POLICY

As.
In 1939 the total Armenian population of the Soviet Union amounted 161
to 2,151,000 of which only 1,281,000 lived in Soviet Armenia. Only 65,000 Armenians are left in Turkey, according to official Turkish statistics, most of them living in Istanbul. There is, however, a third group of Armenians in whom Soviet propaganda had always been particularly interested – that Armenian diaspora scattered all over the

[1] [Cf. Category 131, p 216 -- Analyst]

Armenians RJ3

161 world. On the eve of the Second World War these Armenians were distributed as follows:

United States and Canada	200,000
Syria and Lebanon	175,000
Iran	100,000
France	75,000
Rumania	40,000
Bulgaria	30,000
Greece	30,000
Egypt	30,000
Argentine	20,000
Iraq	15,000
Brazil and Uruguay	10,000
Cyprus	4,000
India and Java	3,000
China	2,000
Ethiopia	1,000
Other countries	15,000[8]

167 In the inter-war period the Soviet Government showed little interest in the question of repatriating to Armenia even the communist elements of the Armenian emigration.[1] It was preferable from the Soviet point of view to leave them on the spot. They were able to play a useful role, particularly in the Middle Eastern countries where there was little native proletariat and where the Communist parties were weak. A systematic repatriation on a large scale was only initiated when Russia started its cold war against Turkey in 1945 by raising simultaneously the problem of the Dardanelles and the question of 'Turkish Armenia'.

The legal basis for the repatriation policy were two decrees: one of November 1945, which provided for state subsidies and exemption from customs duties for all Armenians who wished to return to their homeland; the second, of July 1946, under the terms of which any Armenian repatriate became automatically a Soviet citizen on crossing the Soviet border. Families of repatriates were entitled to a long-term loan of 25,000 roubles if settling in villages and of 30,000 roubles if taking up residence in towns. Many Armenian refugees living abroad in precarious circumstances could rightly be expected to grasp the opportunity offered by the Soviet Governments of Moscow and Erevan and to return to Armenia. During the first year of the implementation of the repatriation scheme, in 1946, 50,000 Armenians went to the Armenian S.S.R. In 1947, however, the enthusiasm for repatriation had somehow cooled off. Instead of 60,000 Armenians as foreseen by the plan, only 35,000 came to the U.S.S.R.[9] In and after 1948 the repatriation action petered out, presumably because of the unfavourable reports which the first repatriates had sent abroad to their kinsmen on their experiences in the Soviet Union.

[1] [Cf. Category 161, pp. 217-218 --Analyst]

Armenians RJ3

Armenia RJ1

The contingent of the first repatriation year[1] included 20,000 Armenians from North-Western Persia. As. 167 Many of them cannot be regarded as Aa. voluntary repatriates; they had compromised themselves for the Soviet 167 cause when Russian troops were in occupation of Persian Azerbaidzhan and probably preferred to leave with the Red Army rather than to expose themselves to Persian reprisals. Indeed, quite a number of Armenians in Persian Azerbaidzhan who failed to join the repatriation action in time, seem to have been rounded up by the Persian authorities and transferred to Southern Persia.[10]

The organizers of the Soviet repatriation drive were particularly eager to get the largest possible number of children repatriates who, from a political point of view, would constitute a lesser problem for the Soviet authorities than adult immigrants. This attempt seems to have been crowned with success, since among the 85,000 Armenians repatriated in 1946 and 1947, there were over 16,700 children of school age alone. In the beginning the repatriated children were not permitted to mix with children born in the Armenian S.S.R. The segregation was partly due to language difficulties, for many repatriated children spoke little or no Armenian, and partly to political reasons. The repatriated children were kept together in eleven new specially established schools and in sixty-four new classes which had been added to schools already in existence.[11]

To make even a partial success out of the repatriation scheme the Soviet Government badly needed the support of the Armenian Gregorian Church. The Government realized that a single appeal in favour of repatriation made by the Patriarch of Echmiadzin might be more effective than the most extensive official repatriation propaganda. The Patriarch, George VI, who is not less dependent on Soviet goodwill than the Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, could not help becoming the principal repatriation agent of the Soviet régime. Shortly before the repatriation action started, he invited Armenians all over the world to return to Soviet Armenia. He issued a further more pressing appeal as soon as the first hitches in the repatriation action became apparent. He not only appealed to, but actually threatened those who opposed the return to the old homeland. 'Whoever overtly or covertly opposes repatriation' the Patriarch said, 'willingly or unwillingly places himself outside the framework of the national and spiritual unity of the Armenian nation. With pain in our hearts we must mention those people, though few in number, in Armenian colonies abroad who have forgotten the bitter lessons of history, who are engaging in intrigues against the Soviet Government and are prepared to collaborate even with its enemies'.[12]*

[1] [i.e. in 1946. Cf. cat. 116, p. 218, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz--Analyst]

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* Apart from assisting the official repatriation campaign the Patriarch also supported the policy of the Kremlin by issuing a sharp condemnation of the Vatican whose general line of conduct he described as being 'incompatible with the high aims of Christianity'.[13]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Armenia RJ1

167 466 Even without the Armenian repatriates from the Middle East and the Balkans there were enough Armenians in the Soviet Union to staff industrial undertakings and scientific institutions in an area considerably larger than the present Armenian Soviet Republic. By inviting an ever increasing number of Armenians into the small Armenian mountain country, the Soviet Government was apparently pursuing the aim of building up a reserve force which one day might take charge of the neighbouring Turkish territories if they should be included in a Greater Armenia.

161 361 178 On the small territory of the Armenian S.S.R., the Soviet power was responsible for outstanding achievements, including the building of an Armenian capital, an impressive cultural, economic and political centre – Erevan – which no longer had need to look enviously towards Tiflis and Baku. Erevan had 200,000 inhabitants in 1939, but was supposed to house 450,000 people after the termination of the repatriation action. The second largest Armenian town, Leninakan, which is situated only a few miles from the Turkish border, is said to have grown at an 'American pace'.[14] Leninakan, founded as late as 1837 as the fortress of Alexandropol, is now the most important centre of textile industry in the whole of Transcaucasia.

The policy of industrializing Soviet Armenia to the utmost capacity and bringing as many Armenians as possible into the country was calculated to make more obvious the discrepancy between the Armenian Soviet Republic on the one hand and the sparsely populated and destitute eastern provinces of Turkey on the other. The density of population in Soviet Armenia between 1926 and 1939 rose from 29 to 43·6 people per square kilometre, and to about 47 in 1947, while the density of population in the seven provinces of 'Turkish Armenia' was 10·5 per square kilometre in 1933.

186 Soviet policy in Armenia endeavoured to bring about not only a concentration of manpower and of industrial potential on the Turkish border, but also a concentration of hatred. No efforts were needed on the part of the Soviet Government to achieve that objective. The memory of the massacres in Turkey is alive in Soviet Armenia. Many citizens of Soviet Armenia are themselves refugees from Turkey, many lost their parents and relatives in the massacres and every one of them has been told from his earliest youth about the sufferings of his people.

103 186 A small symbolical gesture shows better than anything else how much the past is overshadowing the present in Soviet Armenia. Near the Turkish border a new Armenian village called Zeitun was founded. There is hardly an Armenian in whom the very word 'Zeitun' does not call up the most painful associations. Zeitun was an Armenian mountain town in the Western Taurus, in Southern Anatolia, whose entire population the Ottoman authorities deported. Franz Werfel in his novel *The*

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

ARmenia RJ1
ARmenians RJ3

Forty Days of Musa Dagh gave an eloquent description of Zeitun's Ag. 103 importance from the Armenian national point of view when he said: 186

> 'Zeitun had been a perpetual thorn in Turkish flesh. For the earth has both its holy places, its sites of pilgrimage, which frame the human mind to devotion, and its natural fortresses, redolent of hate and defiance, whose spirit is such as to arouse to seething point the blood of an opposing racial fanaticism. In Zeitun such hate had its definite reasons. . . .'[15]

And this Zeitun has re-emerged in the Soviet Union both as a warning S.U. to Turkey and as an encouragement to the Armenians, hundreds of [728] thousands of whom eagerly await the moment when they may be called to cross the Soviet border into Turkish Armenia and to reoccupy the Kars Province, which was a Russian possession between 1878 and 1921.*

THE ROLE OF THE ARMENIANS IN THE SOVIET UNION

It would be wrong to consider the Soviet Armenians only as a pawn in S.U a diplomatic, political and military game against Turkey. The Armen- 563 ians fulfil important tasks inside the Soviet Union, too, and have gained 648 the reputation of being uncommonly useful and versatile Soviet citizens. As.

The aptitude of the Armenians for foreign languages, for instance, 555 has made a number of them eligible for diplomatic posts. One can find 463 Armenians holding high office in various Soviet embassies and legations, and even among the delegates of the U.S.S.R. to the various United Nations bodies. The Soviet Government has also appreciated the commercial talent of the Armenians and has applied it in the service of the Soviet State, particularly by making an Armenian communist, Anastas Mikoyan, its foreign trade chief. It has also occurred to the Soviet authorities that, contrary to the views which prevailed in Czarist Russia, a people who traded all over the world ought to be able to supply good sailors as well. On this assumption the Red Fleet recruited large numbers of Armenians. The Armenian sailors succeeded in occupying the highest ranks in the Soviet naval hierarchy and distinguished themselves in all the seas in which Soviet vessels fought in the Second World

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* The first period of Russian rule over Kars was a failure both from a Russian national and from an economic point of view. The conqueror of Kars during the Russian-Turkish War of 1877–8, Grand Duke Michael, suggested a large-scale Russian peasant colonization of that strategically vital area. This never materialized and the Kars Province, once a granary of Anatolia, declined economically. At the time of its annexation by the Russians the great majority of the population of the Kars Province were Moslems. Although 80,000 Moslems emigrated to Turkey proper during the first three years of Russian rule the province continued to have a Moslem majority throughout the nineties of the last century while the Armenians counted for less than a quarter of all inhabitants. Armenian, Greek and Russian colonists combined were unable to fill adequately the gaps resulting from the departure of the Moslems. Many fields remained untilled and many villages were completely deserted. The new settlers could not maintain the yield of the soil on the previous level and this led to a shortage of cereals in the province.[16]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Armenians RJ3
Armenia RJ1

S.U. 563 648 As. 555 War. Soviet propaganda has even endeavoured to create a naval 'mystique' among the Armenians by reminding them that their ancient State had possessed a sea-coast.[17]

463 As 703 As far as the Russian army is concerned, at any rate, the Armenians had a glorious tradition of long standing. At least five Armenian generals fought in the Napoleonic Wars, the most prominent of whom, Prince V. G. Madatov, won fame in 1813 during the recapture of Vilna from the French armies. In all the military campaigns against the Turks and the Persians, the Armenians supplied not only 'fifth-columnists' who secretly assisted Russia from beyond the border, but also gallant soldiers for the front line. As early as 1838 a Russian publication paid the following striking tribute to the military qualities of the Armenians: 'As faithful sons of a common mother and a common fatherland the Armenians have always shared the efforts and the glory of the victories of the Russian Army'.[18] It was thus no surprise that the Armenian people provided sixty generals for the Soviet army in the Russian-German War of 1941–45.[19] They included the only non-Slav general who became one of the top commanders of the Red Army, Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan.

As. 555 815 Armenians also occupy an outstanding place in the Russian world of learning. Russia was in particular indebted to the Persian Armenian I. L. Lazarev, who in 1816 founded the famous Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages in St. Petersburg, where hundreds of Russian experts on Asiatic affairs were educated. To-day scores of Armenian scholars are working in Soviet scientific institutes, among them the brothers A. I. Alikhanov and A. I. Alikhanyan, are researching into cosmic rays.

THE SURVIVAL OF ARMENIAN NATIONALISM

Aq. [illegible] 517 626 There is hardly another small people in the Soviet Union which has given to the old and the new Russia as much as have the Armenians. The Soviet régime, not content with using for its own ends the hands and brains of the Armenian people, seeks to capture their very soul, the soul of a people with a history stretching back over 4,000 years. The Kremlin is willing to concede to the Armenians the right to extol their historic past – but only to a certain extent. The Armenians are told that it is unnecessary and out of place to indulge in the glorification of any such distant historic epoch as the 'golden age' of Armenia, when the climax of Armenian national history can be found so near at hand, namely, in the foundation of the Armenian Soviet Republic.

This explains why, after the Second World War, certain Armenian scientific and literary works were put 'on the index' as expressions of 'bourgeois nationalism'. Not only have individual Armenian writers 'sinned', but the entire Union of Soviet Writers of Armenia, the depart-

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Armenia RJ1
Georgia RI1

Aa·
ments of history, philosophy and literature of the Armenian Academy 517
of Sciences, have been found guilty of bourgeois nationalism and devia- 186
tions and criticized accordingly by the Armenian Communist Party 626
leadership.[20]

Thus there is ample evidence that the Armenians have been unable to accept the double-faced role which the Soviet Government has tried to assign to them. The Soviet régime, indeed, expected that the Armenians would be Armenian nationalists in their relations with the Turks and Persians, but, at the same time, good communists and Soviet patriots inside the Soviet boundaries. Whilst fulfilling the first part of the ideological assignment, the Armenians have remained largely nationalists inside the Soviet Union as well.

The Armenians feel the isolation which the communist régime im- Aa·
posed on the peoples of the U.S.S.R. much more than most other 177
nationalities in view of their great traditions, the large number of their intellectuals and the extensive contacts which they used to keep up with the world at large. The repatriates who came to Soviet Armenia after the Second World War, were bound to find it particularly difficult to accept the totalitarian order ruling in the homeland of their race. Many of them had come from democratic or at least comparatively democratic surroundings. These repatriates have learned by their own experience that Russia offers to the Armenians security in a purely physical sense, but not the possibility of a genuine spiritual and national survival.

II. GEORGIANS

Not only are the Georgians neighbours of the Armenians but their Ge,
history and area of settlement are so much intertwined with those of the 101
Armenians that it is often impossible to say where Georgian history begins and Armenian history ends. It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this that the historic destiny of the two peoples was in any way identical. The Georgians, though they had suffered a great deal, did not bear the cross of a 'chosen people' – they led nominally an independent religious existence but had no special dogmas of their own such as brought about the isolation of the Armenian Church from the rest of the Christian world.

'GEORGIAN-RUSSIAN BROTHERHOOD'

Georgia was less exposed to foreign invaders than Armenia partly Ge
because the Armenians frequently played the part of the shield which 176
protected the Georgians. Although Georgians and Armenians often became simultaneously victims of aggression, there were other cases when Armenians were subjugated, but Georgians spared. The precarious role of a small Christian people which, for geographical reasons, was at

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Georgia RI1

Ge. 175 the mercy of Moslem powers soon suggested to the Georgians the path of seeking an alliance with Russia. The desire for such an alliance was expressed for the first time as early as 1587 when a Georgian prince, Alexander of Kakhetia, asked the son of Ivan the Terrible, Fyodor, to accept the overlordship of the whole of Georgia. Subsequently, attempts of Georgian princes to get the Russian Czars interested in their country never ceased. Deputations of the Georgian principalities were repeatedly going to Moscow to ask for Russian assistance against Persia. However divided on other issues the Georgian principalities – Kakhetia, Kartli, Mingrelia, etc. – always showed a considerable degree of unity in their positive attitude towards Russia.

S.U. 175 563 Ge 175 Peter the Great was the first Russian ruler to conclude a formal alliance with a Georgian king, namely with Wachtang VI, ruler of Kakhetia, Eastern Georgia, for his time a very progressive personality, author of law books and founder of the first printing works in Tiflis. The Peter-Wachtang alliance is part of the history of the first Russo-Persian War of 1722–25, an undeclared war in which Peter occupied Persian provinces without ever breaking off diplomatic relations with Persia. After some initial successes the Persian expedition had to be discontinued, partly because Georgian assistance proved to be less effective than Peter had hoped for. Wachtang, and many other Georgians, who had compromised themselves for Russia's cause were offered sanctuary in Moscow. These Georgian exiles and their descendents, as individuals, played a distinguished part in Russian history by embracing military and diplomatic careers. At the same time they continued to contribute to the development of Georgian national culture and published books in their mother-tongue.

The actual establishment of Russian overlordship over Georgia was also due to the initiative of the Georgians themselves. Georgia became a Russian protectorate in 1783 by a treaty concluded between Catherine II and the King of Kakhetia, Irakli II. The Georgian King who let the Russians enter his realm and sign the death-warrant of the independent Georgian State, was by no means a weak or degenerate ruler who betrayed his country for personal advantages. He was one of the ablest kings Georgia had ever had. In signing the treaty he was guided by a deep understanding of Georgian history and acted under no external compulsion whatsoever. Since he was not only a gifted statesman, but also a brilliant military commander, he succeeded in making the end of Georgian independence not a source of humiliation and grief for the generations to come, but a matter of heroism and glory which inspired a great many of the writers and poets which Georgia had brought forth in the course of the nineteenth century. The treaty with Irakli paved the way for the manifesto of September 12th, 1801, about the incorporation of Eastern Georgia into the Russian Empire which Czar Alexander I

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Georgia RI 1

signed only after some hesitation. This manifesto marked the actual beginning of a determined Russian Transcaucasian policy. S.U. 175 563

A large number of Russian revolutionaries came to Georgia immediately after its annexation and spread their influence among the Georgian intelligentsia. Quite a number of these aristocratic Russian revolutionaries, who later participated in the December rising of 1825, served on the staff headquarters of the Caucasian Army Corps under General Yermolov, the uncrowned king of Georgia between 1816 and 1827. Recent Soviet historical writers have emphasized Yermolov's progressive trend of thought and have given him credit for many positive things achieved in Georgia under his proconsulate. Thus the first Georgian newspaper was published in Tiflis under Yermolov in 1819, which was the more remarkable since there existed then but three provincial newspapers in the whole of the Russian Empire, namely in Kharkov, Kazan and Astrakhan.[21] Ge. 175 S.U. [204]

All these historical facts[1] constitute the basis of that concept of Georgian-Russian brotherhood which contributed to the formation of the political personality of Stalin perhaps as much as Marxist-Leninist theory. The encouragement which Stalin, the Georgian, gave to Russian nationalism, the demonstrative tribute which he paid to the Great Russian nation can only be understood if the Russian-Georgian associations in the past are taken into account. From the point of view of Stalin and of the Soviet régime, the historic Russian-Georgian brotherhood offers an excellent argument for the thesis that the Georgians ought willingly to accept dependence on Moscow.

That, however, is not the conclusion which Georgian nationalists might wish to draw from Georgian history.[1] Without denying that Christian Russia played the role of Georgia's protector against such mighty oriental powers as Persia and the Ottoman Empire, they might consider that this protection has come to an end. Indeed, no powerful Shah or Sultan is likely to threaten the Georgian State in future, or try to Islamize it. Nor can gratitude for the beneficial effects of Russian culture on Georgia during the nineteenth century in any way interfere with Georgia's political orientation in the twentieth century. Georgian nationalists can only too easily make the point that classical Georgian literature borrowed a great deal from Persian literature, without the Georgians having ever felt any debt of gratitude towards Persia for that reason. Ge. 186 648

For the Georgian nationalists who tried to build up an independent Georgian State after the Russian October Revolution, neither Istanbul nor Teheran was the real danger, but communist Moscow.

[1] [Cf. cat. 116, pp. 223-225, R1 Soviet Union 21: Kolarz--Analyst]

MENSHEVISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM

S.U. 643 Ge. 668 Georgia was for Stalin not only the homeland where his first political notions were formed,[1] but also the scene of those of his political triumphs which had been the most difficult to achieve. The saying that a prophet has no honour in his own country applies fully to Stalin.

Stalin's attitude towards Tiflis is in many ways comparable to Hitler's attitude towards Vienna. Hitler disliked Vienna because he considered that city was not sufficiently German and too polyglot. Stalin hated Tiflis because of its petty bourgeois atmosphere and the absence of sharp class conflicts. Vienna offered no scope to Hitler and forced him to seek his luck in Germany. For Stalin, Tiflis was tantamount to failure. In Tiflis Stalin found a strongly developed Georgian nationalism preventing the unfolding of an internationalist revolutionary working-class movement such as Bolshevism wanted to be at the beginning of the century. Having recognized that Tiflis and the whole of Georgia were a rather hopeless ground for his activities Stalin left the field to the Georgian Mensheviks, a popular socialist party with deep roots in the national traditions. He went to Baku, which became the capital of the Transcaucasian revolutionary movement.

S.U. [635] Ge. 665 The day of revenge came. Just as Hitler entered Vienna as conqueror on March 12th, 1938, Stalin entered Tiflis in the middle of July 1921 not as a Georgian, but as the representative of the Moscow central power. For three years little Georgia had succeeded in keeping outside Soviet control. From the Russian October Revolution onwards until the proclamation of the Georgian Soviet Republic on February 25th, 1921, Georgia was not just a little recalcitrant Caucasus Republic, a 'Menshevik Vendée' braving Bolshevik Moscow, but the symbol of the struggle between World Bolshevism and international Social Democracy. Social Democrats of Western Europe looked with hope and almost with pride towards Georgia. The leaders of the Second International went to Tiflis and returned to their respective countries greatly impressed by the achievements of the Georgian Menshevik Government. The chief theoretician of Social Democracy, Karl Kautsky, wrote an enthusiastic book, *Georgia – a Social Democratic Peasant Republic*, and the Belgian socialist leader Emile Vandervelde contributed a preface to a book on democratic Georgia by the Menshevik, Vladimir Voytinsky. Social democrats throughout the world seemed to indulge in a secret wish that small Menshevik Georgia would make a better case for socialism than large Bolshevik Russia. Social democrats also expected Georgia to demonstrate that the relationship between peasants and workers could be solved more satisfactorily by democratic means than by establishing the Bolshevik hegemony of the city proletariat over the rural

[1] [Cf. category 175, p. 225--Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Georgia RI1
Caucasia RH1

population. In short, Tiflis was designated to avenge the defeat which Ge. 665
democratic socialism had suffered in Petrograd and Moscow.

The liquidation by military action of Menshevik Georgia under these S.U.
circumstances‸became a vital necessity from the point of view of the 648
Bolshevik leaders. By establishing Soviet power in Georgia they attained several aims simultaneously. In Russia proper Bolshevik prestige was greatly enhanced by the fact that a province of the Czarist Empire had been recovered. The British Empire was embarrassed by Russia's enlargement of her access to the Middle East. More important than all this was the blow inflicted by the young Soviet State on 'World Menshevism', which led to a strengthening of the Russian grip on certain sections of the working-class of Western Europe.

STALIN'S FIGHT AGAINST 'NATIONAL' BOLSHEVISM

The proclamation of the Georgian Soviet Republic was a victory for S.U.
Bolshevism, but, as yet, not for Stalin personally, since the original 631'
leaders of the Georgian Communist Party were hostile to Stalin and to 643
his views on Georgia's future within the framework of the Soviet Union. Ge.
Those Georgian Bolsheviks who took over the Tiflis Government after 665
the collapse of Menshevik rule considered Stalin as a kind of renegade, because he had completely stripped himself of any Georgian national feeling and was determined to uphold against the Georgians the interests of the central power, which were ultimately Russian interests. Knowing his Georgian compatriots, Stalin feared that even the Georgian communists would strive for a measure of independence detrimental to Soviet centralism. He felt that the Georgian people with its strong historical state traditions and occupying the largest single territory of Soviet Transcaucasia needed to be more thoroughly watched than the Armenians or the Azerbaidzhani Turks.

It was always Stalin who insisted on curtailing the powers of the S.U.
Georgian Bolsheviks while Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders of the 631
early period were prepared to grant them far-reaching freedom within 563
the Soviet framework. It was also Stalin's idea to press the Georgians Ge. 642
into a Transcaucasian Soviet Federation in order to keep them better Ca.
under control. Such a Transcaucasian Federation might have been a 631
commendable solution for a *rapprochement* between Georgians, 642
Armenians and Azerbaidzhani Turks; it might have even become a means for creating a united front of the three peoples against Moscow centralism. Stalin's intervention, however, brought a different sort of federation into being. For Stalin, federation was no end in itself, but just a temporary instrument of Soviet policy to be cast aside after its aim had been achieved. At a time when Soviet centralism was not strong enough to rule Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaidzhanis from

‸[Cf. category 635, p. 226 for continuity -- Analyst]

Georgia RI1
Caucasia RH1

S.U. 631 563 Ge. 642 Ca. 631 642 Moscow, the Transcaucasian Federation was an intermediate agency by which the national sovereignty of the three republics could be limited. The cabinet of the Transcaucasian S.F.S.R. included ministers for agriculture, home affairs, home trade, finance, and local industry as well as the Chairman of the Transcaucasian State Planning Commission, who was usually a Russian. The existence of the Transcaucasian Federation enabled the Russian communists generally to play the role of arbiters.

Ge. 665 [642] The Georgian communists felt the weight of the Transcaucasian Federation more than anybody else, for the headquarters of the federal government were in Tiflis. The recognized leaders of the Georgian communists, like Budu Mdivani and Philip Makharadze, energetically opposed Stalin's federation manœuvre and wanted Georgia to become a direct member state of the U.S.S.R., which in their view should be but a loose federation. The ideal solution which they aimed at was, however, to have no Soviet Union at all, but to be linked with the Russian communists only through the Communist International.

In the early twenties the Georgian communists showed many signs of an independent policy, confirming Stalin's anxiety as to the future relationship between Georgia and the Soviet State as a whole. If Georgia could not be independent from Moscow, they wanted her to keep at least as many prerogatives of an independent State as possible. Thus they resisted Russian control over the Georgian railways and ignored the foreign trade monopoly of the Moscow Government by concluding contracts with foreign companies directly. In doing so they were in accord with the recommendation which Lenin had given to the Transcaucasian communists shortly after the formation of Soviet Georgia. This is what Lenin had advised: 'Make the utmost intense and speedy economic use of the capitalist West by means of a policy of concessions and by commercial intercourse. . . .'[22] Soviet Georgia also wanted to maintain an independent attitude in relation to the other Transcaucasian Soviet Republics and their subjects. Thus certain categories of Armenians and Azerbaidzhanis were ordered to leave the Georgian Soviet Republic so that the country might assume a more homogeneous national character. Ge [641] Georgian women marrying citizens of other Soviet republics lost their Georgian nationality. The central Government in Moscow declared all these discriminatory practices null and void.

Despite all appearances the Georgian communists were by no means chauvinists. They knew only too well that their régime was unpopular and that they had to maintain themselves in power by making concessions in every possible direction, including concessions to nationalist feelings. When taking over the Georgian Government in February 1921 the Bolsheviks claimed a membership of 20,000, of whom about one-half were expelled from the party almost immediately after the

GEORGIA R11

establishment of Soviet rule. The Mensheviks, on the other hand, had Ge 665 60,000 members on the very eve of the collapse of Georgian national independence. After Georgia's annexation by Soviet Russia the Mensheviks and other opposition forces continued to exercise considerable influence on the Georgian peasantry, whose material conditions remained unsatisfactory, and on Georgian intellectuals, who temporarily were replaced in the administration of the country by Russian com- Ge munists. By 1924 half the civil servants in Georgia were of non-Georgian [647] origin and in Tiflis, the capital, as many as 63 per cent.[23]

In view of the comparatively liberal rule of the local communists, Ge underground activities on a mass scale were then still possible in 661 Georgia. All non-Bolshevik groups of Georgia formed a secret coalition under Menshevik leadership and also established contact with resistance forces in the Northern Caucasus and in Azerbaidzhan. On August 27th, 1924, the long prepared rising broke out. It was probably the biggest anti-Soviet insurrection initiated by any non-Russian nationality after the end of the Civil War. The centres of the rising were the rural areas in Western Georgia and the Chiaturi manganese mines, the most vital economic asset of the country. The rising was liquidated by the Red Army within a few days. A British trade union delegation which toured the Caucasus soon afterwards and which otherwise almost entirely endorsed the official Soviet attitude remarked: 'The insurrection probably had the sympathy of a majority of Georgians and would have had their support had it succeeded. But it never had any chance of success.'[24]

About 3,000 people perished in the rising. The régime showed a comparatively mild attitude towards the organizers of the insurrection; none of them was executed after a trial which took place in the summer of 1925. Later on Soviet courts were less indulgent and passed death sentences not only on genuine rebels but also on participants in imaginary Ge. plots against the régime. The rising was nevertheless a turning point. 661 It led to the speedy liquidation of all opposition groups and the com- 665 plete consolidation of the communist one-party system in Georgia. Inside the Communist Party itself conditions remained unsatisfactory. Official Soviet sources pointed out later that members of a gang of 'enemies of the people' had penetrated into high party and state posts, particularly during 1929 to 1931.[25]

Stalin's principal antagonists in Georgia were, however, not the Ge. new converts to Bolshevism, but the old Bolsheviks around Mak- 661 haradze, the President of Georgia, and Mdivani, the Vice-Premier. For 665 a long time mutual dislike and hostility were covered up by hypocritical S.U. 665 statements which reached a culminating point in the celebrations held in Tiflis in February 1936 on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Georgian Soviet Republic. The Georgian leaders to whom Stalin extended his congratulations were then already marked as purge victims.

Ge 661 665 S.U. 665 The speeches which they delivered in return in praise of Stalin could not save them. There was only one element of dignity in Soviet Georgia's noisy birthday celebrations, namely when the patriarch of Georgian communism, Makharadze, recalled the following passage from Lenin's letter to the Caucasian and Transcaucasian communists: 'The Transcaucasian communists . . . shall understand the necessity of not copying our (i.e. Russian) tactics, but of thoughtfully varying them in accordance with the difference in the concrete conditions'.

In view of his advanced age Makharadze was later spared from trial and execution. The other Georgian leaders were less fortunate. They were executed after two separate trials for 'terrorism and high treason' in the summer of 1937. The first group included Budu Mdivani and the Georgian planning chief, Toroshelidze. The second group was headed by the Georgian Prime Minister, Mgaloblishvili.

THREE GEORGIAN COMMUNISTS: ORDZHONIKIDZE, YENUKIDZE, BERIYA

S.U. 665 635 G. 665 661 By a strange coincidence a prominent Georgian member of the central Government, the Peoples Commissar for Heavy Industry, Grigory Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze (1886-1937), a member of the Politbureau, died suddenly in his Moscow flat shortly after the arrest of the Mdivani-Torozhelidze group,[1] which included relatives and personal friends of his. His death occurred a few hours after a meeting of the Politbureau which is believed to have discussed the Georgian situation. Ordzhonikidze had enjoyed a considerable popularity even among many non-communists. No wonder that his death provoked a large number of contradictory rumours. Although the official announcement spoke of Ordzhonikidze's natural death, people in Moscow were suspicious and believed that he had committed suicide. The régime tried to remove suspicion by a pompous state funeral and by keeping the name of the dead man in high honour. Ordzhonikidze used to be one of Stalin's few personal friends; he was known to have persistently endorsed the tough line which the secretary-general had pursued towards his Georgian compatriots. This does not exclude the possibility of suicide. The friendship between Ordzhonikidze and Stalin may have ended suddenly on account of the refusal of the former to accept the wholesale physical extermination of the Georgian communist leadership.

S.U. [555] 665 Only two years before Ordzhonikidze's death Stalin had broken with another close Georgian friend of his, Abel Yenukidze, who had become a danger to his policy. He had occupied the extremely influential post of the secretary-general of the Central Executive Committee (TsIK), which was, until the introduction of the new Stalin constitution, the highest Soviet institution, the body which made the laws of the U.S.S.R.

[1] [Cf. category 665, pp. 229-230 --Analyst]

GEORGIANS

S.U. 665 661 Ge. 665 661 S.U. [635]

All decrees and laws which the Central Executive Committee passed had to bear Yenukidze's* signature as well as that of Kalinin. Early in 1935 the Transcaucasian Federation approached TsIK with the request that Yenukidze should be relieved of his post so that he could become Prime Minister of the Transcaucasian federal Government. Soon afterwards, Yenukidze was indeed relieved of his post, but not to take up the high office reserved for him. He was dismissed as a punishment for alleged lack of vigilance, for having allowed untrustworthy elements to infiltrate into important positions of the TsIK apparatus. Two and a half years later Yenukidze was executed as a traitor, together with other high-ranking Soviet officials, including the Armenian-born diplomat Karakhan (1889-1937), former Soviet ambassador to Turkey and China. The Yenukidze riddle is easily solved. When Yenukidze was sacked,* Stalin had already decided to scrap the Transcaucasian Federation, which was no longer necessary for the checking of local nationalism in view of the consolidation of the central state machinery. Stalin had no need for a strong personality like Yenukidze at the head of the Transcaucasian Government, who might have instilled new life into a dying body. The Federation was formally disbanded in 1936 with the introduction of the new Stalin constitution.

S.U. 665 625 555

In the place of Ordzhonikidze and Yenukidze, another prominent Georgian penetrated into the supreme Soviet leadership and into the closest circle of Stalin's favourites. His name was Lavrenty Beriya. His principal merit was that he had carried out purges all over Transcaucasia. These had been of such importance for the strengthening of the Soviet régime as a whole that they led to his appointment to the post of all-Union Soviet police chief in December 1938.

GEORGIA'S ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL MISSION

Ge [136] 433 S.U. [135] 433 [439]

In the inter-war period the Soviet central authorities considered Georgia primarily from the point of view of its economic usefulness. We have already referred to the manganese mines of Chiaturi. They are not the largest manganese ore deposits in the U.S.S.R., which are those of Nikopol in the Ukraine, but the Chiaturi ores contain a higher percentage of manganese and are famous for their high quality. In the early years of the Soviet régime the Chiaturi manganese played an important part in Russian foreign trade, and as late as 1931 Chiaturi covered 42 per cent of the world demand for that valuable mineral. In later years Chiaturi manganese was less used for export in view of the discovery of new manganese ore deposits in the 'capitalistic world', but Soviet industry itself relied greatly on Chiaturi's output.

Apart from boosting manganese production, the Soviet régime encouraged the increase of Georgia's oil and coal output and founded over

*[Cf. category 665, pp. 230-231--Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Georgia R12

S.U. 800 industrial enterprises in the country, most of which had a local
433 importance only. Great attention was paid to the cultivation of tea and
[245] citrus fruits. The tea plantations, almost non-existent before the First
Ge. World War, covered 128,440 acres in 1947. Tea production increased
[433] from 264,556 pounds in 1913 to 118,814,635 pounds in 1940, and the
245 entire Soviet Union is now drinking 'Georgian tea'. Georgia has become
439 completely dependent on the Russian market for this new produce of
her soil; an independent Georgian State would hardly be able to find alternative buyers for the quantity of tea which is being grown on Georgian territory on the basis of all-Union economic planning.

S.U. The same would most probably apply to Georgia's citrus fruits, for
245 which Georgia has also a monopoly in the U.S.S.R. The Georgian citrus
185 fruit plantations grew from 295 acres in 1913 to 24,700 acres in 1938,
Ge. but an ambitious plan fixing the area of these plantations at 98,000 acres
245 in 1944 has remained largely on paper. Such a sensational increase had been decreed by the Council of Peoples Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on April 25th, 1940, but even without the interruption of the war the fulfilment of these targets might have proved unattainable. After the war, the question of the Georgian citrus fruit plantations was reconsidered by the central Government. A new decree was enacted on February 15th, 1946, which fixed the revised target for 1950 at 72,600 acres only.

It was the Georgian Government which was entrusted with the unpopular task of prohibiting the Georgian collective farmers from planting the areas reserved for the new citrus plantations with anything but lemons, oranges and tangerines. The overall responsibility for the implementation of the decree on the development of Georgian citrus plantations was, however, divided between the all-Union Ministry for Technical Cultures and the Georgian Government.

The extension of tea and citrus fruit plantations in Georgia prevented
Ge. any increase in the local wheat and maize production which would have
243 corresponded to the 32 per cent augmentation of Georgia's population
433 between 1926 and 1939. Even before the First World War Georgia was
439 forced to import cereals in years of an average harvest. The agricultural policy which the Soviet régime had pursued in Georgia made things much worse. In 1950 Georgia had to import 75 per cent of its bread supply from other Soviet Republics. This state of affairs was bound to cause considerable dissatisfaction in the country and the Communist
Ge. Party found itself compelled to change its agrarian policy. It introduced
[185] a special seven-year plan for Georgian agriculture with the aim of making the republic self-sufficient in cereals by 1957.

The economic assignments given to Georgia were not of such magni-
Ge tude as to require any substantial manpower imports. On the contrary,
464 the Georgians belong to those few peoples in the Soviet Union who
should be able to cope with the tasks allotted to them by economic

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Georgia RI 1

planning without much assistance from labour drawn from the outside. Nevertheless racial intermixture in general and the immigration of Russians in particular increased even in Georgia under the Soviet régime. In 1926 there had been but 3·4 per cent Russians in the country against 8·9 per cent in 1939. On the other hand the percentage of Georgians dropped between the 1926 and 1939 census from 71·5 per cent to 61·4 per cent.

Ge. 464 [162]

Russian cultural influence in Georgia is, however, much stronger than the percentage of Russians in Georgia's population indicates. In 1947 there were 300 Russian secondary schools in Georgia out of 800 altogether. Kupradze, the Minister of Education of the Georgian S.S.R., himself admitted that more than half of the pupils in Russian schools were non-Russians.[36]

Ge. 177 87 871

It must be noted in this connection that the standard of education in Georgia is higher than in any other Soviet Republic, including the R.S.F.S.R. Thus in 1939 Georgia had, for every 1,000 inhabitants, 113·4 persons with secondary education and 12·2 persons with higher education. In the Russian Federation, on the eve of the Second World War only 76·8 per 1,000 had secondary education and only 6·5 per 1,000 had higher education. Georgia has also introduced eleven-year secondary education instead of the ten-year school existing everywhere else in the Soviet Union. This comparatively high educational level, combined with a good knowledge of Russian, has enabled the Georgians to play a not unimportant part in the Soviet civil service and in the bureaucratic machinery of the party.

S.U. [771]
Ge. [555]

GREATER GEORGIA

During the war the Georgians made a greater contribution to the defence of the U.S.S.R. than most non-Russian peoples. They played an outstanding part in preventing the Germans from penetrating into Transcaucasia. Fighting mostly in separate Georgian regiments and under Georgian officers they held up the German advance at the state borders of Georgia. It was thus a legitimate symbolical recognition of the Georgian war effort that a Georgian sergeant was allowed to hoist the flag of victory over the Berlin Reichstag together with a Russian Red Army man.[37]

SU 701 563
Ge. 702

The Soviet Government had every interest in advertising the war effort of the Georgians, for Moscow wanted to tell the world that here was a small people who had fought Hitler most heroically. This people must be rewarded at the expense of a neighbour state which had been neutral throughout the war. In other words, Georgia was to be switched into the diplomatic offensive which the Soviet Government launched against Turkey immediately after the end of the Second World War.

SU 562 648 208

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Georgia RI1

S.U. 563 648 [208] Ge. 186 648 [914] The Soviet Government remembered very conveniently,* that there were old Georgian national claims against Turkey which Bolshevism had persistently ignored during 27 years, but which could easily be revived to embarrass the Turks. Two Georgian professors, S. N. Dzhanashia and N. Berdzenishvili, started the job by publishing a long learned article in the Tiflis newspaper *Kommunisti* on December 14th, 1945. In this article, entitled 'Our Lawful Demands to Turkey', the two Georgian historians claimed for Georgia all territories which Georgia had lost from the Middle Ages onwards. They included, in particular, a coastline 170 miles long on the Turkish shores of the Black Sea.

The Georgian professors said 'We appeal to world public opinion concerning our ancient lands wrested from us by Turkey. This is not a matter of an insignificant territorial infringement, but of the seizure from us of the cradle of our individuality as a nation; of a crime which cut in two the living national body. . . . The Georgian people must get back their lands which they never gave up and cannot give up'.[28]

The world outside Georgia would never have learned of this re-birth of an outspoken Georgian national imperialism, had not the Moscow newspaper *Pravda* reprinted the entire article in Russian translation a few days later.

Ge. [538] What the historians had started was carried on by poets and playwrights. Thus Grigol Abashidze, co-author of the Georgian national anthem, wrote a collection of poems, *On the Southern Border*, in which he passionately advocated the reunion of the Georgian territories of Turkey with the Georgian motherland. North-Eastern Anatolia appears in Abashidze's poetry as the Georgian Province of 'Tao'. In one of his poems Abashidze promised that 'Tao' including the two ancient cultural centres of the Georgian people, Khandzta and Tbeti, would become Georgian again:

Ge. [539]
Tao, O Tao, our country thou,
Cradle thou of Georgian glory!

Ploughland of my forebears' furrows,
Brooded o'er by ancient towers,
How wast thou beset by sorrows
'Ere decay befell thy flowers!

Tao, O Tao, I hear thee, Tao,
Hear thy weary sighing dying.

Khandzta weeps and Tbeti murmurs;
Brothers' hearts there turn towards us.
One day Tao will join our numbers
'Neath the flag that proudly guards us.

*[i.e. in launching a "diplomatic offensive" against Turkey after World War II—Analyst]

GEORGIANS

[Laz]

For this and similar lyrical expressions of irredentism Abashidze was S.U.
awarded a Stalin Prize for 1950. The same honour was bestowed on the 563
Georgian playwright, Ilo Mosashvili, for the play *Sunken Stones*, which 648
deals with the national aspirations of the Georgian inhabitants of an Ge.
imaginary Turkish town not far from the borders of the U.S.S.R. The [638]
title of the play refers to the ruins of an ancient Georgian church, a 186
national shrine of the local Georgians, which the Turkish authorities dismantle by night, throwing the débris into the sea. The play was shown in all the leading theatres of Georgia.

In the past the Soviet Government cared as little for Georgian as for S.U
Armenian national aspirations. In 1921 it had ceded to Turkey some of 563
the territories which the Georgians have demanded since 1945. During 648
the inter-war period any mention of the Georgian claims against Turkey would have been tantamount to high treason, since it would have disturbed Soviet-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, the Soviet régime showed an ambiguous attitude towards Turkey even in the period of the Bolshevik-Kemalist honeymoon. Almost from its inception the Georgian Ge.
Soviet Republic included a small special territorial unit which, in itself, [694]
constituted a challenge to the Turks. This territorial unit is called 563
186
Adzharistan or Adzhar A.S.S.R. It is situated in Georgia's south-western S.U.
corner and covers but a tiny territory of 970 square miles. Adzharistan 648
which consists of the port of Batum and its surroundings, was incor- 563
porated into Russia in 1878 after Turkey had held it since 1625. From a Georgian national point of view this conquest was of great significance, since it was the first of those vast formerly Georgian Black Sea territories which Russia succeeded in wresting from the Turks.

Though the population of these ancient Georgian territories, which reached as far as Trebizond, was forced to accept the Moslem religion, many continued to speak a Georgian dialect. Georgian nationalists, who called the lost Georgian lands 'Moslem Georgia', or 'Turkish Georgia', and their inhabitants 'Moslem Georgians', or Lazi, claimed that Russia, in her treaty with Irakli II, had pledged herself to strive for the reunion of Georgia with the lands which had belonged to her of old. The treaty did indeed contain a clause which might have been interpreted in such a way. Imperial Russia was in no way inclined to satisfy Georgian national demands. She was interested in Batum because it was an excellent sea-port and, later on, the terminus of the oil-pipeline running from Baku to the Black Sea, and not because Georgian nationalists cherished the idea of Batum's annexation.

The idea of annexing more Turkish Black Sea coastal territories by using Batum as a springboard for further conquests was not alien to Czarist policy. But this was *par excellence* a Russian imperialistic idea which totally disregarded any specific Georgian national interests. The development of Batum from a wretched little place with 1,500 inhabitants

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Georgia RI2

[Abkhaz]

S.U. 648 and one stone building – the house of the Russian consul – in the year of
563 annexation, to a port of international importance ten or fifteen years
Ge. later certainly helped to raise Russia's prestige in north-eastern Turkey.
186 The Russian scholar, N. Y. Marr, who in 1910 travelled in Lazistan,
563 'Turkish Georgia', noted that Russia enjoyed a fairly good reputation among the Lazi; at the same time he was unable to trace any pan-Georgian feelings among the latter. He found that the Lazi were actually dying out.[29] Notwithstanding the evidence supplied by Marr, Georgian nationalists continued to talk of 'Turkish Georgia', which included, they said, as many as 600,000 Georgians. During the First World War these nationalists formulated, indeed, territorial demands for large stretches of land along the Black Sea coast, including areas to the east of Trebizond.[30]

Soviet estimates about the number of 'Turkish Georgians' were for a long time rather cautious. A textbook published in 1949 said that there were 'not less than 200,000' of them, but three years later the Soviet Encyclopædia asserted that there were 'over 500,000'.[31]

ABKHAZIA

S.U In the early years of the Georgian Soviet Republic Stalin tried to enlist
563 the small national minorities of Georgia in the fight against the com-
[664] munist leadership in Tiflis. Stalin then complained of the 'harmful and
Ge. dangerous chauvinism' of the Georgian communists who thought 'there
563
625 was no need to reckon with less cultured and less developed nationalities'.[32] The minorities whom Stalin had in mind were the Georgian Moslems (also called Adzharians), the Ossetins and in particular the Abkhazians.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the Abkhazians found themselves in a difficult situation. They had been exposed to colonization from two sides and had become part of both the Great Russian and the Georgian living space. In these circumstances thousands of Abkhazians thought it preferable to leave their homeland for Turkey rather than to wage a hopeless struggle against the dual Russian-Georgian pressure. Although the Georgian nationalists and 'National Bolsheviks' disliked the idea of an Abkhazian autonomy, an 'Abkhazian A.S.S.R.' was nevertheless established within the Georgian S.S.R. on the insistence of the Moscow Government. In 1926 Autonomous Abkhazia covered 3,240 square miles and had a population of 174,000 of whom the Abkhazians accounted for less than one-third.

The Abkhazians, though useful as long as they could be played up against the Georgians, lost favour with the central Government as soon as their national interests clashed with those of the Soviet Union as a whole. This happened when, under the Second Five-Year Plan, Ab-

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

[Abkhas] Georgia RI 1

Azerbaijan RK 1

[Baku]

khazia was ordered to increase considerably its tobacco production. S.U.
Since the population of Abkhazia as it was at that time, and the small 563
Abkhazian people in particular, could not possibly have coped with the Ge.
targets assigned to them by the Five-Year Plan, more Russians, Georg- 563
ians, Armenians and Greeks had to be brought into the republic. 635
[167]

It mattered little to the Abkhazians whether the new influx of foreign elements into their country was effected in the name of socialist planning and 'specialization', or in that of nationalist expansion. Fearing for the future of their people, Abkhazian communists demanded that the Abkhazians who had emigrated to Turkey under the Czarist régime should be brought back and take the place of the non-Abkhazian colonists. It is no wonder then that, in consequence, Soviet publications started complaining about Abkhazian resistance.[33]

In the end the Abkhazians fell completely into disgrace with the Kremlin. Paradoxically enough, the leaders of the people whom Stalin had shielded against encroachments by Georgian nationalists became involved in an alleged plot aiming at assassinating their 'protector'. The Abkhazian Bolshevik leader, Nestor Lakoba, was fortunate enough to die a natural death in 1936, for in the following year he might have been the central figure in a plot trial held in the Abkhazian capital, Sukhum. Most of the forty-seven defendants charged with having attempted to murder Stalin were Lakoba's friends, relatives and collaborators. Ten of them were executed.

The 'liquidation' of 'the Abkhazian nationalists in Bolshevik disguise' cleared the way for further Georgian colonization in Abkhazia. After the Second World War a special Resettlement Board of the Tiflis Government gave grants to Georgian collective farmers settling down along the Black Sea shore in the Abkhazian coastal districts of Gagry, Gudauti and Ochemchiri.[34]

III. *AZERBAIDZHAN*

BAKU – THE OIL CITY

Whilst Georgia fell into the hands of the Russians like a ripe fruit, the S.U.
establishment of Russian rule over Azerbaidzhan was a very protracted 175
affair. The conquest of Azerbaidzhan was in fact one of the most diffi- 636
cult and costly enterprises in the entire subjugation of Transcaucasia. Az.
The first Russian conqueror of Azerbaidzhan's future capital, Baku, was 175
the leader of lawless Cossack bands from the Don, Ataman Stenka Razin, one of the greatest rebels against the authority of the Czar. The second conqueror of Baku was Russia's greatest Czar, Peter I. S.U.

The fact that Peter's general, Matyushkin, brought Baku, in 1723, for 175
twelve years under Russian rule, is, perhaps, less important than the 636

175 principle which the Czar laid down in his instructions to the general.
C3L Peter described Baku as 'the key to our whole business' (*klyuch vsemu nashemu delu*), which meant the key to the success of the Russian cause on the shores of the Caspian Sea and, perhaps, in the whole of Transcaucasia. If the totality of Peter's plans and deeds is to be considered as his political will, his appreciation of Baku was undoubtedly one of the most prophetic parts of it.

The eventual fulfilment of Peter's order – the final conquest of Baku – took place in 1806. Russia paid for it with the death of her first great administrator and military commander in Transcaucasia, Prince Pavel Dimitrievich Tsitsianov, who was treacherously murdered during the negotiations for the surrender of Baku.

While the existence of oil deposits in the Baku region has been com-
315 mon knowledge for centuries, it is only since the seventies of the nineteenth century that they have contributed to the development of the city. As late as 1883, not only St. Petersburg but even southern Russia used the more expensive American oil, because the oil production of Baku was still in its beginnings and transport facilities for Caucasian oil inadequate. At the turn of the century Russia was the second oil producer in the world after the United States, and for a short time even exceeded the American oil output.

[470] The upsurge of Baku as oil centre was only to a minor degree due to the Russian national genius. It was the foreigners who had the lion's share in the technical development of the oil production and in financing both production and transport of Baku oil. Particularly high credit goes to the Swedish brothers Robert and Ludwig Nobel, who started the first Baku oil refinery in 1875 and were responsible for many technical improvements introduced during the following decades into the Baku oil industry. Nobels had the largest refineries and the largest oilfields of Baku and built up the most important oil concern. The Rothschilds, in exchange for mortgages on Russian-owned Baku oilfields, financed the Transcaucasian railway line running from Baku to Batum on the Black Sea, which enabled Russia to export the Baku oil to Europe. The reverse of the medal was the gradual elimination of small oil firms in the hands of Russian and Persian owners. Thus conditions in Baku became in reality symbolic of Czarist Russia's semi-colonial dependence on foreign capital. By ousting all the Swedish, British, French and German 'capitalists' from Baku the Soviet régime brought the city and its riches into the possession of the Russian State.

THE BOLSHEVIK BAKU

800 The great historic role of the Russian Bolsheviks, with regard to Baku, did not consist in the extension of its oil production and the building of

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Azerbaijan RK1

[BAKU]

an engineering industry, but in giving Baku two new political functions, 000 both of which have helped to augment enormously its offensive strength as a frontier outpost.

At first the Russian Bolsheviks transformed Baku into one of the S.U. chief headquarters of the revolutionary movement in Russia, and later 633 they made it the capital of the Azerbaidzhan Soviet Republic. As the 665 'Capital of the Bolshevik Movement of Transcaucasia', which it became Az. at the beginning of the century, Baku constituted an alien, international 665 enclave in the land of the Azerbaidzhani Turks. Thus Lavrenty Beriya, 633 175 in his official history of the Bolshevik organizations in Transcaucasia, fails to mention a single prominent Azerbaidzhani Turk among the leaders of the Baku Bolshevik Party before 1917. The virtual absence of the Azerbaidzhani from the Bolshevik movement is corroborated by the fact that the eight Bolshevik newspapers published in Baku [204] between 1904 and 1907 included four papers in the Russian language, three Armenian papers and only one Armenian-Turkic paper, *Kochdevet*.[35] Before the October Revolution, the Bolshevik party organization in Baku was mainly composed of Russians, Armenians and Georgians. There was but a small extremist Azerbaidzhani Turkish group, 'Gummet' (Energy), connected with the Bolsheviks and working among both the local Moslem population and the immigrants from Persian Azerbaidzhan.

After the October Revolution Baku went, during a certain period, its own way. For several months it had a Soviet Government of its own, while the Azerbaidzhani nationalist party 'Mussavat' ('Equality'), which had its headquarters in Gandzha, was in control of the rest of the country. The short-lived Baku Soviet Government of 1918, the so-called 'Baku Commune', is usually described as one of the most glorious episodes of the entire Russian civil war. The indigenous people of Azerbaidzhan, however, took almost no part in the 'Commune'.

The Chairman of the Baku Soviet was Stepan Shaumyan (1878-1918), an Armenian, a genuine professional Bolshevik revolutionary of the old type. He had participated in the illegal revolutionary movement both inside Russia and abroad and was a highly educated personality. His chief lieutenant was the Georgian Alyosha Dzhaparidze (1878-1918), People's Commissar of the Interior. The People's Commissar for the Army and Navy, Grigory Kurganov (1886-1918), was a Russian and so was the Chairman of the Baku Economic Council, Ivan Fioletov (1884-1918). The only Azerbaidzhani Turk occupying an important post in the revolutionary Baku was Meshadi-Bek Azizbekov (1876-1918), a graduate of St. Petersburg University, who was Assistant People's Commissar of the Interior.

After the fall of the 'Baku Commune', in September 1918, Shaumyan, Az. 665 together with twenty-five other communists, almost all of them Russians 661 175

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Azerbaijan RK1

[Baku]

Az. 665 661 175

and Armenians, were executed without trial by the 'counter-revolution'. The 'twenty-six Commissars', who belong to the most cherished martyrs of communist Russia, had been intercepted while trying to escape to Astrakhan, via the Caspian Sea, and shot by the right-wing 'Socialist Revolutionaries' who were then in control of Transcaspia (Turkmenistan).

Az. 642 S.U. 635 315 162

The Azerbaidzhani Soviet Republic came into being only at the end of April 1920, when the Bolsheviks had finally wrested the capital and the whole country from the Mussavat Party. The Soviet régime carried on with the work of the Nobels and Rothschilds and developed the oil industry of Baku. In 1932 the production of crude oil reached 12,613,000 tons (against 10,028,000 tons in 1904 and 7,669,000 tons in 1913) and in 1937, 23,227,000 tons. The population of the oil city also continued to increase. It went up from 453,000 in 1926 to 809,000 in 1939. This was a remarkable achievement though a less striking one than the growth of Baku under the Czarist régime when the number of its inhabitants had risen from 15,000 in 1873 to 92,000 in 1893 and to 333,000 in 1913.

MULTI-NATIONAL BAKU

Az. 361 162

Under Soviet rule Baku also preserved its international character, which had increased to the same extent as the number of its inhabitants and the output of its oil wells. In 1875 over 90 per cent of the population of the city were still Azerbaidzhani Turks. The two minority groups, Russians and Armenians, formed but 5 per cent each. The number of Russians was then 782. By 1905 the Russian element had multiplied ninety-five times. In that year the Russians of Baku numbered over 74,000 against 72,000 Azerbaidzhani Turks or 'Azeri' and so-called 'Persian Tartars', as the immigrants from Persian Azerbaidzhan used to be called under the Czarist régime. The third largest ethnical group were the Armenians with 34,000. In addition, thirty-nine other nationalities had their representatives in the oil city.

Az. 361 563

In 1923 Baku's racial composition was as follows: Azerbaidzhani Turks 31·3 per cent, 'Persians' (mostly Turkic speaking people from Persian Azerbaidzhan) 14·7 per cent, Russians 28·3 per cent, Armenians 15·2 per cent, Jews 5·7 per cent, other nationalities (including Georgians, Lezghians, Germans, Greeks, Assyrians, etc.) 4·8 per cent. Azerbaidzhani Turks, together with the Persian 'Azeri', thus accounted for just half the population of the city.

In the industrial and oil-producing area of Baku city there was, however, a clear predominance of the Russian element over the autochthonous Turkic one. As late as 1934 only one out of five oil workers was an Azerbaidzhani Turk.[36] The composition of the Baku town council elected in 1950, reflected roughly the same racial intermixture as the

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Azerbaijan RK1

[Baku]

population statistics for 1905 and 1923. Over 54 per cent of all elected town councillors were Azerbaidzhani Turks, 30·5 per cent were Russians, 6·5 per cent Armenians, and the rest comprised a large number of other nationalities.[37] Az. 361 563

The composition of the Baku school population shows that the Russians are likely to remain a strong factor even in the next generation. In 1949 there were 46,200 Azerbaidzhani, 47,800 Russian and 19,000 Armenian school children in the oil city. Although the number of Russian and Azerbaidzhani children is almost equal there are considerably more Russian than Azerbaidzhani schools in Baku. In 1949 Russian was the language employed in teaching in seventy-eight schools and Turkic in fifty-eight schools. In forty-one schools teaching was given in both languages. There were only four Armenian schools, an indication that most of the local Armenians receive none but Russian education.[38] Az. [870]

BAKU AND AZERBAIDZHAN

Baku, which became the fifth largest city of the U.S.S.R., reached its fullest growth roughly by the outbreak of the Second World War. After the war Baku was still Russia's largest single oil-producing centre, but its output had dropped to about one-half of the total Soviet oil production. Although Baku's stormy progress has thus reached a standstill, Russian colonization of Azerbaidzhan will nevertheless continue, because industry is shifting from Baku to other places, particularly to Kirovabad, the ancient Gandzha, and to new towns which were created under the Five Year Plans. These include Dashkesan, a mining town producing iron ore, Minchegaur, which supplies electric power to Baku, and Sumgant, which is to provide equipment for the oil industry of Baku. The first miners of Dashkesan came from the Ukraine; the builders of Sumgant hailed from Kharkov, Moscow, Leningrad and Chelyabinsk.[39] S.U 361 Az. 369

Thanks to Soviet economic policy, Azerbaidzhan has ceased to be a backward, feudal-patriarchal country, but the gap between Baku and its hinterland still exists, even if it has narrowed. There is still a cleavage between the international city, on the one hand, and the Moslem country on the other. Even in the future, the Azerbaidzhani Turks are unlikely to accept Baku, which is much too big a capital for a republic with 3,200,000 inhabitants. Az. [161]

Although the integration of Baku into Azerbaidzhan is largely fictitious, Soviet propaganda as directed to the Middle East is bound to treat the two as an entity if it is to be successful. This propaganda is inspired by the belief that Baku and Azerbaidzhan are called to play a vanguard role in the Orient. Probably nobody has defined that role as authoritatively as Azerbaidzhan's most glorified Bolshevik poet, Samed S.U. 648 208 635 Az. 208 538

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Azerbaijan RK1

S.U. 648 208 635 Az. 208 538 Vurgun, in the play *Khangar*. The play deals with Stalin's stay in Baku in 1907. Vurgun put into Stalin's mouth the following words, which the future leader of the Soviet State, then still bearing the pseudonym of 'Koba', addresses to a young Azerbaidzhani party member in his Baku home:

> From here the light will burst in living torrents
> On Araby, Afghanistan, Iran,
> And dawn will bathe the Orient of tomorrow
> From this thy land, the happiest of lands![40]

There is no doubt that Vurgun faithfully interpreted Stalin's own ideas on the importance of Azerbaidzhan.

THE NATIONALIST OPPOSITION

Az. 177 An independent Azerbaidzhani State would have been conceivable, both from the geographical and from the cultural point of view. In Czarist Russia the Azerbaidzhani Turks had competed with the Kazan Tartars for leadership of the Russian Moslems, but in their readiness to become Europeanized they rank above all other Turkic peoples of the Russian Az. [212] Empire. On the question of the latinization of the alphabet, for instance, the Azerbaidzhani marched ahead of most of their co-religionists on the Volga and in Central Asia and never opposed or sabotaged the 'alphabetic revolution' in the same way as other Turkic peoples of the U.S.S.R. A

Thus, while the Azerbaidzhani Turks may have been no less ripe for statehood than the Anatolian Turks, the colossus of Baku and the evil influence of the oil factor frustrated their national aspirations. Not only Azerbaidzhani nationalists but also the Azerbaidzhani Turkish communists tried to revolt against the inescapable fate of their country, which was to become a prey of foreign, mainly Russian, industrial colonization.

Az. 665 186 M. D. Bagirov, during ten years the leading G.P.U. official in Azerbaidzhan and First Secretary of the local Communist Party since 1937, admitted the strength of nationalism within the Azerbaidzhani communist camp when he wrote: 'From the very first days of the existence of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan, national deviationists tried to counteract by every means the formation of a firmly united monolithic Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks of Baku, faithful to the banner of Lenin and Stalin, conducted an energetic struggle against the treacherous activity of the national deviationists who later on were unmasked as spies of a foreign intelligence service'.

Az. 665 661 The struggle against the national deviation among the Azerbaidzhani communists during the first years of the existence of Soviet Azerbaidzhan was conducted by the Russian, S. M. Kirov, who, as party secre-

A [Cf. cat. 116, pp. 34-38, R1 Sov. Union; 21: Kolarz -- Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Azerbaijan RKI

Az.
tary, guided the destinies of the country between 1921 and 1925. Almost 665
immediately after his arrival in Baku, Kirov liquidated the first Azer- 661
baidzhani 'deviation', the national-communist 'Narimanovism'. This
was an historic act in so far as it constituted the first purge of 'national
communists' in the whole of Transcaucasia. In 1924 Kirov suppressed
the second inner-party revolt, the 'Khanbudagovism'. Under the leader-
ship of Khanbudagov, Azerbaidzhani communists had demanded the end
of Russian colonization and the replacement of non-Turks by Turkic
workers.

Although Kirov left Azerbaidzhan in 1925, he returned again in 1930 when a new crisis broke out in the Azerbaidzhani Communist Party. His role as commissar extraordinary was later taken over by another of Stalin's favourites, the Georgian L. P. Beriya, who, according to Bagirov, took a 'conspicuous part in the merciless unmasking and extermination of the Trotskyite-Bukharinist and bourgeois-nationalist nests in the country.[41]

Whilst the Azerbaidzhani 'deviationists' defended the interests of their Az.
people, the Russian communists of Baku and the Soviet bureaucracy 433
headed by Kirov and Beriya were fighting in the first place for oil and, 248
secondly, for cotton. Azerbaidzhan, apart from being the principal oil S.U.
source of the Soviet Union is also the 'second cotton basis of the 433
U.S.S.R.'. Between 1913 and 1938 the sowing area for cotton increased 248
by 90 per cent, while there was a shrinkage of the wheat sowing area by
12 per cent, and of the rice sowing area by 48 per cent.[42]

The enforcement of cotton-growing in Azerbaidzhan at any cost Az.
added greatly to the difficulties which the Soviet power encountered in 248
that country. Cotton-growing to the detriment of the cultivation of 668
cereals was unpopular with all parts of the agricultural population,
kulaks, middle peasants and the village poor. Even Communist Party
organizations in villages and the rural party district committees
frequently sabotaged the instructions which the Baku authorities issued
on the implementation of the cotton plan.[43] Collectivization alone could
not solve the cotton problem and break the 'anti-cotton front'. The
Soviet Government had to impose the implementation of the cotton plan
on the collective farmers by the same measures of coercion which had
been used against individual farmers.

RUSSIAN-AZERBAIDZHANI CULTURAL SYNTHESIS

Despite the fact that oil and cotton were the primary concern of Soviet S.U. 513
policy in Azerbaidzhan, the Soviet régime by no means overlooked the 668
cultural side of the Azerbaidzhani problem. Soviet cultural policy in 648
Azerbaidzhan consisted in strengthening the cultural independence of Az.
the Azerbaidzhani from their Moslem neighbours, Anatolian Turks and 517
177

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Azerbaijan RK1

SU 562 668 648 Az. 517 177

Persians. Both had shown a considerable interest in Russian Azerbaidzhan during the Civil War of 1917-21, when the Russian Empire was in a process of disintegration. Persia had flatly claimed Russian Azerbaidzhan on historical and geographical grounds in a memorandum submitted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The pan-Turkists of Turkey, too, had looked towards Baku as the item of their annexation programme which seemed to be the easiest to materialize. Soviet policy quite naturally aimed at making the Azerbaidzhani Turks immune against all future pan-Turkic, pan-Iranian and pan-Moslem temptations by creating a new artificial ideology aimed at isolating them from their oriental surroundings in which they had lived for many centuries.

Az. [814] 177 517

The Azerbaidzhani Academy of Sciences made it its task to study Russian-Azerbaidzhani relations in the past and to show that the union between Azerbaidzhan and Russia was based, not only on the superiority of Russian weapons which conquered Baku, Shemakha and Gandzha, but also on the attraction which Russian culture had exercised on the Azerbaidzhani.

The essence of Soviet cultural propaganda in the Azerbaidzhani language is contained in the following statement which Bagirov made in 1945: 'For its great achievements in the field of science and culture, literature and art the Azerbaidzhani people is indebted to the beneficial influence of the great Russian scholars, teachers, poets, writers, artists, etc. We have learned from the Russian people the best traditions of revolutionary struggle. With the help of the Russian people we established the Soviet régime'.

In the light of Soviet ideology, as formulated for Azerbaidzhani consumption, the spiritual leaders of Azerbaidzhan, such as the poets Khagani Shirvani and Nizami Gandzhevi, have had a lively interest in Russia ever since the twelfth century. The beginnings of a political pro-Russian orientation in Azerbaidzhan are traced as far back as the time of Ivan the Terrible; and in the nineteenth century all notable Azerbaidzhani personalities, according to the official thesis, had been conspicuous in advocating almost fanatically Russian-Azerbaidzhani friendship.

There is no doubt indeed that eminent representatives of Azerbaidzhani intellectual life in the nineteenth century established personal friendship with Russian writers and poets and learned the Russian language. It was only through the medium of Russian that they had been able to acquaint themselves with Western ideas and Western science. The greatest Azerbaidzhani poet of the nineteenth century, Mirza Fathali Akhundov (1812-78) (in the Azerbaidzhani spelling Mirza Fethali Ahund-zade), who is called the 'Molière of the Orient', was so completely devoted to the Russian cause that he urged his compatriots to fight Turkey during the Crimean War.

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AZERBAIDZHAN

The Czarist authorities put no obstacle in the way of gifted Azerbaid- Az.
zhani Turks qualified to occupy distinguished posts in St. Petersburg or 555
Moscow. The poet and writer, Mirza Dzhafar Topchibashev, was assist- 177
ant professor of the Persian language at St. Petersburg University and the 517
Azerbaidzhani philologist, A. Kazem-bek, even became a member of the S.U.
Russian Academy in the middle of the nineteenth century.*[44] 563 555

The Communist Party and the Soviet régime want more than a mere Az.
recognition of the facts testifying to Russian-Azerbaidzhani cultural 186
interdependence in the past, which would be but reasonable. The Azer- 177.53
baidzhani are also expected to admit their own inferiority by stressing 538
that their modern poets took their inspiration from Russian literature. Views expressed to the contrary are nailed down as 'deviations', as in the case of the Azerbaidzhani writer G. Mekhti, who had stated in September 1948 that the three Azerbaidzhani writers and poets, Akhundov, Akhverdov (1870-1933) and Mamed Kuli-zade (1869-1932), could not be looked upon as pupils of Russian masters. The Union of Soviet Writers of Azerbaidzhan had to issue a statement describing the opinion expressed by Mekhti as a 'harmful distortion of historical truth'.[45]

Whilst trying to link Azerbaidzhani culture as closely as possible with S.U.
Russian culture, the Soviet régime is equally eager to deny the existence 563
of close cultural ties between Azerbaidzhan and Persia. The fact that 538
most of the great poets brought forth by Azerbaidzhan in the past wrote Az.
mainly in Persian does not discourage the Soviet theoreticians, who are 177.53
working out the ideological basis of Soviet nationalities policy. They 538
declare categorically that everything produced by poets born in Azer- 191
baidzhan 'belongs to the Azerbaidzhani people,' notwithstanding the language in which the works of the so-called Azerbaidzhani poets were written.[46] According to this theory the Persians have no right to claim any of the outstanding poets who had written in the Persian language; if, nevertheless, they do advance such a claim they are immediately branded as guilty of 'pan-Iranianism'.

The attempt to 'annex' an important part of Persian literature and S.U.
to transform it into 'Azerbaidzhani literature' can be best exemplified 563
by the way in which the memory of the great Persian poet Nizami (1141- 538
1203) is exploited in the Soviet Union. The Soviet régime does not pay 186
tribute to Nizami as a great representative of world literature, but is Az.
mainly interested in him as a 'poet of the Soviet Union', which he is 538
considered to be because he was born in Gandzha in the territory of the

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* Azerbaidzhani scholars were not alone in becoming famous in Czarist Russia; no limit was imposed on the Azerbaidzhani Turks in attaining the highest posts in the army. Eight members of the Bakikhanov family alone had served as generals and colonels in the Czarist forces. Russian artillery is greatly indebted to Azerbaidzhani military scientists, particularly to General Ali Aga Shikhlinsky, who took a leading part in the defence of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and was later appointed to a post in the Red Army.

S.U. present Azerbaidzhani Soviet Republic. The Soviet régime proclaims its
563 ownership over Nizami also by 'interpreting' his works in accordance
538 with the general pattern of Soviet ideology. Thus the leading Soviet
186 journal *Bolshevik* stressed that Nizami's 'great merit' consisted in having
Az. undermined Islam by 'opposing the theological teaching of the un-
538 changeable character of the world'.[47]

Stalin himself intervened in the dispute over Nizami and gave an authoritative verdict on the matter. In a talk with the Ukranian writer, Mikola Bazhan, Stalin referred to Nizami as 'the great poet of our brotherly Azerbaidzhani people' who must not be surrendered to Iranian literature, despite having written most of his poems in Persian. Stalin even quoted to Bazhan a passage from Nizami where the poet said that he was forced to use the Persian language because he was not allowed to talk to the people in their native tongue.[48]

Thus in Stalin's view Nizami is but a victim of Persian centralism, and of a denationalization policy directed against the ancestors of the Azerbaidzhani Turks. Nizami is not a Persian poet, but a historical witness of Persian oppression of 'national minorities'. It is by no means surprising that Stalin should take this line or that he should attach the greatest importance to everything that would undermine Persia's cultural and political prestige. Stalin's interest in Persia is that of a Georgian rather than that of a Russian. In spite of being, as we have seen, a bad Georgian nationalist in many other respects, he is animated as far as Persia is concerned by a traditional Georgian animosity against the 'hereditary enemy'. To gain economic and political influence in Persia is traditional Russian policy ever since Peter the Great, but the Soviet Government, thanks to Stalin's influence, has done more than follow in the footsteps of Czarist diplomacy. It has put into effect new methods to disintegrate Persia, methods which only a Caucasian neighbour of the Persians and an expert on nationality problems could design.

THE OTHER AZERBAIDZHAN

S.U. Even before the Second World War the Soviet authorities of Moscow
563 and Baku knew that autonomist and separatist movements would
648 emerge one day in Persia, particularly among the Turks of Persian
Azerbaidzhan. It was felt however that some time might elapse before conditions would be ripe for launching a 'national liberation' campaign in Persia. The organ of the Soviet of Nationalities, *Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, stated as late as 1930 that the Azerbaidzhani Turks of Persia never ceased to consider themselves as an integral part of the Pahlevi monarchy and continued to supply both leaders and pioneers for the Persian national movement. However, the same article forecast that the growth of Turkic culture in Soviet Azerbaidzhan and the attraction

of the Baku oilfields would play their part in awakening the Turkic national consciousness of the people of Persian Azerbaidzhan.[49] SU. 563 648

The 'awakening' of the Azerbaidzhani Turks came earlier than the Soviet sociologists could have foreseen in 1930, and was a direct consequence of the Russian military occupation of Northern Persia of 1941-46. During this occupation the Persian Azerbaidzhani were brought into close contact with the people of the Azerbaidzhani Soviet Republic, and it is small wonder that the idea of a union took shape in the two Azerbaidzhans, which, though widely differing economically and politically, are united by the bond of a common language. With the assistance of the 'brothers from the North' this Turkic language – ignored under Persian rule – was given the first place in education and administration all over Persian Azerbaidzhan. An Azerbaidzhani university and an Azerbaidzhani National Museum were opened, Azerbaidzhani books and newspapers were either printed on the spot or imported from Soviet Azerbaidzhan. While contact between Tabriz, the capital of Persian Azerbaidzhan, and Teheran was practically cut off, the most advanced Turkic nationalists were encouraged to look to Baku for political and cultural inspiration. Left-wing Azerbaidzhani poets praised Baku with oriental hyperbole. One of them, Tavrieli, described Baku as the 'Rose of beauty graved in stone' and another, Muhammed Biriya, poet and also secretary of the trade unions of Persian Azerbaidzhan, said he came to Baku to drink the 'life-giving water' of this city and that he wept 'happy tears' on seeing Baku.[50]

In 1946, when the Soviet troops left Northern Persia, the Persian Government only too easily swept away the régime set up by pro-communist Azerbaidzhani autonomists in Tabriz. The nationalism of the Azerbaidzhani Turks of Persia was still too feeble to put up a successful resistance even to a weak Persian State. The end of the Azerbaidzhani separatist government was, however, not the end of the Azerbaidzhan problem. The Soviet régime did its best to keep the issue alive both in Soviet 'Northern Azerbaidzhan' and in Persian 'Southern Azerbaidzhan'. Soviet Azerbaidzhani poets and writers continued to deal in their works with the problem of the unredeemed brothers in the South and thus to foster an irredentist ideology among the people of the Azerbaidzhani S.S.R. On the other hand communist refugees from Southern Azerbaidzhan were given shelter in Baku and were assisted in their efforts to keep in touch with the Turkic-speaking people of Northern Persia.

IV. TRANSCAUCASIAN MINORITIES

Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaidzhani Turks are the three 'state nations' of Transcaucasia, but they do not exhaust the nationality prob- Ca. 563 SU. 563

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

[Talysh] Caucasia RH1

[Aissor]

Ca. lems facing the Soviet Government in that part of the Russian Empire.
563 Each of the three Transcaucasian republics also includes a large number
S.U. of ethnical minorities which differ widely in character and can, from
563 the point of view of the Soviet régime, be classed into three categories:
[101] 1. Minorities organically linked with the three Transcaucasian state nations (Ossetins and Abkhazians in Georgia, Talyshi in Azerbaidzhan*). They are a purely internal problem of the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics.

2. Minority groups, mainly made up of immigrants, who proved to be a handicap to the Soviet régime. These minorities included Germans in Georgia and Azerbaidzhan, Greeks who, in 1926, formed 2 per cent of the entire population of Georgia, Anatolian Turks in Armenia and small groups of Persians. The Soviet Government treated all these minorities at one time or another as potential agents of a foreign power. These communities of immigrants were much reduced by deportations and arrests during and after the Second World War.

3. Minority groups who can be used for purposes of Russian power politics. This group comprises Assyrians and Kurds.

THE ASSYRIANS

Ca. The Assyrians can be compared in many ways with the Armenians. They
563 are a Christian people scattered among Moslem countries, a people
[101] which has been deprived for many centuries of a State of its own. The
S.U. number of Assyrians who have survived oriental persecution is too
563 small to enable them to follow the example of the Armenians and
[101] rebuild a kind of 'National Home'. As a matter of fact, by interfering in the life of this small Christian people Russia probably did more to hasten their doom than to help them towards recovering from the blows which their Moslem neighbours had inflicted on them.

During the First World War in particular the Assyrians had to pay dearly for their pro-Russian sympathies. The Russian army relied in the early part of the war on the Assyrians as allies behind the Turkish lines. The Assyrians assisted the Russians, indeed, wherever they could, but in return they did not obtain national liberation. Their fate was exile or death. In May 1915, inspired by the expectation of Russian help, the Assyrians started an insurrection but were unsuccessful. To save their lives 40,000 Assyrians then embarked on a heroic march across difficult mountain passes and finally reached the Russian side of the front. The Russian authorities cordially welcomed them and the Grand Duke Nikolay decorated the Mar Shimun, the political and religious leader of the Assyrians, who had led the great migration. These platonic expressions of sympathy were of little help to the Assyrians. Transcaucasia was soon drawn into the turmoil of revolution and civil war and there was no Russian authority in existence which could be interested in the fate of the Assyrian people. S.U. 563 Ca. 563

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* The Talyshi are a people of Persian stock of whom 80,000 are living in the area of Lenkoran on the Soviet-Persian border. They were not granted a special administrative unit, presumably because their national consciousness is little developed. Most of them are bilingual and speak Turkic in addition to their native tongue.

It is not our task to follow up the further calvary of the Assyrians in Iraq, their recruitment into the famous Assyrian levies and the massacres of 1933 – we are concerned here only with the Russian aspect of the problem. Whilst the centre of gravity of the Assyrian nation was in Iraq, where the Mar Shimun had his residence, Soviet government circles claimed that the largest single group of Assyrians lived in the U.S.S.R. and thus, from the Russian point of view, the Assyrians had become one of the peoples of the Soviet Union.[51]

In 1935 the number of Assyrians in Russia was officially estimated at 50,000-60,000, but the 1939 census recorded not more than 20,000. They occupied eight villages in Transcaucasia and had also small colonies in Krasnodar, Rostov, Kiev, Leningrad and Moscow, where at one time over 2,000 Assyrians were counted. In all these places the Assyrians had their own national schools, and a special Assyrian section was established in the Teachers' Training College in the North Caucasus town of Armavir. Soviet Assyrians were looked after by a special Assyrian organization, 'Khoyadto', which both attended to their cultural needs and directed their mobilization for socialistic reconstruction work. S.U. 563 162

The Soviet Government found it a hard task to reconcile the Assyrian people with Bolshevik ideology, in view of their deep attachment to their ancient Nestorian Church. In April 1933, a statement of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee complained about 'undermining activities' which class-alien exploiting elements were alleged to have carried out amongst Soviet Assyrians. These 'elements' were said to have penetrated into Assyrian collective farms and cooperatives in an attempt to dominate them. S.U. 563 771 Ca. 563 771

The régime also found fault with the communists and Communist Youth League members who had been recruited amongst the Assyrians in 'considerable numbers', for even Assyrian communists seemed to have kept faith with their nation and its rich traditions. In the middle of the thirties the authorities turned against a number of Assyrian communists who had proved to be 'prisoners of family ties', and who had defended 'class enemies' because of their Assyrian nationality. These 'communists' had denied the necessity of class struggle inside the Assyrian people since they could not see any class divisions within a nation which had concentrated all its energies on its survival.[52] Ca. 563 665 186

Soviet philologists also tried to replace the 'archaic' Syriac alphabet of the Assyrians. At first they gave them a Russian alphabet, then, in 1930, a Latin alphabet. This had to be revised two years later because it was 'unsuitable' and in the end the Russian alphabet was re-introduced. S.U. 563 212 ooo was 'unsuitable' and in the end the Russian alphabet was re-introduced.

S.U. Many 'Soviet Assyrians' disliked the anti-religious policy of the Bol-
563 sheviks, the continuous experiments which the Soviet authorities made
648 with Assyrian cultural life, as well as the entire communist social
Ca. system. A large number of Assyrians therefore left Russia for Iraq in
563 the period between the wars to join the Assyrian levies under British
167 command.

During and after the Second World War Soviet Russian power politics made use of the Assyrians of Northern Persia. Although their number was small Soviet occupation authorities mobilized them, together with local Armenians, in support of the pro-Russian autonomous régime established in Tabriz. After the withdrawal of the Red Army troops the Persian Assyrians suffered together with all other groups of the population in whom the Russians had shown particular interest.

RUSSIA AND THE KURDISH PROBLEM

The small number of Assyrians in Middle Eastern countries (30,000 in Iraq, 9,000 in Syria, 25,000 in Persia) indicates that Russia coulduse them
K. only for very limited purposes. The Kurds may become a more re-
161 doubtable instrument in Russian hands. They are one of the most important factors in the Middle East. How many Kurds are there altogether? This purely statistical question is in itself part of the 'Kurdish problem'. In Turkey, for instance, official data referring to 1945 say that their number in that country does not exceed 1,900,000, but sources more favourable to the Kurdish national point of view speak of 4,000,000 Turkish Kurds. It is significant that this latter figure is approvingly quoted in a Russian monograph on Turkey.[53] In addition, there are 800,000 Kurds in Iraq, 700,000 in Persia and 200,000 in Syria.

S.U. The four States with a Kurdish population are bound to draw closer
563 to each other for military, geographical, political and economic reasons.
648 The Kurdish question common to all of them to a greater or lesser degree may prove to cement their unity. Russia's interests are the exact opposite of those of the four Middle Eastern countries with Kurdish minorities. Russia is a bitter opponent of any kind of federation on her borders. What she wants is not Kurdish cement but Kurdish dynamite.

For a long time Soviet Russia had had no real Kurdish policy. The strength of Britain in the Middle East prevented both the Soviet Government and the Comintern from playing the Kurdish card. In Russian communist eyes the Kurds were but a 'counter-revolutionary force', a tool of British imperialism intended to embarrass Turkey, the Arab world and even the Soviet Union itself.

But even at the time when leading Soviet quarters still held this negative view on the Kurds, they envisaged the possibility of a change in the

evaluation of the Kurdish factor. From the cultural point of view the S.U
Kurds were still an unwritten sheet of paper. Soviet Russia, so the communist 563
strategists may have argued, thus stood the chance of exercising 648
a paramount influence on the development and the character of a future Kurdish culture, if she only tried.

The raw material for such a Soviet experiment was the small Kurdish K
minority in Transcaucasia. The exact number of the Kurds in Soviet [161]
Russia is as difficult to ascertain as their number in any other country. Ca.
Officially Russia had only 54,700 Kurds in 1926 and 45,800 in 1939, but 563
unofficial pre-war data recorded as many as 80,000, of whom 40,000 were [162]
in Azerbaidzhan, 23,000 in Armenia and the rest in Georgia and Turkmenistan. Only in Armenia and Azerbaidzhan were the Kurds a political problem.

For a long time neither Azerbaidzhani nor Armenian communists seemed to have grasped the importance of the Kurds within the framework of a far-sighted Soviet policy in the Middle East.[1] They either neglected the Kurdish minorities living in their respective republics or even tried to deprive them of their national character.

The Armenian communists disliked the Kurds in view of the role which the latter had played in the Armenian massacres, and thus showed not the slightest interest in their well-being and their mobilization for the Soviet State. Kurds in Armenia were not entrusted with political and social work, no skilled workers were recruited from among them and Kurdish peasants were not even organized into collective farms.[54] In 1936, the Soviet central Government strongly reprimanded the Armenian communists for letting national animosities interfere with their Kurdish policy.

All the mistakes which local Transcaucasian authorities committed in S.U.
handling the Kurdish question in the inter-war period proved to be 563
unimportant at a moment when Russia was able to use the Kurdish 725
issue on a big scale. Her success in handling the problem was then indisputable. Colonel W. G. Elphinston, who was in charge of Kurdish affairs as a British Middle East Intelligence Officer, said that the effects of propaganda in the Kurdish language originating in the Kurdish community in the U.S.S.R. made themselves felt as far away as Syria, and communist pamphlets in Kurdish penetrated as far as Cairo.[55]

The Kurdish group outside the U.S.S.R. most directly affected by S.U.
Russian policy and propaganda were the Persian Kurds whose country 563
was occupied by the Red Army between 1941 and 1946. The Soviet 648
occupation authorities did not spread communist ideas among the K.
Kurds; they did not propagate collectivization and nationalization. All 648
they aimed at was to make the Kurds respectful to Soviet Russia, the 642
Russian Army and Stalin. The Kurdish Republic set up with Russian help in 1946 under Quazi Mohammed as Prime Minister was a national

[1] [Cf. cat. 116, pp. 250-251, R1 Sov. Union --Analyst]

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S.U Kurdish State and not communist. It existed for only nine months, des-
563 pite the Treaty of Alliance for twenty years which it had concluded with
648 K another Soviet-sponsored government, the autonomous administration
648 642 of Persian Azerbaidzhan.

Even such short-lived experiments as the Kurdish Republic of 1946 can become an important factor in the national tradition of a people, who, like the Kurds, are living under foreign rule. Experiments of that kind are apt to create a myth which ultimately may have a greater impact on the national development of the people than the original event itself. From year to year the Kurdish Republic of Quazi Mohammed may appear to the Kurds more splendid and more powerful, particularly if Soviet propaganda does its share by reminding the Kurds of the downfall of 'their' republic and recalling the part which Russia played in its
S.U. foundation. Soviet propaganda is indeed taking every opportunity of
[208] referring back to the glorious times when two pictures decorated the walls of the houses of many a Kurdish sheikh – that of Quazi Mohammed, the Kurdish leader, hanged by the Persians in March 1947, and that of Generalissimo Stalin.[56]

K, Despite the collapse of 'Free Kurdistan' Soviet Russia has neverthe-
177 less made great progress in mastering the Kurdish problem. Kurdish
648 chieftains became acquainted with Soviet institutions and Soviet ideo-
167 517 logy while the Russian occupation of Persia's Kurdish territories lasted.
S.U. Many Persian Kurds joined their countrymen already living in Soviet
563 Transcaucasia and Kurdish culture 'national in form and socialist in
[214] content' developed: 200 Kurdish pamphlets and books had been pub-
555 lished in the Soviet Union by 1949.[57] Nor was there any shortage of qualified Kurdish personnel in the Soviet Union after the war. On the contrary, Soviet propaganda was able to boast of Kurdish 'state dignitaries and outstanding workers in culture and science', who had sprung up among the Russian Kurds. A Kurdish Soviet poet, Amin Avdal, is the 'author of wonderful verses on the Soviet homeland'. Another Kurdish poet, Jasmeh Jalil, translated Russian classics into his native tongue. A Kurdish philologist, Nure Pulatova, a graduate of Leningrad University, became the only Kurdish woman scholar in the world.[58] And lastly, between 1946 and 1950 the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. included a Kurdish deputy, Samand Alievich Siabandov.

However important the recent Soviet experiments with the Russian Kurds may be, the latter represent not even 5 per cent of the entire Kurdish people. Soviet Russia must bring either the Turkish or the Persian Kurds within her orbit if she wants to make a success of her 'Kurdish policy'. It remains to be seen whether the political dynamic of the U.S.S.R. and the ideological power of Bolshevism will be sufficient to accomplish this aim.

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IX

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

The possession of wide stretches of Central Asia is one of the essential S.U. factors which have made Russia a world power. The area east of the 636 Caspian Sea and south of the lakes Aral and Balkash has, from the point 648 of view of Russian power politics, far greater weight than the whole 185 gigantic body of Siberia. This area is indeed the watchtower from which Russia can look into India, Western China and Afghanistan. With Central Asia as far as the Pamir in her hands, Russia has become an Asiatic power without losing her separate status as a European power, while the possession of the much larger but more isolated Siberia had made Russia only a Euro-Asiatic power.

Ethnically Central Asia is not the natural continuation of European T. Russia like Western Siberia. Central Asia, which is primarily inhabited 101 by Asiatic peoples with an old history and an old civilization, is a colony of the Russian Empire where Russian colonization has been and still is active and successful.

THE CONQUEST

The Russian advance into Central Asia was carried out mainly in the S.U. nineteenth century, mostly during its latter half, although the founda- 175 tions for the final conquest were laid and consolidated from the [636] eighteenth century onwards. [85

Russia established her rule over Central Asia by a gigantic two- T. pronged strategic movement starting from Omsk in a southerly 175 direction and from Orenburg in a south-easterly direction.

The main work had been performed from Orenburg, later named after S.U. [361] Chkalov, the first Soviet pilot to fly from Russia to America across the North Pole. The foundation of Orenburg, which is no more than a provincial town on the border of Europe and Asia, was one of the most outstanding events in Russian history, ranking in importance not far behind the conquest of Kazan. Unlike the establishment of many other outposts of the Russian Empire, the beginnings of Orenburg did not result from Cossack exploits, but from careful geographical and political
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S.U. planning. Some of the finest Russian brains of the epoch, such as I. K.
175 Kirillov, the author of the first geographical atlas of the Russian Empire,
185 and the prominent historian V. N. Tatishchev, were associated with the
T Orenburg project. It is characteristic of the methods of Russian coloniza-
175 tion that Orenburg was actually founded three times. In 1737 the original Orenburg fortress was erected at the confluence of the rivers Or and Ural; in 1740 it was transplanted about 112 miles down the river, and in 1742 it was shifted to a place about 165 miles from Orenburg II.
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[103] The very name of Orenburg was no longer justified since the fortress was, in its final location, far away from the Or river.

For a hundred years the Russians stopped at Orenburg. They used it as a cornerstone for the building of the Orenburg Line, a chain of small fortresses along the Ural river, but for a long time they did not move further. A similar chain of fortresses called the Irtysh Line was built at the north-eastern fringe of Central Asia, south of Omsk. Around the middle of the nineteenth century, the Russians started to move again. They advanced from Orenburg to the Lake Aral and reached the mouth of the Syr Darya river in 1847. Starting from the Irtysh Line they pushed forward to the Lake Balkash and beyond. In 1853, troops of the military governor of Orenburg gained command of the middle course of the Syr Darya by capturing Ak Mechet, which then became the Fort Perovsk, while in the next year troops advancing from the Irtysh Line erected the fortress of Verny – 'The Faithful'.

The most triumphant day of the whole Central Asiatic campaign was June 15th, 1865, when General M. G. Chernayev, with only 1,500 men and twelve cannons, captured Tashkent against enemy forces 30,000 men strong and having fifty guns at their disposal. Only two persons were killed in the final 'assault' on the city, which became the administrative centre of Russian Central Asia.

Three years later another Russian force took, likewise almost without casualties, the town of Samarkand, once one of the most splendid cities of the world, for the possession of which Asiatic rulers had sacrificed tens of thousands of people. A great act of historic *revanche* was associated with this victory. In Samarkand was the grave of Timur the Lame, before whom Russia had trembled and whose men had set Moscow on fire.

From the point of view of Soviet Russian state ideology it is of no small importance that the most vital parts of Central Asia and, in particular, some large and famous towns joined Russia's fold, not as a result of bloody battles, but by virtue of the respect inspired by Russian might and superiority, and as the outcome of skilled manœuvring and diplomatic action. When the Soviet régime reconquered Central Asia for Russia from local nationalists during the Civil War, it was at a much higher cost in human life.

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THE 'NATIONAL-TERRITORIAL DELIMITATION'

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Soviet Central Asia went through many an experiment before taking its 642 present shape. In the early years of Bolshevik rule Soviet Central Asia 631 was still described as 'Turkestan', as it was under the Czarist Government. An Autonomous Turkestani S.S.R. was founded on May 1st, 1918. In addition there existed the 'Soviet People's Republics' (as distinct from 'Soviet Socialist Republics') of Bokhara and Khorezm, previously known as the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva. These two 'People's Republics' were formally outside the Soviet Union and were linked with the Russian Socialist Soviet Federation by treaties of alliance.

Turkestan, Bokhara and Khorezm had a multi-national character. T. 162 The population of Turkestan consisted of 41·4 per cent Uzbeks, 10·8 per cent Kirghiz, 10·3 per cent Kazakhs, 7·7 per cent Tadzhiks, 4·7 per cent Turkmenians. Khorezm had 61 per cent Uzbeks and 28·8 per cent Turkmenians. 98·6 per cent of all Kirghiz and 66·5 per cent of all Uzbeks lived in Turkestan, but the Tadzhiks were almost equally divided between Bokhara and Turkestan, while the Turkmenians were split between three territorial units: 43·2 per cent lived in Turkestan, 27 per cent in Bokhara and 29·8 per cent in Khorezm.

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The Soviet régime considered that its task in Central Asia consisted 631 in establishing national states for Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Turkmenians and 185 Kirghiz. This was achieved by the formal annexation by Soviet Russia 568 and partition of Bokhara and Khorezm and by the disbandment of the T. Turkestani A.S.S.R. This whole process was officially described as the 642 'national-territorial delimitation' of Soviet Central Asia. It was decided 162 upon in principle in September 1924, and carried out by the spring of 1925. As an outcome of the 'delimitation' 94·2 per cent of all Turkmenians were allocated to a Turkmenian Soviet Republic, 82·6 per cent of all Uzbeks of the U.S.S.R. to Uzbekistan, 86·7 per cent of all Kirghiz to Kirghizistan and 75·2 per cent of all Tadzhiks to Tadzhikistan.[1] (These percentages do not, however, take into account those Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirghiz, etc., who are living outside the Soviet Union.) Not all of the newly formed national territories were immediately given the rank of fully fledged Soviet Republics. Tadzhikistan, for instance, was an Autonomous Republic within Uzbekistan until 1929, when it was raised in status. Kirghizistan, originally an Autonomous Soviet Republic within the R.S.F.S.R., became a Soviet Republic as late as 1936. In the same year, Kazakhstan became the fifth Soviet Republic of Central Asia.

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THE REVOLUTIONARY ROLE OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

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For the Soviet Union, Central Asia became more important than it had ever been for Czarist Russia. In addition to being a strategic watch-tower, Central Asia became a Soviet show-window for the peoples of the East. This double role of Central Asia was always present in the minds of Lenin and Stalin.

Lenin said in 1919: 'The establishment of relations of the right kind with the peoples of Turkestan has now, without any exaggeration, a gigantic world-historic importance for the R.S.F.S.R.'[2] In 1923, Stalin elaborated on this idea when he declared: 'Turkestan is the most important Soviet Republic from the point of view of revolutionizing the East. . . . The task is to transform Turkestan into a model republic, into an advanced post for revolutionizing the East. With this aim in view it is necessary to concentrate on Turkestan in the sense of raising the cultural level of the masses, of putting the state machinery into the hands of the local peoples, etc. We have to fulfil this task whatever the price may be without sparing efforts and without shrinking from sacrifices. . . .'[3]

Stalin always remained faithful to the 'show-window' idea as far as Central Asia was concerned. When, in connection with the new Soviet constitution, Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan were transformed into Union Republics, Stalin and his experts on nationalities policy immediately assessed the importance which this gesture might have on Russia's Asiatic neighbours. Thus Semyon M. Dimanshtein, Stalin's former collaborator at the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, wrote 'One cannot overlook the fact that Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan are situated on the borders of the Soviet land. They are objects of tremendous interest for their foreign neighbours – China, Persia and for the comparatively near Afghanistan; every forward step carried out by the Soviet Republics meets with a loving echo in the hearts of those peoples suffering under the yoke of imperialistic States and enduring all the horrors of the colonial rule of imperialist robbers. . . . They see from the example of the national republics located near to them and belonging to the U.S.S.R. how national and social liberation can be achieved. Their hopes receive a new inspiration with every success of the formerly oppressed peoples of the U.S.S.R. We can be bold enough to declare that the transformation of Kirghizistan and Kazakhstan will have a great echo beyond our frontiers'.

In this statement which was made in July 1936 in the journal *Revolyutsiya i Natsionalnosti*, Dimanshtein mentioned China, Persia and Afghanistan as countries which Soviet Russia wanted to impress by her policy on nationalities in Central Asia; he might have added

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India to that list. Russian objectives in each of those countries are of a 648 very different nature. The idea of annexing the whole or part of 563 Afghanistan is from a Russian point of view not unreal. Nor can it 185 be ruled out by a far-sighted Soviet policy. The idea of transforming Persia into an 'Iranian People's Republic' seemed to have been harboured and repeatedly encouraged by the Soviet rulers. In India, Russian aims were bound to be more modest. None the less, the Bolshevik leaders S.U. have always indulged in the hope that important sections of Indian [208] public opinion can be influenced by clever propaganda on the achievements in Soviet Central Asia, and more particularly so if this propaganda were not conducted via Moscow but by reliable allegedly independent 'national governments' of Soviet Central Asia.

In regard to China, despite its long common frontier with Soviet Central Asia, the latter represents no more than a secondary base for a Russian political and propaganda offensive. The part assigned to Soviet Central Asia in a campaign against a hostile China was of a purely local character. It consisted of loosening the ties between the sparsely populated Chinese Turkestan and China proper.

Soviet Central Asia can fulfil its many-sided tasks within the framework of Russian power politics by its division into five Soviet Republics, each of which has a special part to play in Russia's relations with the outside world. The Soviet Government was fully aware of the fact that each of the five principal peoples of Soviet Central Asia had racial brothers living on the other side of the Russian border. There are Turkmenians both in Persia and Afghanistan; Tadzhiks both in Afghanistan and India; Uzbeks in Afghanistan; Kirghiz and Kazakhs in Western China. It was, therefore, logical to assume that the very existence of national Turkmenian, Tadzhik, Kirghiz and Uzbek Republics would exercise a certain attraction on their kinsmen beyond the Soviet borders. It was even logical to believe that this attraction might ultimately lead to an enlargement of the 'national republics' of the U.S.S.R., and in the final analysis to an enlargement of the Russian Empire.

THE FIGHT AGAINST CENTRAL ASIATIC UNITY

By dividing Soviet Central Asia into five national republics the Govern- S.U. ment of the Soviet Union not only served the aims of its foreign policy 631 563 but also safeguarded the stability of Russian rule in Soviet Central Asia T. itself. With the exception of the Tadzhiks and some minor ethnical 631 groups, the nationalities of Soviet Central Asia are all Turkic peoples 563 intimately inter-related. The formation of a Central Asiatic federation would, therefore, be quite logical and would probably correspond to the desires of the peoples concerned. Such a federation is, however, bound

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S.U. to threaten Russian predominance and weaken the links between the
631 central power and each of the five Central Asiatic Republics. The
563 Soviet central Government has, therefore, strongly opposed all federa-
T. tive tendencies. Organizations which originally dealt with Central
631 Asia as a whole, such as the Central Asiatic Bureau of the All-Union
563 Communist Party and the Central Asiatic Economic Council were disbanded in 1934. The Soviet Government alleged that the liquidation of these bodies constituted a recognition of the growing maturity of the various Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. In reality this measure was dictated by the desire of the Soviet Government to eliminate anything which might serve as a lever for the formation of a regional alliance of non-Russians against the centre.*

T. Even now there is but comparatively little contact between the
517 members of the Central Asiatic cultural élite such as writers, folk-
814 lorists and historians, despite the existence of many problems which
177 could be satisfactorily solved by mutual co-operation. In the majority
S.U. of cases, the only kind of co-operation existing between them operates
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658 on the all-Union level, i.e. in a wider framework alongside Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians, etc. Thus, for instance, no special conferences of Central Asiatic writers and historians are held, a fact which was regretfully admitted by the Uzbek writer Aibek at the Eleventh Plenum of the Soviet Writers' Union.[5]

The lack of co-operation and co-ordination leads to the isolation of the literature and culture of the various Central Asiatic peoples of the U.S.S.R. The artificial process of separating the national histories of the various Central Asiatic peoples from each other has favoured narrow-minded local nationalism and a certain anarchy in the field of history writing. Textbooks produced for Kazakhstan and Kirghizistan and for Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan conflict with each other in a number of cases.

THE RUSSIANS AS 'ELDER BROTHER'

S.U. The idea which the Soviet régime wishes permanently to implant in
563 Central Asia is that the links between each of the non-Russian peoples
T. and the Russians should be closer than those of the non-Russian peoples
177 among themselves. Moscow wants the Uzbeks, the Tadzhiks, Kazakhs,
626 Turkmenians and Kirghiz to realize that one and all of these peoples owe a great deal of gratitude to the great Russian brother while they owe hardly anything to each other. Every Soviet official in Central Asia must

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T. 665 * At the time of the disbandment of the Central Asiatic Bureau the total number of organized communists in Uzbekistan (including Karakalpakia), Turkmenistan and Tadzhikistan amounted to 79,150. In Tadzhikistan and Turkmenistan half of the party membership consisted of Europeans, in Karakalpakia as much as 70 per cent. Only in Uzbekistan were 'native' communists in the majority.

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endorse this idea as a token of loyalty to the régime. Even the highest representative of the intellectual life of Soviet Central Asia, the rector of the Central Asiatic University in Tashkent, Sultan Umarov, had to make the following statement: 'The whole Uzbek people, young and old, will remember for all time that it owes its achievements to the party of Lenin and Stalin, to its elder brother, the Russian people, and to the leader and teacher of the nations – the great Stalin'.[6]

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Representatives of other Central Asiatic peoples had to express their political creed in almost identical terms. The great pioneer role of the Russians in Central Asia is indeed undeniable, but the slogan of the Russian 'elder brother' implies more than a recognition of this pioneer work, it expresses servility and self-effacement on the part of the peoples who use it, and subordination of the rich history of the Central Asiatic peoples to Russian history which, as far as Central Asia is concerned, began only in the nineteenth century.

A very important aspect of the 'elder brother' theory is that in Central Asia his is not a temporary function which might come to an end at some later date. With the further economic development of Soviet Central Asia the 'elder brother' will become increasingly indispensable, because the Central Asiatic peoples by themselves are unable to reach the target figures fixed for them by Stalin's five-year plans. They are also incapable of producing from their own people the technical and educational *cadres* necessary for the implementation of these plans. This inability is in part due to the failure of Soviet schools to turn out adequate numbers of qualified personnel from amongst the local population. In addition, it is true to say that some of the Central Asiatic peoples are numerically too small to master the tasks assigned to their national republics by the centre even under the most perfect educational system.

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The step from illiteracy to literacy, itself won with difficulty, was easy in comparison with the next objective, namely, the training of a native intelligentsia worthy of the name and capable of replacing the Russians in the key positions they now occupy in Central Asiatic economy. Various causes account for this. In the first place, it proved to be extremely difficult to keep the sons and daughters of steppe peoples for years under a rigid school discipline. In many cases the decree on compulsory school attendance remained a dead letter.* Secondly, there is an acute shortage of qualified teachers in Soviet Central Asia; the majority

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* In the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. of Uzbekistan 24,000 children of school age, presumably the majority of all children in this republic, did not have any education in 1942–3.[7] As late as 1947, according to the admission of the organ of Soviet trade unions, more than 150,000 school children of Uzbekistan did not attend school.[8] In Kirghizistan 25 per cent of school children did not go to school in the rural districts of the republic, while an even larger number had failed to attend schools in the Kirghiz towns at the end of the first term of 1947.[9]

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T. of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in
8/1 methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school
555 training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek,
[191] Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage
S.U. in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete
871 command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when
563 trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his
555 mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another
language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful
career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical
education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without
a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred
from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes
in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and
technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains
S.U. the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the
563 Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the
554 Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain
T. privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important
563 key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local
554 ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the personnel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state
banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of
'family affection'.

T. The Russians living in the various Central Asiatic Republics are even
[517] entitled to join hands for common cultural tasks while the Central
Asiatic peoples, as we have seen, are kept apart as much as possible.
Thus in May 1948, a conference of Russian writers of Central Asia met
in Tashkent. The conference dealt amongst other things with the help
which Russian authors were to give to Russian theatres throughout
Central Asia.[10]

Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian
factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the
Ka. Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan,
101 which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated
in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably
linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

I. KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and
stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral
600 storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its

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KAZAKHSTAN

It ranks first in the world for its
chromium deposits and possesses 57·4 per cent of all copper, 56·3 per S.U.
cent of all lead, 49·8 per cent of all zinc, in the U.S.S.R., in addition to 433
its wealth in coal, oil and silver. Moreover, 15 per cent of the entire 635
stocks of cattle and 20 per cent of the sheep of the U.S.S.R. are found Ka.
in the territory of Kazakhstan. Both the size of the Republic and its 433
extraordinary economic importance make Kazakhstan a most suitable
model for the study of Soviet nationalities policy in Central Asia.

Soviet policy in Kazakhstan is based on ensuring the political and S.U.
ideological reliability of this rich country with its vast potentialities. 635
This aim is to be achieved by destroying any organized Kazakh national 563
movement, by wiping out all anti-Russian tendencies among the Ka.
Kazakh communists and non-party people and by spiritually trans- 177. 62
forming the Kazakhs into Russians. 626

After the October Revolution the Soviet régime in Kazakhstan was Ka.
faced with a powerful Kazakh nationalist movement, the 'Alash Orda', 668
which, like other Oriental nationalist parties of its kind, was at first 665
courted by the communists and later dropped and most bitterly attacked.
Kazakh communists were a rare species at that time. Most Communist
Party organizations in Kazakhstan had but 1 to 5 per cent of Kazakh
members, while the entire party machinery was in Russian hands. The Ka.
Russian colonists who, particularly since the end of the nineteenth [167]
century, had penetrated into the Kazakh steppe, were the only solid
pillar on which communist propaganda could rely in Kazakhstan.

On the whole the Russian colonization of Kazakhstan was accom- S.U.
plished in twenty years – from 1893 to 1912. During that period the 167
total male population which poured into that country, and particularly Ka.
into its northern and central districts, numbered 750,600. Russian 563
colonization advanced even in far-off South-eastern Kazakhstan, including the town of Verny, which in 1910 had 26,000 Russians among its 37,000 inhabitants. In varying strength the Russians spread over practically the whole of Kazakhstan, introduced agriculture into that country of cattle breeding nomads and occupied wide stretches of the most fertile and valuable parts of the Kazakh steppe.

In the years following the October Revolution Kazakh nationalists Ka.
threatened to annihilate Russian colonization by sending the colonists 186
back to Russia proper and making Kazakhstan a Kazakh country.
Had they succeeded, a large part of Central Asia would have become a prey to anarchy and famine, but they failed thanks to the Russian communists who defended in Kazakhstan the interests of both the Russian people and the Russian State.

The Soviet Government ruled Kazakhstan at first from Orenburg, Ka.
which was merely at the periphery and practically outside the country. 633
In 1925 the capital of the then 'Kazakh Autonomous S.S.R.'* was moved 103
right into the Kazakh steppe, to Kzyl Orda (formerly 'Ak Mechet' S.U.
* [i.e. Kazakhstan--Analyst] 562
631

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Kazakhstan RQ1

Ka meaning 'White Mosque'), so that the régime could increase its hold
633 on the Kazakh people. Orenburg was separated from Kazakhstan and
102 added to Russia proper. This measure, amply warranted by the Russian
S.U character of Orenburg, was a very important operation. It separated the
523 Volga Moslems from the Moslems of Central Asia and thus thwarted
631 nationalist dreams about a great united State of Russia's Turkic peoples.

The name of the new administrative centre, 'Kzyl Orda', which stands for 'Red Capital', was soon devoid of meaning since in 1927 it was decided to move the capital to Eastern Kazakhstan, to Alma Ata, formerly Verny.

SOVIETIZATION OF THE KAZAKH VILLAGE

Ka. The chief problem facing the communist rulers of Kazakhstan was the
621 Sovietization of the Kazakh aul (village), and this process was not
665 made much easier by the shifting of the capital from Orenburg to
628 Kzyl Orda and from Kzyl Orda to Alma Ata. In 1926 there was but one communist in every 1,000 of the Kazakh 'aul' population, and most of these 'aul communists' were technically and politically illiterate.[11] In that year only 5 per cent of the responsible posts in Kazakhstan's village councils were in the hands of communists. Many councils were controlled by the 'bais' who were more than a mere Central Asiatic counterpart of the Russian 'kulak'; they were chiefs of clans and leaders of an anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian Kazakh nationalism. In order to curb the power of the 'bais', the communists established a special class movement of the village poor known in Central Asia as 'Koshchi'. At first this measure also failed. The 'bais' infiltrated into the 'Koshchi' organization under the guise of village poor. In 1928, 2,000 'bais' were expelled from the organization and 700 'bais' exiled to 'distant areas' after confiscation of their cattle.

Ka. The Soviet authorities were unable to devote their undivided attention
665 to the class struggle in Kazakhstan. They were forced to check at the
186 same time the strong nationalist tendencies among the first Kazakh
423 communists. It seems that the majority of the party leadership was, in 1927, in the hands of the nationalists whose chief aim was to carry out land reform at the expense of the Russian and Ukrainian colonists. A Communist Party conference summoned under the auspices of the nationalist Kazakh elements decided that in Kazakhstan Kazakhs must have priority in questions of land distribution. Russian and Ukrainian peasants were to receive their share only after the needs of the Kazakhs had been satisfied. The Government of Kazakhstan implemented this decision without waste of time. Russians and Ukrainians were speedily removed from their fertile fields and transferred to unproductive stony ground.

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Kazakhstan AQ1

In this situation the central authorities of the Soviet State put their Ka
whole weight on the side of the Slav peasants and declared null and void 665
all anti-European discriminatory measures. The Communist Party of 563
Kazakhstan, from which nationalist elements were removed, had to 423
hold another conference revising the decision of the previous one and proclaiming the absolute equality of all nationalities in respect of land distribution. The Kazakh nationalist wing inside the Communist Party never recovered from that blow. For about five years an old Russian Bolshevik, Filip Isayevich Goloshchokin, became the ruler of the country in his capacity as party secretary. Under his proconsulate not SU
only was the existing Slav colonization protected, but the country was 499
opened to new colonists, particularly in connection with the construction 167
of the Turkestan-Siberia (Turksib) railway line cutting across Eastern Kazakhstan. The Turksib was opened in 1930 at a ceremony which was meant to be a big communist pan-Asiatic manifestation. The speakers on that occasion were significantly enough the veteran Japanese communist leader, Sen Katayama (1859–1933), and representatives of Soviet Bashkiria and Soviet Kazakhstan. While the building of the Turksib greatly improved the communication system in Soviet Central Asia, it did not acquire the importance which the Bolshevik leadership had initially attributed to it. The original assumption that several million Europeans would be able to settle down within a few years on both sides of the railway line proved to be erroneous.

The Turksib was by no means Goloshchokin's only miscalculation. Ka
In line with instructions received from the central Government he tried 474
to settle the Kazakh nomad population and to create collective farms 665
in large numbers for the very people who had just abandoned their 361
nomadic way of life. In a single year Goloshchokin and his underlings tried to transform 400,000 nomads into a settled population attached to collective farms. This attempt failed for a variety of reasons. The Kazakh Vice-Premier, U. D. Kulumbetov, openly admitted in 1932 that 'the settlement of the nomads had been carried out by high-handed administrative measures without having, by means of propaganda, prepared the minds of the people concerned and without having ensured in advance the economic conditions necessary for such an important operation'.[18]*

Kazakh nationalists opposed the settlement of the nomads and Ka
collectivization because they considered both as tantamount to 17797
Russification and to the confiscation of cattle belonging to Kazakhs. 474
Indeed, the collectivization of agriculture and cattle breeding increased 186
the influence of Russian and Ukrainian settlers in Kazakhstan because of the 'assistance' which Slav collective farmers had to give to their

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* Kulumbetov was executed as a 'bourgeois nationalist' in March 1935 together with eighteen other leading Kazakhs.

177.47 Kazakh colleagues. Russian and Ukrainian collective farms established
474 a 'sheftsvo' or 'patronage' over Kazakh collective farms.

196 In the early part of 1932 the situation in Kazakhstan got completely out of hand. Seventy per cent of all newly founded collective farms [231] collapsed, the so-called 'liquidated nomads' resumed their nomadic way [167] of life, slaughtered a large part of their cattle and fled across the Soviet-Chinese border into Sinkiang. In some districts of Kazakhstan livestock was reduced by 50 per cent.

665 The Central Committee of the Communist Party intervened and re-
647 called Goloshchokin. On September 17th, 1932, it issued a statement denouncing the 'serious political mistakes' which he had committed.[13] The Central Committee sent two men to Kazakhstan to clear up the entangled situation. They were L. M. Kaganovich, who headed a special mission in charge of the stabilization of Kazakh agriculture and cattle breeding, and an Armenian, C. I. Mirzoyan, who replaced Goloshchokin as party secretary. One of his main tasks was to attract more Kazakhs into the administration, which his predecessor had badly neglected. The beginning of his activity was not very promising in this direction. Mirzoyan arrived in Kazakhstan with a staff of forty Russians and Armenians whom he placed in responsible positions.

474 231 423 In the economic sphere the situation improved after the termination of 'left-wing megalomania' in autumn 1932. The decree of September 17th stipulated that nomadic cattle breeders after having joined collective farms could own privately as many as eight to ten cows, one hundred sheep and goats, eight to ten horses and three to five camels.* Even collective farmers conducting a sedentary life could own two to three cows, ten to twenty sheep and ten to twenty pigs. These concessions led to a consolidation of Kazakh cattle breeding, but on the political front conditions continued to be difficult even under Mirzoyan. The years be-
668 tween 1932 and 1936 were a period of tension in Kazakhstan due to the activities of 'Trotskyist and Bukharinist elements and of Kazakh nationalist deviationists intent on selling socialist Kazakhstan to the imperialists of Fascist Germany and Japan'.[14] These elements – so official Soviet sources alleged – tried to disrupt the industrialization of the country, to undermine collective farms and to arouse discontent among workers and collective farmers against the Soviet power. The 'enemies of the people' were even accused of killing shock-brigade workers, of provoking railway accidents and of organizing attempts on the life of communist leaders. Party secretary Mirzoyan was held responsible for all these happenings and removed from his post in 1938.

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* The Model Statute of the Agricultural Artel of 1935 increased the maximum figures for the nomadic cattle breeders to eight for camels and to 150 for sheep and goats.

½ [Cf. cat. 116, pp. 264-266, R1 Soviet Union--Analyst]

INDUSTRIAL COLONIZATION

Economic, political and ethnical conditions in Kazakhstan were greatly 178
affected by the industrialization of the country. Soviet power established 563
the third largest coal-producing centre of the U.S.S.R. in the Karaganda [665]
area of Central Kazakhstan; it encouraged oil production at Emba and
copper mining at Balkash and Karsakpay. Large numbers of Russian
and Ukrainian skilled workers, engineers and technicians were imported
to staff the new enterprises. The immigrants, many of whom came from
the principal Bolshevik bulwarks, Moscow, Leningrad, the Donets
Basin and Baku, included a very high percentage of Communist Party
members. Thus the new industrial colonists provided not only manpower
but also consolidated communism in Kazakhstan by increasing
numerically the politically reliable elements in the country.

With the help of the immigrants the urban population of Kazakhstan 369
rose from 9 per cent in 1926 to 17 per cent in 1936, and to 27·7 per cent
in 1939. In 1949 there were as many as thirty-six towns and 100 workers'
settlements in the country most of which had come into being under
the Soviet régime.[15] Before the Second World War, Alma Ata, the
Kazakh capital, had 230,000 inhabitants and Karaganda 165,000 inhabitants.
A new town, Temir Tau, which came into existence after the
war, will eventually accommodate 100,000 people.

The increasing concentration of the population of the republic in 369
towns enabled the régime to exercise control over the country more 563
efficiently. From the point of view of Kazakh national interests urbanization
turned out to be harmful because the natural increase of the
Kazakhs lagged behind the growth of the towns in their territory. The
new towns were thus bound to become predominantly Russian, and [77]
Russians took a prominent part in their administration. Thus in 1933,
when Karaganda was still in process of growing, the city council of
150 members and 56 alternate members was made up of 115 Kazakhs,
81 Russians, 4 Tartars and 6 'others'.

More and more former Kazakh cattle breeders are being transformed 369
into unskilled workers and town dwellers. In 1940 about half of the total 463
number of workers employed in Kazakhstan were Kazakhs against
one-third in 1930. However, this increase was not sufficient to give the
Kazakhs an economically decisive position in their homeland. There
are too few of them in the skilled and intellectual professions. Thus out
of 100,000 tractor and harvest combine drivers in Kazakhstan, only
26,000 were Kazakhs at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan, and in
1938 there were only 203 Kazakh students at Alma Ata University out
of a total of 865. This was a remarkable achievement perhaps, if compared
with conditions under the Czarist régime, but not enough to

Ka. 369 463 guarantee to the Kazakhs a political future in a country where the cult of the specialist prevails.[16]

167 162 Czarist colonization policy had established an important Slav minority in Kazakhstan. Soviet colonization policy went further; it completely reversed the balance of nationalities and transformed the Kazakh people into a virtual minority in their own country. In 1926 there were 57 per cent Kazakhs in Kazakhstan against 19·8 per cent Russians, and 13·2 per cent Ukrainians, while the remaining 10 per cent were split up among various Asiatic peoples. By 1939 the Kazakhs formed less than 50 per cent of the population in 'their' republic. According to the census of January 17th, 1939, the whole population of Kazakhstan then numbered 6,146,000, while the total number of Kazakhs in the entire Soviet Union was 3,098,000, of whom at least 10 per cent were living outside Kazakhstan in various Central Asiatic Republics and in Russian industrial centres.

Ka. 161 Official Soviet statistics likewise reveal that under the Soviet régime the Kazakhs have declined numerically. Between 1926 and 1939, the number of Kazakhs in the Soviet Union dropped by 869,000. Taking into account the average rate of increase of the population of the U.S.S.R. there ought to have been an increase of 631,000 Kazakhs. Thus the actual population deficit of the Kazakhs in the period roughly covered by the first two Five-Year Plans amounted to at least 1,500,000. No satisfactory explanation has been given so far for this development, but migration movements into Sinkiang have been mentioned as one of the reasons for the 'disappearance' of so many Kazakhs.[17] Ka. [168]

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE KAZAKH SOUL

Ka. 177.21 814 S.U. 563 814 During the first thirty years of Soviet power the external pacification of the rather recalcitrant Kazakh people made great headway; the struggle for the soul of the Kazakhs is still, however, as fierce as ever. One of the essential objectives of that struggle is to bring about the complete harmony between the Kazakh and the Russian conception of history. It is, of course, taken for granted that whenever history as seen from the Kazakh point of view clashes with the official Soviet Russian version, the former must give way to the latter.

The Soviet Russian conception of Kazakhstan's history may be reduced to four cut and dried formulae to which Kazakh intellectuals, and more particularly writers and historians, were bidden to subscribe. These were as follows:–

1. The Union of Kazakhstan with Russia was an aim which had been pursued by the most prominent and far-sighted rulers of the Kazakh people since the end of the sixteenth century.

2. The Union of Kazakhstan with Russia had prevented the enslavement

of the Kazakhs by the 'barbarian States of the Orient' and brought them into close contact with a country 'incomparably more civilized' than all their Asiatic neighbours. Ka. 177.81 814 S.U. 563 814

3. The annexation of Kazakhstan by Russia had ended the partition of that country between China, Russia and Kokand, and had opened the way to more progressive forms of economy.

4. All through their history the Kazakhs had never possessed a genuine well-organized State, only loosely connected semi-state organizations. The Soviet régime had enabled the Kazakhs to have a real State of their own – the Kazakh S.S.R.

Even Kazakh communist intellectuals whose devotion to the Soviet régime is beyond doubt were unable to agree with the aforesaid principles, particularly the last. These intellectuals expressed their viewpoint in a voluminous *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.*, which was published in 1943 and to which sixteen historians and seven writers had contributed. It is true that not all of this team of twenty-three were Kazakhs since they had been assisted by Russian scholars; nevertheless the compilation of the *History* constituted primarily an effort on the part of the native Kazakh intelligentsia.

While the authors' views on Kazakhstan's history under Soviet rule were fully in keeping with the official party line,[A] they were accused of having committed 'grave errors' when dealing with the more remote past of the Kazakh people. The principal 'errors' consisted in considering Czarist Russia as the chief and most dangerous enemy of the Kazakh people; in expressing regret at the liquidation of the primitive 'shuzy' – or hordes – as the Kazakh 'States' which had come into existence since the sixteenth century were called, and in idealizing Kazakh national leaders who had refused to accept Russian rule. Because of these and similar 'errors' the *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.* was withdrawn from circulation, despite the fact that it had been originally heralded as an important step forward in the development of the Asiatic peoples of the Soviet Union, inasmuch as it represented the first comprehensive history of a Central Asiatic Soviet Republic. Ka. 814 626

While the Second World War was still in progress, the Communist Party leadership instructed the authors of the *History* to undertake a thorough revision of the book in a spirit of Kazakh-Russian brotherhood.[16] It took them over seven years to complete this task. A 'Second, Revised and Supplemented Edition' of the *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.* was published in two volumes in 1949 and 1950. From the official point of view the new edition marked a great improvement, but it still contained 'serious errors' in the description of events connected with the incorporation of Kazakhstan into the Russian State. Early in 1951 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan decided that the *History of the Kazakh S.S.R.* would have to be revised once more.

[A] [Cf. Category 814, pp. 268-269 -- Analyst

Kazakhstan RQ1

Kirghizstan RPJ

Ka 177 51 517 S.U. 563 517 Soviet propagandists have carefully selected all the historical facts tending to prove that Kazakhstan is a dependency of Great Russia not only politically but also culturally. Thus they have laid great stress on a short visit which Pushkin paid to some Kazakh auls near Orenburg, an event important enough to give Pushkin's name to the library of Alma Ata, the largest in Kazakhstan.

F. M. Dostojevsky too became part of Kazakh cultural history and cultural life, having lived as an exile in Kazakhstan for nine years. He is said to have considerably influenced the development of Kazakh culture, mainly because of his friendship with the first Kazakh intellectual to have a European education – Chokhan Valikhanov (1835–65). This first Kazakh to exchange the life of the steppe for one at St. Petersburg University, was treated with great friendliness by the most distinguished Russians of his time, such as the geographer, Semyonov-Tyanshansky, and the poet, Maikov, who never considered him as an 'exotic' oddity but treated him as an equal.

Soviet publications strongly underline that all the other outstanding Kazakh intellectuals in Czarist times have been no less closely connected with Russian culture. Thus the greatest Kazakh poet, Abai Kunanbayev (1845–1905), translated Krylov, Pushkin and Lermontov into Kazakh and made Pushkin as popular among his people as the favourite native poets. The first Kazakh pedagogue, Ibrai Altynsarin (1841–89), was an ardent missionary of Russian civilization and founder of mixed Kazakh-Russian schools. He was the first to transcribe Kazakh in the Russian alphabet, fifty years ahead of the introduction of that 'reform' by the Soviet régime. The relationships which had existed between Kazakhs like Valikhanov, Kunanbayev and Altynsarin and the Russians are held up as an example to the present generation of Kazakhs, but this argument is neither convincing nor logical. The fact that enlightened Russians of the nineteenth century helped in the development of the Kazakh people and that Pushkin inspired the first Kazakh poets is by no means a reason for the Kazakhs of our time to look to a communist Moscow for guidance. Those Kazakh intellectuals who master the positive elements of Russian culture, such as the humanism of Pushkin, must on the contrary inevitably turn their backs on the distorted form of Russian civilization propagated by the Soviet régime.

II. KIRGHIZISTAN

RUSSIAN COLONIZATION

Ki 175 167 In Kirghizistan as in Kazakhstan Russian mass colonization was the factor which determined the development of the country in the twentieth century. Russian colonization in Kirghizistan started in 1866,

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Kirghizstan RP1

KIRGHIZISTAN

Russian colonization in Kirghizstan started in 1866 Ki.
but became really important only after 1907. Up to that year only twenty Russian settlements existed in Northern Kirghizistan, but between 1907 and 1914, sixty-one settlements were founded. In Southwest Kirghizistan, the Kirghiz part of the Ferghana plain, where Russian colonization was practically non-existent until 1906, fifty Russian settlements were established between that year and 1915.[19] 175 167 [361]

Russian colonization proved to be a serious menace to the rather small Kirghiz people. Between 1902 and 1913 the Kirghiz population of the Russian Empire had decreased by 8 or 9 per cent. The position had been aggravated further by a national disaster, namely, the unsuccessful uprising of 1916 when the Kirghiz, the Kazakhs and other Central Asiatic peoples revolted against the introduction of conscription. The Kirghiz rising had an all-national character, with members of the feudal upper-class, the 'Manaps' and 'Bais', not only participating in it, but even assuming the leadership of the movement. It is estimated that during the rising 150,000 Kirghiz were killed either by Czarist punitive expeditions or by Russian colonists. In addition a great number of Kirghiz died of starvation in China where they had sought refuge. All in all about 30 per cent of the Kirghiz people perished for various reasons between 1915 and 1920. Losses were greatest in the northern part of the present Kirghiz Soviet Republic which had been almost completely cleared of its Kirghiz population. Ki. 161 175 669

Soviet propaganda claims that the Soviet régime 'saved' the Kirghiz from extinction. In reality, the régime did not stop the suffocation of the Kirghiz by the Slavs, but on the contrary gave it a new impetus. In 1926 the Kirghiz accounted for about two-thirds of the population of their republic. On the eve of the Second World War their number had dropped to about 50 per cent. In the Supreme Soviet of the Republic, elected on February 16th, 1947, the Kirghiz received 56·6 per cent of the seats, which was slightly more than they were entitled to on the basis of their numerical strength. The Russians got 25·1 per cent and the Ukrainians 8·7 per cent of the seats. These figures must be compared to the returns of the 1926 census when Russians and Ukrainians accounted respectively for 11·7 per cent and 6·45 per cent of the entire population. Ki. 162 S.U. 563 Ki. [666]

Russian influence dominates every aspect of life in the Kirghiz S.S.R. At the end of 1949 the Kirghiz occupied only 17·8 per cent of all the leading industrial posts of the country. In the same year the percentage of the Kirghiz in the planning, financial and trade organs of Kirghizistan was 27 per cent.* Nearly all the remaining jobs were in the hands of Europeans and notably of Russians. The capital of the republic – Frunze – is an essentially Russian town bearing the name of a Russian communist leader, Mikhail Frunze, descendant of a family of colonists Ki. 555 563 Ki. 103

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* *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya*, October 10th, 1949.

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Kirghizstan RP2

102 who had settled in the country. Przhevalsk, another of the very few towns in the land of the Kirghiz, was named after a famous Russian explorer of Central Asia, N. M. Przhevalsky (1839–88), its native name of Karakol having been abandoned.

231 453 Soviet policy aiming at settling the nomads proved to be even more disastrous in Kirghizistan than in Kazakhstan. The decline of livestock in Kirghizistan was catastrophic. The number of sheep and goats dropped in 1937 to 1,886,000 from 3,665,000 in 1914 and 5,906,000 in 1928–29. The number of cattle between 1914 and 1937 underwent the following changes: 1914, 477,299; 1928, 1,084,000; 1937, 486,000.

668 662 665 The Communist Party shifted the whole responsibility for this economic plight on to Kirghiz nationalists. The opposition to collectivization and the settlement of the nomads in Kirghizistan was officially referred to as 'Sydykovshchina' (or Sydykovism) so called after Abdukerim Sydykov, a prominent member of the Kirghiz State Planning Commission. He was accused of being the leader of a counter-revolutionary feudal 'bai' organization engaged in sabotage, disruption of the collective farms and even armed struggle against the Soviet régime.[30] Another prominent Kirghiz to be expelled from the party was Prime Minister Yusup Abdurakhmanov. He was unmasked as a traitor because he had allegedly demanded that no Kirghiz bread should be exported to Uzbekistan. The most outstanding Kirghiz communist to be purged was Taras Ryskulovich Ryskulov, who was the only Kirghiz to acquire all-Union importance in the first thirty years of Soviet power. Ryskulov was, in 1922, Stalin's deputy in his capacity of Peoples' Commissar of Nationalities; he was later Vice-Premier of the R.S.F.S.R. and occupied various other prominent positions in Moscow, until he disappeared in the great clean-up of 1937.

'RUSSIAN MARCH TO VICTORY'

186 528 On the Kirghiz 'cultural front' the Soviet régime for a long period used to encourage anti-Chinese traditions which are rather deep-rooted among the Kirghiz. The history of the struggle between the Kirghiz and China is summarized in the epic work *Manas*, the 'Iliad of the steppe', as the Kazakh scholar Valikhanov describes it. *Manas* is an encyclopaedic compilation of all the Kirghiz legends and folk tales grouped around one single person, Manas, hero of countless battles against the Kirghiz' enemies, particularly against the Chinese who are depicted throughout the epic as 'terrible and dangerous opponents'.[31] In the U.S.S.R. *Manas* is considered the longest epic work in world literature; several months would be required to recite it from beginning to end. Before the October Revolution only extracts from *Manas* had been written down and the recording in written form of the complete

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Kirghizistan RP2

epic poem was due to the initiative of the Central Committee of the Kirghiz Communist Party.* 186 528

The most important Kirghiz literary work written under the Soviet régime, *The Bloodstained Years*, by Aaly Tokombayev, also has to a certain extent an anti-Chinese tinge. Tokombayev is the greatest contemporary Kirghiz poet and writer, [539] and his book, revered as a Gospel by the young Kirghiz generation, depicts the misfortunes which befell the Kirghiz people after the 1916 rising and especially the sufferings to which they were exposed in Western China where they had sought refuge. The book ends with the description of the Kirghiz returning to a new and free Russia after having been robbed of all their possessions by the Chinese authorities. The conclusions to be drawn from Tokombayev's work are that there can be no future for the Kirghiz and no solution of their problems outside Russia and without the Russian people. This is clearly stated in the advice which Adymkul – the hero – gives to his friend, Dzhunuzh:

'The Czar has been dethroned, and now, Dzhunuzh,
Follow the Russian banner and Russian march to Victory!'[83]

The 'Russian march to Victory' in Kirghizistan brought in its wake 177
among other things, a considerable measure of cultural progress em- 658
bracing native dramatic art, literature, literary translations into Kirghiz 626
poetry, etc. At the same time, however, the Soviet régime severely regimented Kirghiz cultural life and prevented it from assuming a genuinely Kirghiz national character.

The great literary purge which started in the autumn of 1946 in most parts of the Soviet Union was carried out in Kirghizistan by a predominantly Russian party bureaucracy headed by the First Secretary, the Russian Nikolay Semyonovich Bogolyubov. It was he who rebuked Kirghiz poets, writers and playwrights for having favoured in their works Kirghiz historical subjects to the detriment of those 'reflecting the life of the Soviet people'. The party leadership took particularly to task the Kirghiz theatre, for having produced historical plays and for having portrayed 'backward people, not characteristic of the Soviet epoch'.[84]

Soon after the purge of Kirghiz literature, the head of the Propaganda 626
Department of the Kirghiz Communist Party, Soronbayev, was replaced 914
by a new man. The new propaganda secretary, Orozaliev, discovered

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* After the establishment of a communist régime in China official Soviet enthusiasm for *Manas* faded away. Its folk character and its historicity were then questioned.[82] The 'revaluation' of *Manas* is, however, not only motivated by opportunist considerations but it is also connected with a general change in the party attitude towards the great literary epics produced by the peoples of the Soviet Orient. Thus from April 1951 onwards the Communist Party and its subsidiary organizations denounced the Azerbaidzhani national epic *Dede Korkud* as 'anti-popular' and 'reactionary' although previously it had been praised in the most enthusiastic terms. Just as *Manas* had been compared with the *Iliad*, *Dede Korkud* was ranked on the same level as the most ancient Russian epic *Lay of Igor's Regiment*.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 81 Soviet Union
Kirghizstan RP2
Uzbekistan RN2

Ki 626 814 more 'ideological mistakes' in the summer of 1947, this time in the field of history. He accused the Language, Literature and History Institute of the Kirghiz Branch of the All-Union Academy of Sciences of ignoring the class-struggle aspect of Kirghiz history, thus failing to show in its true light the role played by the bais, manaps and khans.

Almost identical criticisms were applied on various occasions to the works of the historians of many a Soviet nationality. However, the Kirghiz case differs from other similar cases in so far as those guilty of 'nationalist deviation' were not only Kirghiz nationalists but included two Russian scholars of Jewish origin, Professor A. Bernshtam and S. Abramson. In his book, *Outline of Kirghiz Culture*, Abramson had expressed the heretical point of view that the Kirghiz popular masses submitted reluctantly to Russian rule, whereas the upper class, the manaps, accepted it willingly. Bernshtam's offence was even graver: he had the temerity to compare one of the historic local rulers of the Kirghiz – Ormon Khan – with the Russian Czar, Ivan the Terrible, whose personality and reign occupy a place of honour in the Stalinist conception of Russian history.[30]

III. UZBEKISTAN

Uz. 101 [161] While Kazakhstan is territorially the largest of the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics, Uzbekistan has the biggest population. The ethnic group from which Uzbekistan derives its name, the Uzbeks, are 5,000,000 strong and are the largest non-Slav people of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan forms the very heart of Central Asia and is the only Central Asiatic Republic to have common borders with each of the four other republics. Both their numerical strength and their geographical position make it easy for the Uzbeks to play a leading part among the Central Asiatic peoples. Moreover, of all nationalities in Soviet Central Asia the Uzbeks have the strongest and most continuous state tradition. They had been the politically decisive force in such States as the Khanate of Kokand which had come to an end in 1875 and the Emirate of Bokhara and the Khanate of Khiva which existed until after the downfall of the Czarist Russian Empire.

Uz 669 After the collapse of Czarism the Uzbeks tried to recover what they had lost during half a century of Russian rule, and fought for some kind of statehood not only in Bokhara but throughout the territory of Turkestan, the Uzbek 'living space'. These aspirations towards national independence found an outlet in the formation of a short-lived Autonomous Turkestan Government in Kokand which collapsed in February 1918, and later on in the Basmachi movement which comprised not only Uzbeks but all anti-Soviet elements of Turkestan. The word 'Basmachi' means 'bandit' or 'robber' in the Uzbek tongue, but for anti-Soviet

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Uzbekistan RN1

Uzbek nationalists it had become identical with 'patriot' and even Uz. 'holy warrior'.[56] The hold of the nationalist-religious factor on the popu- 649 lation even after the termination of organized bandit fighting in Uzbeki- Uz. stan can best be gauged by the attitude of Uzbek Moslems towards [562] women whom the Soviet authorities, by force or persuasion, had induced to abandon the veil. In 1927-28 hundreds of these unfortunate women were killed by their own relatives for having violated one of the essential commandments of Islam.[57]

The vigorous nationalist resistance movement which existed in S.U. Uzbekistan in the years following the October Revolution, caused the 523 Moscow Government to fear that the Uzbek Soviet Republic might 625 become the point of departure for a re-unification of all Turkestani Uz. Moslems. A strong Uzbekistan might even have become a potential ally 642 of an anti-Soviet power and a threat to Russia. To prevent the Uzbeks 636 from embarking on an independent policy and developing into an 131 important factor in the destinies of Central Asia, the Soviet Government created for them the most inorganic and one might almost say the most 'crippled' of all the Central Asiatic Soviet 'States', very long and narrow in shape and with abnormally long frontiers. In the final form which it assumed after some experiments and adjustments, the republic is almost 900 miles long and 200 miles wide at its widest point. Its area is 157,000 square miles, but two-fifths of it belongs to the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakia, a thinly populated territory bordering Lake Aral.*

SAMARKAND AND TASHKENT

From the point of view of political strategy the selection of the Uzbek Uz. capital was as important as the drawing of the republic's boundaries. 633 At first the choice of the Soviet leaders fell on Samarkand, birthplace in 196 1904 of the Moslem reform movement, 'Dzhadidism', and an important centre of progressive Turkestani nationalism ever since. The Communist Party attempted to conquer Samarkand from within by making it the seat of Uzbekistan's Soviet Government.

Samarkand proved a bitter disappointment to the Bolshevik leadership. It seems that some Uzbek communist intellectuals, instead of applying themselves to the transformation of Samarkand into a bulwark of the Soviet régime, were seduced by the spirit of that old oriental city where every stone breathes Moslem tradition. After the unsuccessful experiment with Samarkand the communist Government of Uzbekistan decided to move to Tashkent in 1930.

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* Karakalpakia was, until 1930, part of Kazakhstan. For the next six years it came under S.U. the direct control of the Russian Soviet Federation. In 1936 it was included in Uzbekistan. [534] The Karakalpakians, a Turkic people, formed in 1926 but 38·1 per cent of the 300,000 inhabitants of the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. The republic further included Uzbeks (27·7 per cent), Kazakhs (28·1 per cent), Turkmenians (3·2 per cent) and Russians (1·8 per cent). 1/ [Cf. cat. 116, pp 274-275, RL Soviet Union--Analyses]

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Uzbekistan RN1

As we have already seen, the transfer of a capital always had and still has a deep political significance in Russia. This was the case with the transfer of the Russian capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg under Peter the Great and its retransfer to Moscow under the Soviet régime. The shifting of the Ukrainian capital from Kharkov to Kiev and of the Lithuanian capital from Kaunas to Vilna were likewise expressions of far-reaching changes in the countries concerned.

Uz. 639 186 513

Each city has a specific individuality of its own which is the sum total of its history, the peculiarities of its geographic location, its economic functions and the character of its inhabitants. If a town becomes a capital this individuality reflects on the essence of the State concerned. The change-over from Samarkand to Tashkent meant in practice that the essentially national Uzbek atmosphere which prevailed in the former town was to be superseded by that of a half-European international city – Tashkent. It was much easier to keep Uzbek nationalism in check from Tashkent with its strong Russian population than from Samarkand where the number of Russians was negligible.

Quite rapidly Tashkent became the seventh largest city in the U.S.S.R.; the number of its inhabitants grew from 323,000 in 1926 to 585,000 in 1939. This increase was to the advantage not of the Uzbeks, but of the Russian and international character of the city. Thus the town council of Tashkent which was elected in 1950 included but 51·3 per cent Uzbeks against 37·2 per cent Russians and 11·5 per cent representatives of other nationalities.*

SOVIET COTTON POLICY

SU. 635 185 248 Uz. 249

Soviet policy in Uzbekistan aimed not only at eliminating antagonistic political forces, but also at giving the country a definite function in Soviet economy, linking it firmly to the Russian State, and depriving it of the possibility of becoming a comparatively self-contained unit. The task assigned to Uzbekistan within the Soviet economy consisted of producing a maximum of cotton, quite regardless of the economic interests of the local population.

It would be inaccurate to describe the development of cotton-growing in Uzbekistan as an aim characteristic of the Soviet régime. Any Russian government striving to dominate Central Asia would have conducted there an active 'cotton policy'. Under Czarist rule the cotton-growing area in the territory covered by the present Uzbekistan had increased from 533,000 to 1,045,000 acres between 1902 and 1913 alone. Had the Czarist régime remained in existence it might easily have reached the target figures of Stalin's five-year plans, namely, 2,267,000 acres of cotton-growing areas in 1938 and 2,470,000 acres in 1950.

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* *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), January 7th, 1951.

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Uzbekistan RN1

UZBEKISTAN

Simultaneously with the systematic and sustained campaign for the increase of Uzbekistan's cotton production needed for supplying Soviet textile industry with adequate quantities of raw material,[1] the Soviet régime diminished the cereal-growing area of the Republic from 3,758,000 acres in 1913 to 3,595,000 acres in 1938. This development made Uzbekistan more dependent on food supplies from European Russia, the more so since the population of the Republic had risen between 1926 and 1939 by 1,850,000 or by 37 per cent. Uz. 241 439

When 2,000,000 refugees were given shelter in Uzbekistan during the Second World War, the food situation became critical and the Soviet State had to undo the arm of the official cotton policy by hastily extending grain production. 170,000 acres of Uzbek soil were even planted with sugar-beet to make up for the temporary loss of the Ukranian sugar-beet growing districts. The cotton policy was not, however, revised in the interest of the Uzbeks, but only as a temporary wartime emergency measure. S.U. 722 241 Uz. 722 241

Uzbek opposition to Soviet cotton policy had an all-national character. The peasants adhered to the slogan 'You cannot eat cotton', and it made little difference to their attitude whether they were individual or collective farmers.[28] Uzbek agronomists, cotton experts, and officials of various planning and scientific institutes in Uzbekistan showed great reluctance in encouraging the growing of cotton to the detriment of cereals, and many Russian agricultural experts seemed to have joined them in their negative attitude. Uz. 668 248

To break the 'anti-cotton movement' the central state authorities carried out a sweeping purge of cotton plan wreckers in the scientific research institutes, the cotton experimental stations and the office of the 'Uzgosplan', the Uzbek state-planning board. The immediate cause of this purge was the poor cotton harvest of 1930 when the crop was 7 per cent below that of 1915. The struggle against Soviet cotton policy extended even to the highest Uzbek party circles. There is little doubt to-day that both the Prime Minister of Soviet Uzbekistan, Faisulla Khodzhayev, and the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Akmal Ikramov, who were both in office in the late twenties and early thirties, profoundly disagreed with the central authorities over the cotton question. Khodzhayev, when defendant in the Bukharin trial of March 1938, admitted to having drawn up, with the assistance of his Government, a counter-plan to the First Five-Year Plan for Uzbekistan. 'We laid the economic plans in such a way as to have less cotton' said Khodzhayev before his judges, 'because that industrial crop more than any other was binding Uzbekistan to the Soviet Union; secondly, we planned to develop agriculture in Uzbekistan so as to extend grain farming . . . in order to be independent of Russian grain; lastly, we had planned to develop industry, road building, etc., in such a way as to be more economically Uz. 661 665 [248] [242]

[1] [Cf. category 248, p. 276, for continuity -- Analyst]

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Uzbekistan RN1.

661 independent at the end of the First Five-Year Plan of the Soviet Union,
665 than ever before.'[29]

Both Khodzhayev and Ikramov were national Bolsheviks, leaders of rival Uzbek nationalist groups within the Communist Party, who hoped to get a greater degree of independence for their Uzbek homeland. They were executed on March 13th, 1938, together with Bukharin and Rykov. Khodzhayev was the most prominent political personality Uzbekistan produced in the period between the two wars. At the age of twenty-four he had already been 'Chairman of the Council of People's Nazirs' of the People's Republic of Bokhara. Since 1925 he had been Prime Minister of Uzbekistan. At one time he had even occupied the post of President of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. As Khodzhayev and his friends had been at the head of Soviet Uzbekistan for twelve years Their 'liquidation' amounted to the disruption of Uzbek self-government.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND RUSSIFICATION

178 A partial compensation for the harm inflicted on Uzbek national
369 economy by the cotton policy was provided by the development of industry in Uzbekistan, particularly by the emergence of several new industrial towns near Tashkent. Angren is a new coal-mining centre, Leninsk produces oil, Chirchik has chemical and metallurgical industry, and Yangi-Yul (meaning 'New Road') has textile plants. These modern 'socialist' towns are growing quickly in contrast to Uzbekistan's typical oriental cities, Andizhan, Namangan, Bokhara, etc., which made hardly any progress under the Soviet régime. Industrial development was particularly marked between 1931 and 1945, when the number of industrial
[344] and office workers in Uzbekistan increased from 386,000 to 700,000. These figures include a very large number of Russians.

162 How far did Russian industrial colonization influence the overall ethnographic picture of Uzbekistan? In 1933 76 per cent of the population of Uzbekistan were Uzbeks and 5·6 per cent Russians; in other words, every eighteenth inhabitant was a Russian. Since up-to-date population statistics are lacking the only approximate indication of the present proportional strength of the nationalities of Uzbekistan is the
[260] composition of the Uzbek parliament elected on February 16th, 1947. It included 249 Uzbeks, eighty-three Russians, thirty-two Turkmenians and thirty-six Tadzhiks, Karakalpakians, Kazakhs and other nationalities.[30] Thus the Russians accounted for 20·75 per cent and the Uzbeks for 62·25 per cent. These percentages do not necessarily mean that every fifth citizen of Uzbekistan is now Russian, but this inference can by no means be excluded. The only other explanation of these figures would be that the Russians have more than their adequate share among the members of the Uzbek parliament.

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Uzbekistan RN1

While a great number of Russians are organizing Uzbekistan's industry, tens of thousands of Uzbeks are leaving their country to work in key industrial centres in other parts of the Union, where the Soviet authorities are faced with an acute manpower problem. A case in point is the Urals where Uzbeks are employed in large numbers in foundries and workshops. Uzbek migration into the Urals became such an important feature in the life of the Uzbek people that it found its expression in a literary work. The Uzbek writer, Sadyk Kalyandar, wrote a novel, *We in the Urals*, in which he described the life and work of the Uzbek workers, who far from their homeland are acquiring professional skill as blacksmiths, founders and turners.[31] The most remarkable thing about this novel is that it is the first novel of an Uzbek writer to be written in the Russian language – a landmark in Uzbek history, in Soviet nationalities policy and in the triumph of Russian civilization. It is by no means a rare feature in the U.S.S.R. that writers belonging to the minor nationalities should prefer to write in the Russian language rather than their own; but that a son of the largest people of Soviet Central Asia should follow this example is an interesting new departure indicative of the growth of Russian cultural influence achieved by the Soviet régime.

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UZBEK CULTURE UNDER TUTELAGE

On the cultural plane the Soviet régime in Uzbekistan applied the method of 'give and take'. On the one hand the Uzbeks were given such material advantages as school buildings, publishing houses, cultural institutions, clubs, etc.; in exchange the Uzbeks had to part with their traditional spiritual values, for the retention of which the Uzbek intellectual élite fought a losing battle. The liquidation of the original nucleus of Uzbek cultural leaders was as complete as the elimination of Uzbek political leaders who led the nation until 1937. Most of the prominent Uzbek poets and writers acclaimed in the first fifteen years of the Soviet régime must not be even mentioned to-day. This applies both to Uzbek communist poets, who had later become 'national deviationists', and to writers of the 'Chagatai Group' – a literary movement aiming at the revival of the ancient Uzbek literary language, the 'Chagatai' – who considered the October Revolution as a purely Russian political event and as such having nothing in common with the Uzbek nation. Among the 'liquidated' representatives of Uzbek literature was a young and remarkably gifted poet, Mekhmed Maksud Batu, at one time Minister of Education of Uzbekistan, who was arrested in 1928 as a leading figure in the secret organization 'Milli Istiklal' (National Independence).

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Probably the most treasured exhibit of Soviet cultural policy in Uzbekistan is the 'Central Asiatic State University' at Tashkent, usually

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658 874 referred to under its initials 'S.A.G.U.' Lenin personally had sanctioned the foundation of this university, which was designed to become the largest centre for the training of cadres in Central Asia and not a specifically Uzbek cultural institution. S.A.G.U. worked under the supervision of the central authorities of the Soviet State, till April 1938. Only at that date, i.e. eighteen years after S.A.G.U.'s foundation, was the Uzbek Government put in charge of it. The transference of the university to the care of the Uzbek Government took place shortly after the execution of Khodzhayev[1] and was, therefore, considered as a gesture demonstrating Stalin's confidence in the new Uzbek communist leadership which had replaced the 'national deviationists'. After the Second World War, the Central Asiatic State University was again put under the direct supervision of the central Government, following the creation of the All-Union Ministry for Higher Education.

177 874 At all stages of its development S.A.G.U. continued to be a primarily Russian institution. As late as 1940, 88 per cent of the lecturers were Russians, while the remaining 12 per cent belonged to the local Central Asiatic nationalities. The number of students from among the local population had, however, increased from 6·4 per cent in 1927, to 32·5 per cent in 1940.[illegible]

In order to compensate the Uzbeks for the Russian and international character of S.A.G.U., a special 'Uzbek State University' was set up in Samarkand in 1927. There, too, the state nation of Uzbekistan played none too impressive a part. Of 1,100 students who passed through the university in the first twenty years of its existence, only 'over one half' belonged to Asiatic nationalities, the remainder being Europeans.[illegible]

MIR ALISHIR NAVOI – SOVIET NATIONAL HERO

538 245 The Soviet Government with admirable ingenuity has exploited for its own purposes the memory of the greatest Uzbek poet, Mir Alishir Navoi. Even during the war years huge sums were lavishly spent on the construction and decoration of the 'Palace of Arts of the Soviet East' – the Alishir Navoi Theatre. Its exquisite architecture, wealth of marble facings, mural paintings, chiselled panels and cut-glass chandeliers were meant to satisfy the romantic imagination of oriental intellectuals.

538 461 577 Navoi, the founder of Uzbek literary language, who lived in the fifteenth century, was elevated to the rank of an all-Union national hero, whose effigy even appeared on a Soviet postage stamp. But for the homage bestowed on Navoi by the régime he had to give the Soviet State something in return. His task was similar to that of all Uzbek and Russian poets and writers of the present generation, namely, to contribute to the success of the five-year plans and inspire the people to greater output and industrial achievements. Navoi's name and work were linked,

[1] [Cf. category 661, pp. 217-278 for [illegible] Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Uzbekistan RN2

for instance, with the Farkhad Hydro-Electric Station ('Farkhadges'), Uz. 538
one of the largest in the whole Soviet Union. The station, which 70,000 461
Uzbeks started building in 1943, supplies electric power to new Uzbek 377
industrial enterprises and waters part of the 'hunger steppe' by raising the level of the Syr-Darya River. The dam bears the name of the hero of Navoi's master work, *Farkhad and Shirin*, who is, at the same time, the hero of Uzbek popular legends. In the official Soviet interpretation as given by the Russian writer Nikolay Tikhonov, Navoi's *Farkhad* is the 'symbol of great labour transforming, in the name of love, the earth to the benefit of the people'. Farkhad conquers mountains and forces rivers to give water to the deserts. Princess Shirin is the very heart and soul of the world, who yearns for Farkhad, the source of light and warmth.[86] The country of the Uzbeks has prided itself on possessing a mountain named after Farkhad and a river named after Shirin. The Soviet Government had every interest to pose as the executor of Navoi's legacy and to present Uzbekistan's largest hydro-electric station as the fulfilment of an old dream of the Central Asiatic peoples. The régime wisely withstood therefore the temptation of giving to the new dam the name of Stalin or Lenin.

The Navoi cult[1] also has a certain export value. Navoi, who wrote S.U.
both in 'Chagatai' and in Persian, is held in high esteem not only in 663
Soviet Central Asia but also in Afghanistan where he lived and 638
worked in the town of Herat. By using a vast propaganda machine for 648
the glory of Navoi on a scale which little Afghanistan could never afford Uz.
to imitate, the Soviet régime is able to demonstrate the cultural 639
superiority of Soviet Central Asia over Afghanistan. This cultural 640
supremacy of the Soviet Central Asiatic Republics was ostentatiously displayed in May 1948, when the Soviet Government organized a big Navoi Festival in Tashkent in the presence of Afghan and Persian delegations. The celebrations which marked the 500th anniversary of Navoi's birth were to have been held in 1941 but had to be postponed on account of the war.

The Navoi cult also offers a most welcome opportunity for showing the permanent and beneficial character of the historical links which existed and still exist between the peoples of the present Soviet Central Asia and Western Afghanistan. To the population of the latter territory it also brings home the idea that if one day the town of Herat were to be annexed by Soviet Russia, this would not mean the incorporation of an alien body into the Soviet Union, but a kind of re-union with an area with which Western Afghanistan has been intimately linked in the past.

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All problems from which Uzbekistan had suffered between the two Uz.
wars re-emerged in the war, and particularly in the post-war period, with 727
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[1] [Cf. category 11C, pp. 280-281, R1 Sov. Union -- Analyst]

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1

Uzbekistan RN1
Tadzhikstan RO1

Uz. 727 248 [601] unabated intensity. The cotton policy of the Soviet Government had still to be enforced by Draconic means. A new decree was passed in 1943 punishing 'loss of cotton' with up to ten years' imprisonment and deportation.

Uz. 186 With regard to the situation on the ideological front the party secretary, Yusupov, at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in March 1949, admitted the survival of pan-Turkic tendencies. He said nationalist mistakes were still committed by a section of the Uzbek intelligentsia and even by members of the Communist Party. 'Among the historians and experts on literature', Yusupov added, 'there are still people who completely deny the historical past of the Uzbek nation and the originality of its culture. They assert that the ancient culture (of Uzbekistan) had been brought from outside. Uzbek culture does not exist for these people . . . but only a common Turkic culture. These rootless cosmopolitans do not understand, or rather they do not want to understand, that they essentially embrace the ideology of pan-Turkism, profoundly hostile to Marxism-Leninism'.[36] It can be seen that the people of Uzbekistan still consider the partition of Central Asia into various self-contained Soviet Republics as an artificial act of Bolshevik-Russian 'divide and rule' policy.

IV. TADZHIKISTAN

S.U. 625 643 Tadzhikistan is a typical example of the discrepancy between the colossal ambitions of Soviet nationalities policy and its limited concrete possibilities.

648 Ta. [101] 642 Geopolitically Tadzhikistan is the most important of the five Central Asiatic Soviet Republics. The Kremlin brought a Tadzhik Soviet Republic into being with the clear intention of creating a source of embarrassment for Afghanistan, Persia and India. The history of Tadzhikistan must thus primarily be considered as a sub-section in the history of Soviet diplomacy.

The existence of a special Tadzhik autonomous unit, it is true, can be motivated by the fact that the Tadzhiks as a people have an individuality of their own. They distinguish themselves from the other major nationalities of Soviet Central Asia by being of Iranian and not of Turkic origin. It was in the interest of the Soviet State to over-emphasize this difference, for had the Tadzhiks freely decided their fate they would hardly have destroyed the united Moslem front in Turkestan to satisfy their special national interests.

An Autonomous Tadzhik Soviet Republic was formed on March 15th, 1925, covering the eastern part of the territory which used to belong to the Emirate and later to the People's Republic of Bokhara. On the

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Tadzhikistan R01

occasion of the establishment of the Tadzhik A.S.S.R. Stalin sent an interesting message to the Tadzhik communists outlining the great importance which Tadzhikistan was to have within the framework of Soviet policy. The message said: 'Greetings to Tadzhikistan, the new Soviet Republic of the toilers at the gates of Hindustan. I ardently wish to the whole working people of Tadzhikistan success in the transformation of their republic into a republic which will be exemplary for the countries of the East. The Tadzhiks have a rich history, their great organizing and political abilities in the past are for no one a secret. Party workers of Tadzhikistan! Raise the culture of your country, develop its economy, assist the working people in town and country, rally around yourselves the best sons of your homeland and show to the whole East that you are worthy children of your ancestors, firmly holding in your hands the banner of liberation'.[34]

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The operative words in this message are 'show to the whole East' – '*pokazhite vsemu vostoku*'. This phrase should always be borne in mind when examining the part which Tadzhikistan has been playing in Soviet policy. The message clearly indicated that Stalin wanted the Tadzhik communists to manœuvre on a national rather than on a class basis. The Tadzhik communists were to make use of their national traditions and in propagating the Soviet cause they were to stress both past glory and present achievements.

TADZHIKISTAN VERSUS AFGHANISTAN

On December 5th, 1929, the Autonomous Soviet Republic of Tadzhikistan was transformed into the seventh Union Republic. From the point of view of its internal development Tadzhikistan was hardly fit for the new status, but external events had forced the hand of the Soviet Government. King Amanullah of Afghanistan had just been desposed by an internal revolution. This was a severe blow for the Soviet Government, which rightly counted on Amanullah as a friend and ally of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government felt that the disappearance of Amanullah from the political scene had changed the balance of power in Central Asia and that it was time for a Russian counter-move. The formation of a fully-fledged Tadzhik Soviet Republic was Russia's answer to Amanullah's dethronement, calculated to annoy both the new Afghan rulers and Britain, the power which was believed to be behind Amanullah's foes. The new Soviet Republic covered an area of 55,000 square miles, nearly half of which, 25,800 square miles, is occupied by the Pamir—'the roof of the world'. The high mountain area of Tadzhikistan which has but 30,000 inhabitants became the 'Autonomous Province of Gorno-Badakhshan'.[*] ±

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[*] The bulk of that province, the Eastern Pamir (15,500 square miles), was incorporated
± [Cf. cat. 634, p.284, for footnote --Analyst]

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Tadzhikstan R01
Afghanistan AU1

S.U. 648 563 Af. 162 However small in size, Soviet Tadzhikistan could become dangerous to Afghanistan on account of the complicated ethnical problems of that country. A large part of the inhabitants of Northern Afghanistan consists, to use the official term, of 'Peoples of the Soviet Union', namely Tadzhiks, Uzbeks and Turkmenians. Soviet estimates as to the strength of these 'national minorities' vary in proportion to the amount of pressure which the Soviet Government may wish at any given moment to bring to bear on the Afghan State. In 1925 the Large Soviet Encyclopædia did not see fit to give any figures at all. In 1947 the same Encyclopædia stated that the Tadzhiks of Afghanistan numbered 2,000,000 and the Uzbeks 500,000. A new edition of the Encyclopædia published in 1950 increased the number of the Afghan Uzbeks to one million and also recorded the existence of 380,000 Afghan Turkmenians. The Soviet writer, Sofronov, who in the same year made a hasty trip by car across Northern Afghanistan, reported that there were as many as three million Tadzhiks in that country and over one and a half million Uzbeks.[37]

Soviet ethnographers have paid particular attention to the Tadzhiks of Afghanistan. They have even compiled exact figures showing their percentual strength in the various Afghan Provinces. Thus the Tadzhiks account for 24 per cent of the total population of the Herat Province, for 28·8 per cent in the Kabul Province, for nearly 46 per cent in the Kadaghan-Badakhshan Province, the immediate neighbour of Eastern Tadzhikistan, and for 23·7 per cent in the Mazar i Sharif Province which adjoins Western Tadzhikistan. In the Maimana Province, Turkmenians, Uzbeks and Tadzhiks have a combined majority.[38] These Soviet ethnographic statistics regarding Afghanistan are the more remarkable as the exact number of its inhabitants has never been satisfactorily established. There are but conflicting estimates putting this figure between 7,000,000 and 12,000,000.

S.U. 563 [648] Ta. 175 There can be no doubt that the Soviet Government aims at the creation of a Tadzhik irredenta movement. In its attempt to build up this movement Soviet propaganda operated not only with figures but also with historical facts. Soviet propaganda has always endeavoured to keep alive the idea that the Tadzhik people had been divided by an artificial process. The first step in the partition of the homeland of the Tadzhiks occurred in the middle of the eighteenth century when Afghan tribes under Akhmed Khan detached from the weak Khanate of Bokhara the Tadzhik territories south and south-west of the Amu

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Ta. 634 512 The bulk of that province[1], the Eastern Pamir (15,500 square miles) was incorporated into Tadzhikistan for the sole purpose of increasing the size of that Soviet Republic. From an ethnical point of view, however, it would have been more logical to integrate the Eastern Pamir into Kirghizistan, since its few hundred inhabitants are Kirghiz nomads. The rest of the Autonomous Province – the Western Pamir – is inhabited by three Persian tribes closely related to the people of the Badakhshan Province in Afghanistan, to which the Western Pamir belonged until 1895.

[1] [i.e. the Autonomous Oblast of Gorno-Badakhshan. Cf. cat. 634, p. 283 -- Analyst]

Darya river (Oxus). The territories which the Tadzhiks lost in the S.U.
eighteenth century comprised Balkh, the most ancient centre of 643
Tadzhik-Iranian culture. In 1895 the Tadzhiks were partitioned a Ta.
second time. In that year Russia and Britain fixed the northern frontiers 175
of Afghanistan and ceded to that country the Tadzhik-populated territories on the left bank of the Pandzha river.[39]

The Soviet Union is using the Tadzhik minority issue against S.U.
Afghanistan not exclusively as an offensive weapon but also for self- 563
protection. Tadzhik nationalism was supposed to counteract the anti- 648
Russian tendencies of Afghanistan which had made themselves felt in Ta.
many ways. Various Afghan rulers had toyed for a considerable period 186
with the idea of an anti-Russian Central Asiatic Confederation com- 648
prising Bokhara, Persia and Afghanistan. After the October Revolution, Afghan nationalists became ardent supporters of the federalist idea, and in connection with it advocated certain border changes at the expense of the young Soviet State.[40]

The last Emir of Bokhara, Alim Khan, found in Afghanistan support Ta.
for his attempts to stir up unrest in Soviet Central Asia, particularly in 649
the Tadzhik mountain regions. For several years, it is true, there had been a strong home-grown Basmachi movement which challenged Soviet rule in the remote parts of Tadzhikistan, but by 1926 the armed struggle against the Soviet régime had come to an end and without support from Afghanistan it would hardly have been revived. Anti-Soviet guerilla activities in Tadzhikistan flared up again after Amanullah's dethronement when Alim Khan's people were allowed to use Afghan territory as an operational base. The last invasion into Tadzhikistan occurred in 1931. Its leader was Ibrahim Beg, who called himself 'Commander of the Islamic Army'.

TADZHIKISTAN AND PERSIA

The Afghan aspect is but one side of the Tadzhikistan problem and by S.U.
no means the most important. Although Tadzhikistan has no common 648
frontier with Persia it has become an instrument *par excellence* for the 635
anti-Persian policy of the Soviet Government, perhaps even to a greater extent than Azerbaidzhan.

The dominant Soviet conception regarding Tadzhikistan is that it is not just an Iranian country but the heart and the head of the Iranian world. Tadzhikistan has, therefore, in the Soviet view, a clear claim to
leadership over the Persian State in particular. This claim is based on an Ta.
interpretation of Tadzhik history whose author is the First Party Secre- 186
tary of Tadzhikistan, Bobozhdan G. Gafurov, a young historian. Gafu- 814
rov's method is a simple one. He identifies the entire Iranian tradition of Central Asia with the modern Tadzhik people, the Tadzhik Soviet

Ta. 186 814 Republic and the Soviet Union. Gafurov together with another Tadzhik historian wrote a book, *The Tadzhik People in their Struggle for Freedom and Independence of their Homeland*, which is an astounding document of self-centred nationalism. Gafurov credited the Tadzhiks with having produced, twenty-two centuries ago, 'the first partisan hero in the history of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.', Spitamen, who had organized a popular Tadzhik resistance movement against Alexander of Macedonia when the latter had penetrated into the land which to-day is Tadzhikistan.[41] The historian party secretary also hailed the Tadzhiks as 'the first people of the Soviet Union' to meet the great Mongol onslaught of the thirteenth century which later swept through the whole of Russia. Above all, Gafurov told the young Tadzhiks to admire the great 'Tadzhik' rulers of the past such as Ismail Samani, 'the builder of a strong and centralized State' with its capital at Bokhara.

S.U. 563 648 Ta. 186 538 In the field of culture almost everything Iranian that is not already claimed by the Azerbaidzhani is considered part of Tadzhik culture. Originally, Soviet propaganda coined the term 'Tadzhik-Iranian culture and literature' when referring to the works of certain Persian classics. This term must now no longer be used in the Soviet Union since it has assumed a 'pan-Iranian' and 'cosmopolitan' flavour. Firdausi and other Iranian poets are now described as representatives of Tadzhik culture without any further qualification. Since the great Firdausi is a Tadzhik poet it is only legitimate to use his writings for the education of the Tadzhiks in a spirit of loyalty towards the socialist fatherland. During the Second World War, for instance, a passage taken from Firdausi's greatest work *Shahnama*, was included in a 'Letter from the Tadzhik People to the Tadzhik fighters on the front', and the image of Rustem, the hero of Shahnama and legendary defender of Iran against Turan, was repeatedly evoked by Soviet propaganda to inspire the Tadzhiks in the fight against the Germans.

Of course, there are certain Persian poets whom the Soviet régime cannot, for geographical reasons, claim for Tadzhikistan, for instance, Hafiz and Saadi, who were born in Shiraz; but they are considered as part of the Tadzhik national patrimony for ideological considerations. Both Hafiz and Saadi, said a Tadzhik Soviet poet, Mirzo Tursun-zade, had opposed reactionary Islam and the reactionary Persian State has, therefore, no right to their heritage. The Iranian classics, even if they are not considered as Tadzhik classics, will thus be held as a trust by the Tadzhiks. This task of the Tadzhiks is, however, only a temporary one since, according to Tursun-zade, 'the day will come when the time of reaction will end in Iran and the Tadzhik people will hand back to the Persians their poets in all their original greatness and splendour'. The secretary general of the Union of Soviet Writers, Alexander Fadeyev, carried this idea even further when he said that the Tadzhiks [illegible]

21s Kolarz J-4 (no date) 195? R1 Soviet Union R1
Tadzhikstan R01

ultimately educate the Persians in Persian culture.[62] In the Soviet view S.U
the 'education' of the Persians must not be confined to matters of 648
culture. Tadzhikistan must also give a political lead to the Persian 563
people. The idea of Persia's political re-education was systematically Ta.
propagated by Abulkasim Lakhuti, a Persian communist revolutionary 186
who became 'National Poet of Tadzhikistan'. Lakhuti fled to Russia in 528
1922 after having organized an unsuccessful uprising in Tabriz. The
poetry which he wrote in the Soviet Union was one continuous instigation to revolt addressed to the peoples of the Orient, the Persians in
particular. Lakhuti's appeals reached a climax in the poem written Ta.
during a visit to the famous Ukrainian hydro-electric station, the [529]
'Dnieproges':

And I see: the soil of Shiraz is
Soaked in oppressors' blood,
While a brother of the Dnieproges
Stems the Karun* river's flood.
The Ukraine has won her freedom:
Leninism backed her stand.
Iran one day will also be
A free, a Soviet land.

TADZHIKISTAN AND INDIA

Lakhuti's poetry leads on to the third aspect of the Tadzhikistan S.U.
problem: India. Lakhuti, Tursun-zade and several other Tadzhik poets 648
have largely specialized in 'Indian affairs'. This is hardly surprising 635
since Stalin had described Tadzhikistan as the 'Soviet Republic at the gates of Hindustan' and thus given a hint that the Soviet Union must use the Tadzhiks in its attempts to influence the Indian situation.

It seems that the Soviet Government has for a long time shared the belief of the Czarist régime that India was the point where Russia could deal a deadly blow at British power and British prestige. In practice, Soviet Russia could do very little, if anything, to shake British rule in India and the expectations in this direction which were connected with the foundation of the Tadzhik Soviet Republic were more than unjustified. Britain's withdrawal from India finally frustrated the anti-British plans which the Soviet Government had cherished with regard to Tadzhikistan.

After India and Pakistan had acquired dominion status the 'anti- S.U.
imperialist' propaganda campaign conducted from Tadzhikistan was 648
changed into one directed against 'feudal' and 'bourgeois' India itself. 635
The most important literary propagandist of the new trend is Ta.
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* The Karun river in South-west Persia runs through the concession area of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Tadzhikistan R01

SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

S.U. 648 635 Ta. 208 648

M. Tursun-zade who, in 1948, was awarded a Stalin prize for a collection of Soviet propaganda poems on India. In one of the prize poems, *The Hanging Garden of Bombay*, Tursun-zade invites mankind and, it would seem, particularly the Indians, to join the Tadzhiks in 'the sunny garden of communism'.

Tadzhikistan's mission with regard to India was an absurdity not only because a country of 1,500,000 inhabitants cannot easily influence the development of the huge Indian sub-continent, but also because internal conditions in Tadzhikistan were by no means attractive from the democratic nationalist Indian point of view.

Ta. 178 361 568

Statistically, it is true, Tadzhikistan could present a splendid record. It could easily be proved that Tadzhikistan had made tremendous cultural and economic progress when compared with the situation prevailing under the rule of the Emir of Bokhara. When Soviet propagandists speak of Tadzhikistan they mention in particular the town of Stalinabad, the capital of the republic, as a specially striking example of the advance which the Tadzhiks experienced under Bolshevism. Between 1927 and 1939 Stalinabad increased the number of its inhabitants from 5,607 to 82,500, and grew from a dirty wretched township into a fairly modern city with handsome white buildings, with theatres, a university and even an 'Academy of Sciences'. This was a great achievement, but could it impress India? Could it impress India that Soviet power had built in the land of the Tadzhiks not an Asiatic town but an international, if not altogether predominantly Russian, city? With its large number of Russian officials, its Russian, Ukrainian and Jewish specialists and experts of all kinds, and its Russian party secretary, Stalinabad has become a particularly poor example of Asiatic home rule under the Soviet régime.

TADZHIK NATIONAL OPPOSITION

Ta. 186 661 665

A fair assessment of Tadzhikistan's potentialities as a propaganda weapon is possible only by taking into account the strength of the Tadzhik national opposition and the manifold difficulties which the Soviet régime had to face in the 'Seventh Soviet Republic'. The social and political struggle which was going on in Tadzhikistan in the inter-war years represented a serious obstacle to the realization of the ambitious plans which the Soviet Government conceived for that country.

The end of 1933, the fourth year of the republic's existence, saw the first big crisis of 'Tadzhik Independence'. Both the President of Tadzhikistan, Nasratullah Maksum, and the Tadzhik Prime Minister, Abdurakhim Khodzhibayev, were then removed from office by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party. Simultaneously

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union
Tadzhikistan R01

the entire leadership of the Tadzhikistan Communist Party was replaced 186
because of 'lack of vigilance'. Maksum and Khodzhibayev were charged 665
with having followed a national-Tadzhik instead of a communist policy 661
Actually, Maksum had consistently advocated the expulsion of all Russians from Tadzhikistan while Khodzhibayev had cherished the project of a 'Greater Tadzhikistan' to be achieved not at the expense of Afghanistan – a plan which might have been viewed with favour by Soviet authorities – but at the cost of the Uzbek Provinces of Surkhan-Darya, Bokhara, Samarkand and Fergana. In addition both were found guilty of denying the existence of class differences within Tadzhikistan and thus of readiness to co-operate with kulaks, bais and former officials of the Emir of Bokhara. This unorthodox attitude of the two Tadzhik communist leaders became particularly objectionable during the Ibrahim Beg incursion of 1931, when they tried to set up a kind of coalition of national unity and put anti-communists, members of respected and influential Tadzhik families, at the head of fighting detachments.

Above all, however, the two leaders$^{1}_{\wedge}$became the scapegoats for the 661
unsatisfactory progress of the collectivization and agricultural settle- 423
ment policy. They had failed to fulfil the state plan providing for the 167
agricultural settlement of 45,000 Tadzhik families. The Tadzhik Government had satisfied the land hunger of only 15,000 smallholders; many of the remaining 30,000, disappointed by unfulfilled Soviet promises of land, emigrated to Afghanistan. This action involved a considerable loss of prestige for the Soviet power.[43]

The difficulties of the central Government in Tadzhikistan did not 661
end with the crisis of 1931–33 which led to the 'unmasking' of a 665
Tadzhik nationalist group operating under the guise of communism. In 1937 a second team of Tadzhik leaders were discovered to be traitors; this time they were no longer branded as 'national deviationists' but, according to the fashion of the day, as 'Trotskyites' and 'Bukharinists'. The new opposition was also headed by a Prime Minister – Abdullah Rakhimbayev – and a President – Shotemor. This new set of 'enemies of the people' also included the People's Commissar for Local Industry, Kurbanov, the People's Commissar for Education, Khasanov, and his deputies, three secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and others.[44]

The purges$^{1}_{\wedge}$brought about the virtual collapse of Tadzhik self- 642
government from which the country has not yet recovered. Home rule 665
has remained a fiction in Tadzhikistan even more than in the other Central Asiatic Republics. There are few Tadzhik communists in whom the Bolshevik party leadership has genuine confidence, and the régime prefers, therefore, to put Russians in charge of party and state offices, not only in Stalinabad but also in the provinces of the little republic,

1 [Cf. category 661, pp 288-289--Analyst]

Tadzhikstan R02
Turkmenistan RM1

Ta. 642 665 as well as in the Autonomous Province of Gorno-Badakhshan. Wherever a Tadzhik occupies a leading post there is a Russian nearby to check his actions. These Russians are usually disguised as 'assistant' or 'deputy' or 'secretary'. Supervision by Russian communists in the post-war period,1 was the more vital from the viewpoint of the régime since anti-Soviet feelings manifested themselves in the country in various ways, by the revival of the 'religious prejudices' among the common people, by the existence of pan-Iranian tendencies among a section of the intellectuals and by peasant resistance against the Soviet cotton policy. Ta. [668]

V. TURKMENISTAN

Tu. 75 Turkmenistan, which is almost as big as France, is the youngest of all Russian Central Asiatic colonies. The greater part of Turkmenistan's territory was conquered during the Turkmenian war of 1879–80, while South-east Turkmenistan, with the town of Merv, was occupied as late as 1884, almost twenty years after the capture of Tashkent.

TURKMENISTAN'S CRUCIAL PROBLEM – IRRIGATION

S.U. 312 185 Tu. 312 Both Russian authorities and Russian experts realized at once that the military conquest of the country was nothing compared with the second part of the task facing Russian imperial policy in Turkmenistan: the conquest of the desert. Nine-tenths of the territory which to-day forms the Turkmenian S.S.R. is covered by the Kara Kum desert. It is clear that Turkmenistan can become a real economic asset for Russia only after the realization of a bold irrigation scheme which will transform the desert sand into fertile soil. The possiblity of building a canal across Turkmenia was, therefore, studied almost as soon as Russian rule was extended over the country. The first canal scheme, the 'Project Glukhovsky', was published as early as 1893. It suggested the establishment of a waterway connecting the lower course of the Amu Darya river with the Caspian Sea.

S.U. 312 185 654 Tu. 312 185 At the beginning of the twentieth century the question of the Transcaspian Canal, as it was then called, attracted an increasing interest in both official and scientific circles. New detailed projects were submitted to the Government, one by the economist, Sazonov, another by Colonel Yermolayev, a third by Morgunenkov. Great attention was paid in particular to the Sazonov project which forty prominent personalities, geographers, botanists, members of the State Council and high officials studied at a special conference in 1906. Soon after the October Revolution Professor Rizenkampff came out with another project which he published under the auspices of the 'Supreme Economic

1 [Cf. category 665, pp. 289-290--Analyst]

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 81 Soviet Union 81
TURKMENISTAN RM2

Council'.[68] Until 1947 no practical steps had been taken to launch a serious offensive against the Turkmenian desert or to make use of the research work which Russian scientists had been pursuing for half a century. In 1947 the Soviet Government decided to build the 'Great Kara Kum Canal', to run from the middle course of the Amu Darya to the rivers Murgab and Tedzhen. The canal was to be 410 miles long and was intended to irrigate large tracts of Southern Turkmenistan. In 1950, however, the Soviet Government decided to transfer the priority in their schemes for the irrigation of Turkmenistan, from the south to the north of the country. Apparently without abandoning the project of the 'Great Kara Kum Canal', the Government announced a further plan for the construction of a 'Main Turkmenian Canal', of a length of 600 miles, in Northern Turkmenistan. This canal is to link the lower course of the Amu Darya with Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Sea.

S.U. 312 185 654 Tu. 312 185

All canal projects worked out under the Czarist régime had made the point that the opening up of the country to Russian colonists was one of the main aims of the irrigation plan. The many Soviet statements issued about the 'Main Turkmenian Canal' make no direct reference to the manpower problem as it will present itself in Turkmenistan after the completion of the big scheme. It is obvious, however, that the manpower requirements of the country will be considerable, for the new irrigated Turkmenistan will be able to enlarge not only its tillage area, but also its industry, thanks to the new hydro-electric stations which will be built at the same time as the canal.

S.U. 312 166 Tu. 167 464

Who will work on the new farms, who will man the new factories, the new Machine Tractor Stations? To judge by the figures, it is not the Turkmenians who will reap the benefits of the great canal which carries their name so much as the European immigrants. According to the Soviet census of 1939, there were but 811,000 Turkmenians in the Soviet Union of whom about 770,000 were living in Turkmenistan. They were not in a position, even before 1939, to satisfy the manpower requirement of Turkmenistan's oil and cotton industries, and Russians were thrown in to fill the gaps. A large number of European, i.e. Russian and Ukrainian workers were concentrated also in the port of Krasnovodsk, 'the maritime gateway of Soviet Central Asia'.[69]

Tu. 161 464 563

As late as 1926 Russians formed 5·8 per cent of Turkmenistan's population, whilst the various Turkmenian tribes totalled 77·9 per cent, Uzbeks accounted for 9·8 per cent and the balance was divided up between Tartars, Kazakhs, Persians, Armenians and others. By 1939 the proportion of the Turkmenians in the population of the Turkmenian S.S.R. had dropped to 70 per cent but in the political life of the country the role of the Turkmenian people was smaller than this percentage might indicate. Thus, in the parliament of the republic, the Supreme Soviet, the Turkmenians accounted in 1938 for only 55 per cent of the

Tu. 162 446 [555]

members. Thirty per cent of the others were Russians, 9 per cent were
162 Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Jews and 6 per cent belonged to various
646 Asiatic minorities.[illegible] The composition of the Supreme Soviet elected in
[illegible] 1947 was more favourable to the Turkmenians. Its members comprised only 22·2 per cent of Russians, 12 per cent of Ukrainians, Byelorussians and other minorities, while 65·8 per cent of all the deputies were Turkmenians.[illegible]

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The predominantly urban character of the Russian-Ukrainian immigration into Turkmenistan has led to a sharp increase in the percentage of the town population, from 13·7 per cent to 33·2 per cent between 1926 and 1939. Following the construction of the 'Main Turkmenian Canal'+ European immigration is likely to be less one-sided in character, since farmers will be needed in large numbers for the cotton-growing collective farms which will be established on the newly irrigated land.

GREATER TURKMENISTAN

Not only will irrigation alter the economic life of Turkmenistan and change its ethnographic composition, but it will also affect the relations of Russia with Turkmenistan's neighbours – Afghanistan and Persia.

The attraction exercised by Turkmenistan on Western Afghanistan and North-western Persia is bound to grow in proportion to the increased Russian financial and manpower investments in the irrigated Turkmenian areas. At the same time the Soviet Government will be increasingly tempted to bring stronger political and economic pressure to bear on the territories bordering Turkmenistan in the south.

The progress of the Turkmenian irrigation project might create between Russia and Afghanistan a relationship similar to that existing between Egypt and the Sudan. Russia might be compelled to covet full control over the Amu Darya, for not only does the river's upper course flow through Afghanistan, but its middle course, along a stretch of several hundred miles, forms the frontier between Russia and Afghanistan.

Once provided with an adequate irrigation system Turkmenistan may, in addition to contributing to the break-up of Afghanistan, exert as great an attraction on Persia as Soviet Azerbaidzhan. Just as Soviet propaganda originating from the Azerbaidzhan Republic and the economic development of the latter fostered autonomist and separatist trends in North-western Persia, so a prosperous Turkmenistan would indubitably lead to the development of centrifugal tendencies in the Persian provinces of Khorazan and Asterabad. It is quite likely that following a new influx of Russian colonists into Turkmenistan, Turkmenians, who may easily become a minority in their own country, will

+ [Cf. category 312, p.291--Analyst]

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkmenistan RM1

have but little say in the running of the republic's economy. Neverthe- 600
less, in the interest of the Soviet Empire they might be permitted to play a part in the complex Middle Eastern and Central Asiatic struggle for power, in which the deep-rooted anti-Persian and anti-Afghan national traditions of the Turkmenians would be used to the full. The Turkmenians of Turkmenistan might be offered the opportunity of appealing to their 'brothers' beyond the border, particularly to those living in the Khorazan Province, whose national consciousness, while still underdeveloped at the present stage, would increase with the economic and cultural progress of the Soviet Turkmenian 'motherland'.

A campaign for the 'Union of all Turkmenians in one National State' Tu
would find its ideological foundations already laid. Soviet research into 663
Turkmenian literature discovered that the border area of Persian 648
Khorazan played an important role in Turkmenian literary history. Tu.
Thus the greatest poet of the Turkmenians, Makhtumkuli (1733-82), 538
the 'Turkmenian Pushkin' as he is called in the Soviet Union, was buried in Persian territory on the bank of the river Gurgan. The valley of the Gurgan, it is said, presents a 'particularly great interest' for students of Turkmenian literature. The remains of Makhtumkuli's father, the poet Azadi, rest in a grave 'thirteen kilometres inside Iranian territory'. The nephew of Makhtumkuli, Zelili, another outstanding representative of 'classical Turkmenian literature' spent the last years of his life in the Gurgan valley.[49] On the strength of the above-mentioned facts North-eastern Persia could easily be proclaimed one day 'the cradle of Turkmenian culture' and styled 'Southern Turkmenistan' along with the term 'Southern Azerbaidzhan' which has already found its way into the Soviet vocabulary.

POLITICAL AND LINGUISTIC OPPOSITION

The Soviet régime proved, however, unable always to direct Turkmenian Tu
nationalism and national literature into those channels where they were 669
best suited to assist Russian state interests.

Soviet sources have openly admitted that a strong nationalist Turkmenian organization was in existence at least between 1922 and 1931. This organization was said to be particularly active after 1927, when it prepared an armed rising against the Soviet power. The organization had its ramifications in the Turkmenian Government, and two of its members, the Minister of Education, Boriev, and the Supply Minister, Ak Murad Orazov, were charged with aiming at the establishment of an independent Turkmenian State under British protection.[50]

A very tense situation also existed in Turkmenistan in the middle Tu.
of the thirties when, according to official Soviet sources, a widespread 668
opposition movement developed which was both nationalistic and reli-

668 gious in character. The Turkmenian organization, 'Turkmen Azatlygi' ('Turkmenian Freedom'), it seems, carried out 'terrorist and diversionist acts'. The official version said that the Turkmenian nationalists and saboteurs of collectivization in Turkmenistan were protected by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmenian S.S.R., Nederby Aitakov, one of the thirty sponsors of the Stalin Constitution of 1936.[61] He was executed soon after having added his signature to the constitution project.

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538 To build up a pro-Soviet Turkmenian literature was a particularly difficult task which faced the Bolshevik Party. The most prominent Turkmenian writers, including Berdy Kerbabayev, the Chairman of the Union of Soviet Writers of Turkmenistan, had joined in the early thirties the ranks of the anti-Soviet Turkmenian nationalists who were fighting for an independent Turkmenian State. Kerbabayev was able to escape the fate which 'traitors' like him had to expect under normal circumstances. The Soviet leadership decided to pardon him and his friends and offer them the opportunity of 'repenting'. This was done not out of humanitarian considerations but in recognition of the fact that there were no alternative poets available who could have replaced Kerbabayev and other nationalist representatives of Turkmenian literature. Kerbabayev fulfilled the expectations which the régime had put in him. He publicly expressed 'shame and bitterness' at his anti-Soviet conduct. This is what Kerbabayev confessed during a congress of Turkmenian writers held in 1934 on his behalf and on behalf of other nationalist-minded writers: 'We too have succumbed to the influence of those counter-revolutionary nationalist elements who exploited our national feelings and recruited us for their work'.[62] Ever since his public repentance Kerbabayev has been a reliable supporter of Soviet rule in Turkmenistan, although as late as 1946 he used to be reprimanded for lack of vigilance and complacency.[63]

191 The political complications which the Soviet régime encountered in Turkmenistan were reinforced by difficulties on the 'linguistic front'. As the Turkmenians are geographically nearer to the Anatolian Turks than any other people of Central Asia, pan-Turkic ideas were bound to become popular with their intellectual élite. A number of Turkmenian intellectuals were even convinced that a Turkmenian literary language was altogether superfluous and that Anatolian Turkish should be introduced in Turkmenistan.

All attempts to replace Turkmenian by Turkish having been stigmatized as 'counter-revolutionary' the Turkmenian intellectuals were forced to concentrate on the creation of a Turkmenian literary language but these efforts too were criticized. Thus for a long time complete 'linguistic anarchy' prevailed in Turkmenistan. A Russian scholar, Professor A. Potseluyevsky, asserted that this anarchy was systematically